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1 Introduction
1.1 Theme 
Climate change has primarily belonged to the national and international level as a 
democratic governance issue, with the Kyoto agreement being the main institutional 
apparatus for handling the problem. During the 1990s however, local climate policy 
and planning was established as a distinct policy field of its own and it has become 
evident that local level action can be an important supplement to climate change 
actions at other levels of governance (Collier and Löfstedt, 1997; Bulkeley and 
Betsill, 2003; Lindseth, 2004).
The local level is the main focus of this thesis1. However, the opportunities and 
constraints for climate protection are not shaped within the ‘local’ (Bulkeley and 
Betsill, 2003). This thesis assesses the role of local climate protection in light of 
emerging forms of multi-level governance. I address climate change at the local level 
considering its interplay with other levels, and aim to illustrate the connections 
between the global and the local in terms of governance structures and how actors 
understand and ‘frame’ the climate problem in terms of geographical scales. This 
thesis describes how the climate issue is translated as an abstract and diffuse problem 
into particular political constituencies. It discusses what makes the problem solvable 
in a local context, ways in which the issue can be organised, and cities that are 
motivated around specific problem definitions (‘frames’).   
This thesis builds on a social constructionist perspective of the environment. I not 
only argue that there is a choice as to how the climate problem should be solved, I 
also argue that environmental problems do not materialise by themselves. 
Environmental arguments might seem factual and scientific but the fact that the 
destruction of forests receives attention at a specific place and time, “cannot be 
deduced from a natural natural-scientific analysis of urgency, but from the symbols 
and experiences that govern the way people think and act” (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005, 
1 With local, I come to mean the municipal level, often just refereed to as the ‘city’ and the 
‘municipality’. 
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p. 176). Basic concepts like nature, the environment, and sustainability are always 
contested. Nature has to be made intelligible; without such an interpretative process it 
would be hard to solve environmental problems at all. A social constructionist 
perspective on the environment studies the mechanisms that lead to the agreement on 
what constitutes an environmental problem (Bäckstrand, 2001, p. 32).  
The theoretical perspective in the thesis is a discourse approach. I draw to a large 
degree on the work of Maarten M. Hajer. Hajer (1995, p. 44) defines discourse as, 
[…] a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, 
and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities.  
I aim to contribute to a better understanding of how discourse can be used in 
environmental policy analysis. I highlight the embedded and contextual nature of 
global environmental issues, and the “constitutive role of discourses” in shaping 
identities and attitudes (cf. Macnaghten and Urry, 1998, p. 93). I argue that such a 
perspective is needed in the study of environmental politics in general and climate 
change specifically. Numerous studies show that people are concerned about 
environmental values, but still do not see these values as having much impact on their 
daily lives. It is suggested that understanding more of how perceptions and ideas 
about the environment are shaped is of vital importance for the political space to 
initiate climate policy (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998).
In particular, discourse allows for conceiving scales in environmental politics. The 
concepts ‘scales’ and ‘scaling’ makes it possible to capture “the migration of the 
political from national government to multi-actor multi-level forms of governance” 
(Feindt and Oels, 2005, p. 170). There are few references to scale and the politics of 
scale in studies of environmental policy and planning (Bulkeley, 2005). When it is 
mentioned in the literature, there is a failure to recognize scale as socially constructed: 
Scale is seen as synonymous with the “nested territorial containers within which 
social and political life take(s) place” (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 876). In this thesis I 
highlight how a clear distinction between issues located at different political levels is 
problematic and argue that we need a better spatial grammar to comprehend 
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environmental governance. I have come to understand ‘scale’ as a contested concept 
where what constitutes a geographical scale and what the relationships between 
particular scales are both up for discussion. Scales can be hierarchical, ranging from 
households to community to local to regional, etc., but scales are also often seen in 
terms of webs of networks and relations, where the local extends into the global, and 
the global penetrates the local (e.g., Cox, 1998). Keil and Debbanè (2005) argue that 
scale is shaped by particular discourses, and that we need to understand policy 
processes and outcomes in environmental politics on the basis of which geographical 
scale solutions are sought.
From an environmental perspective it is particularly interesting to discuss whether the 
(constructed) scales of an issue fit the level of governance where the problem is 
placed (e.g., Young, 2002). Cash and Moser (2000) discuss the ways in which 
environmental problems belonging to or placed at a specific institutional level 
correspond to the geographical dimensions of the particular problem. This is 
particularly relevant in a climate change context. Can climate change be demarcated 
ontologically to a specific scale as an environmental problem? Climate change has 
generally been treated as a case of global environmental change (Young, 2002). With 
local level actors taking responsibility for climate change however, it can be argued 
that they are changing the nature of the problem. The world’s climate is an 
interdependent global system. However, to apply the term ‘global’ to the causes and 
effects of global warming is more problematic (Lutes, 1998). For instance, the 
international network Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) argue that 
cities are both a part of the climate problem (since cities are a major source of 
greenhouse gases emissions) and a part of the climate solution (since success in 
climate change action will depend on concerted local action) (see Lindseth, 2004).
I argue in this thesis that the ways in which different actors relate to and use scales in 
their political argumentation have consequences for the outcome of political struggles. 
It will be shown how ‘local’, ‘national’ and ‘global’ must be understood not just as 
arenas where political struggles play out, but as discursively constructed concepts that 
consciously and unconsciously are used as a means of power in political processes. In 
particular this thesis studies the discourse I call ‘thinking globally’. This discourse 
argues that climate policy should help to internationally secure the most cost-effective 
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reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Such an understanding limits the need for 
domestic reductions; rather than prioritising unilateral emission reductions, it is 
argued that Norway could contribute to reducing the total global emissions through its 
relatively clean petroleum activities (Hovden and Lindseth, 2004). I show how this 
discourse has been employed both nationally and locally with great success, and how 
the dominance of this discourse captures an important trend in environmental 
governance. Multilevel governance is a reality that local level actors will meet in their 
aim to work for climate protection. I argue, however, that there is a choice as to what 
extent and how one should include the local level of governance in any kind of 
governing process. The thinking globally discourse is a severe challenge to local and 
national actors that aim to take responsibility for local and national emissions, since 
they can be met with the argument that what really matters are the global emissions. 
Later in this introduction (section 4.1) I provide further discussion on this matter.  
The issue that underlies many of my discussions is that of governance, specifically 
environmental governance. The governance concept is highly contested and defined in 
many different ways. Traditionally, governance has connoted “the act or process of 
governing”, though recent theories have expanded the concept to include many forms 
of steering (Lafferty, 2004, p. 5). Today, ‘governance’ often refers to a set of practices 
where stakeholders and civil society organisations are involved in addition to 
government bodies and experts in policy formulation and implementation (Hajer and 
Wagenaar, 2003; Berger, 2003). In two of the articles in this thesis I elaborate on the 
governance concept (‘Multilevel’ and ‘Kristiansand’) and in section 4.3 I provide a 
broader discussion on the vertical and horizontal dimensions of governance.  
The introduction (Part I) of this thesis ends with a discussion of ‘discursive 
strategies’. This thesis aims to illustrate the complexities of climate change 
governance and contribute to a constructive debate on how actors can be better 
equipped to tackle the problems at hand. Inspired by the work of Yvonne Rydin 
(2003) I try to assess how specific discourses can be used as a tool in policy and 
planning. I argue that an economic, communicative, and scientific rationality infuse 
processes of environmental policy and planning and that a better understanding of 
how these rationalities frame particular contexts is important in reaching sustainable 
development.  
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1.2 Research questions
The overall aim of this thesis is to use a discourse approach to understand climate 
politics and policy at the local level of governance. I show how discourse analysis is a 
tool well suited to comprehend and enhance our understanding of the climate politics 
process. My study emphasises that the ways in which climate change and 
environmental issues in general are understood locally are quite complex and 
relational, and that discourses play a role in both mediating environmental disputes 
and causing specific political outcomes. The articles in the thesis do rely on a broad 
understanding of the discourse concept. Rather than concentrating on how discourses 
can be defined or the differences between the discourse concept and other related 
concepts, I see discourse as an overarching framework partly covering or 
encompassing other related concepts (e.g., ‘ideas’, ‘knowledge systems’, ‘frames’). 
The main point is not how to define these concepts, but how they become useful in the 
particular cases at study.
The geographic focus in the thesis is primarily Norway, and climate policy and 
planning in Norwegian municipalities. In order to say something about the conditions 
for local climate protection2 in Norway, this thesis also includes national climate 
policy in Norway, international experiences with local climate planning, and 
discussions on climate change as a form of multilevel governance. My conclusions 
primarily concern the Norwegian context and are primarily valid for the Norwegian 
context. However, through studying international experiences with local climate 
protection, I compare the Norwegian case to a broader context thereby aiming to bring 
forward knowledge that applies outside Norway.
The thesis’ main research question is: What is the role of discourse in the intersection 
between levels of governance in climate change politics and policy? 
This question is divided into the following four sub questions: 
2 In this thesis I will come to understand the concept ‘climate protection’ as overlapping the more 
general concepts of climate politics or climate policy. The concept is to a large degree made familiar 
and publicly known through the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign.  
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1. Which discourses – at which levels and scales – can be identified in climate 
politics?
2. What is the role of discourse in influencing policy? 
3. How are governance relations changing in climate politics?
4. How can discourse analysis be further developed as an approach for analyzing the 
relationship between scale and multi-level governance in policy analysis? 
The thesis is a collection of six articles that discuss how climate change is translated 
and made relevant in a local (and national) context. I show multiple ways of framing 
environmental issues and controversies and my articles provide a closer reading of 
local environmental conflicts to see how these conflicts are played out. Since this is a 
collection of articles each with independent aims and objectives, each article 
addresses the four different sub-questions to a varying degree.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organised in two parts: the first part contains the introduction, methods 
and theory, synthesized versions of the articles and a concluding discussion based on 
the six articles. The article concept rarely gives room for broad theoretical and 
methodological discussions, thus section two in the introduction provides a broader 
discussion of these matters. Section three summarises the six different articles and 
section four provides a final discussion based on the articles. The second part contains 
the six articles. Three have been published in international peer reviewed journals, 
one is forthcoming, and two articles have been submitted. The following articles are 
included in the thesis: 
Article 1: Hovden, E., and Lindseth, G. (2004) “Discourse in Norwegian Climate 
policy: National Action or Thinking globally?”, Political Studies 52: 63–81. The 
article is reprinted with permission from Blackwell Publishing. 
http://www.blackwellpublishing.com
Article 2: Lindseth, G. (2004) “The Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) 
and the framing of Local Climate Policy”, Local Environment 9 (4): 325–336. The 
9
article is reprinted with permission from Taylor & Francis Group. 
http://www.tandf.co.uk
Article 3: Lindseth, G. (2005) “Local level adaptation to climate change: Discursive 
strategies in the Norwegian context”, Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 7 
(1): 61 – 84. The article is reprinted with permission from Taylor & Francis Group. 
http://www.tandf.co.uk
Article 4: Lindseth, G. (2006) “Scalar strategies in climate change politics: debating 
the environmental consequences of a natural gas project”, forthcoming in 
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy. The article is printed with 
permission from Pion Ltd. http://www.pion.co.uk/
Article 5: Aall, C., Lindseth, G. and Groven, K. (2006) “Multilevel governance and 
local climate planning in Norway”, submitted to Global Environmental Politics. To be 
published with a substantial revision. 
Article 6: Lindseth, G. and Reitan, M. (2006) “The urban governance of transport and 
the environment in the city of Kristiansand”, submitted to Journal of Environmental 
Planning and Management. 
A brief orientation of how the articles relate to each other follows. The national debate 
is important for local work on climate protection. Climate change evolved as a 
specific challenge for politics in the end of the 1980s. ‘Norwegian climate policy’ is a 
reading of the frames into which climate change was set in Norway. Although this 
article does not address the local level, it does provide an important entry point to 
understand the politics of scale and the challenges of reconciling climate change with 
petroleum production. This issue is discussed in more detail in the ‘Stavanger’ article. 
I show here a clear similarity between these two cases in how climate change has been 
framed, and how the dominating discourse of ‘thinking globally’ is also important in 
structuring the local debate in Stavanger. Research questions 1 and 2 are mainly 
addressed by these two articles.
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The ‘Kristiansand’ article and the ‘Multilevel’ article both address the more explicit 
issue of ‘governance’. Climate protection was an important background for the Land 
use and Transport project (ATP) studied in the ‘Kristiansand’ article. Transport is also 
a major contributor to global warming, both in Kristiansand and in an international 
context. Although the climate issue surrounds this case, the ‘Kristiansand’ article does 
not explicit discuss climate change and climate governance. The focus is on how the 
transport issue is reconciled with a broader environmental agenda in an inter-
municipal and a partnership governance structure. The ‘Multilevel’ article focuses on 
vertical relations of governance, particularly the relationship between local and 
national levels. These two articles are the main source for answering research question 
3.
The ‘CCPC’ article addresses the issues of governance and policy frames. It is related 
to the ‘Norwegian climate policy’ and ‘Stavanger’ articles in that it discusses ways 
climate change can be understood in terms of scalar categories and global and local 
discourses. Moreover, it is related to the ‘Kristiansand’ article and the ‘Multilevel’
article in the sense that it accounts for network as a specific form of governance.  
The ‘Climate adaptation’ article is the cornerstone to this thesis. It has a more 
theoretical aim and brings forward an understanding of how discourse can be used as 
a tool in climate politics and planning. Though published in 2005, the article is in 
many ways a conclusion to the thesis. This article is the key source in addressing the 
fourth research question. Together with results from the other articles I use it to 
discuss how discourse analyses can be further developed to tackle the problems at 
hand.
11
2 Methodological and Theoretical Perspectives
The main methodological approach in this thesis is discourse analysis. Apart from one 
exception (cf. Aall, Lindseth and Groven, 2006), all articles to some degree rest on a 
discourse approach. A classification by Ostrom (1999) is useful to place discourse in 
the theoretical and methodological landscape. She separates between frameworks, 
theories, and models. According to Ostrom they can be separated as follows: 
Frameworks identify the most general factors of analysis as well as generic 
relationships between them. Theories specify a set of hypotheses about core elements 
and how they interact in more detail. These should be useful in explaining processes 
and predict outcomes. Models are further formalized and make more precise 
assumptions about a limited set of often quantifiable variables and how they function. 
Based on this classification it seems evident that a discourse approach does not fill the 
role of either a theory or a model. Discourse analysis is best understood as a 
‘framework’ in the sense that it points to a basic set of factors key to understanding a 
phenomenon; it argues that we should look for regularities in the text and language 
and study how this affects practice. Bäckstrand (2001, p. 47) argues that in a discourse 
perspective, empirical material cannot be used to verify or falsify hypotheses, and in 
this sense it is not a theory. Rather than being an objective standpoint in the choice 
between different theories, a discourse analysis can generate arguments in favour or 
against different theories. Bäckstrand argues that empirical data in a discourse 
analysis are best understood as arguments in a theoretical debate. In line with this, 
Ostrom (1999, p. 40) states that ‘framework’ provides “a metatheoretical language 
that can be used to compare theories”. In short, it is an approach or a method. 
The ambition of this thesis is to further understanding of climate change as a policy 
problem through referring to a variety of discursive approaches3 that include; frame
analysis, scalar analysis, and institutional-discourse analysis. These three approaches 
share a number of basic preconditions about the nature of the environmental problems 
3 I understand the concept ‘approach’ as similar to, or overlapping, the concept ’framework’. Nilsson 
(2005, p. 9) describes approaches as “sets of basic factors for research that are key to understanding a 
phenomenon”.  
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and the policy process. Even though discourse analysis is not a theory in itself, the 
present thesis is not without theoretical ambitions. In my articles I focus on empirical 
case studies of climate change politics; this data will be studied in light of discourse 
analytical frameworks and will be confronted by other kinds of research on the 
environment and the climate. In line with Bäckstrand (2001, p. 47) I aim to “advance 
an informed argument for why certain theoretical approaches are more adequate in 
answering the research problem”.  
2.1 Towards a discourse approach
The particular theoretical contribution this thesis aims to make is a better 
understanding of how discourse can be used in policy analysis. Although discourse 
analysis has been used for several decades in sociology, linguistics, and social 
anthropology, it is used only to a limited degree in political science and in policy 
analysis. In order to better understand how discourses influence the policy process, I 
begin with a reading of the context in which discourse studies developed. 
A forefather in the field, Harold D. Lasswell, defines the policy sciences in two main 
approaches: the ‘analysis of policy processes’ concerned with knowledge about the 
formation and implementation of policy, and ‘policy analysis’ concerned with 
knowledge in and for the policy process (Lasswell, 1970a in Parsons, 1995, p. 20). 
The policy analysis approach can be traced back to the war years, in particular to 
operations and techniques of economic analysis. Policy analysis as we know it today 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s in close relation with the managerial practices of 
governments (Parsons, 1995; Fischer, 2003). Policy analysis aimed to be a problem 
solver; in America it came to be associated with the Kennedy-Johnson ‘New Frontier’ 
and ‘Great Society’ programmes that called upon analytical techniques for how 
political science could solve society’s problems. Wildawsky’s (1979) ‘speaking truth 
to power’ captures a dominant belief in the early post-war period of policy analysis; 
that social science was in all essentials ‘a form of engineering or medicine’. It 
indicated a problematic relationship between those finding the true state of the world 
and those wanting to rule it, and also that knowledge of society could improve affairs 
(Parsons, 1995). Analysis of the policy process developed alongside the policy 
analysis approach in the 1960s, and concentrated on studying the role of constitutions, 
legislatures, interest groups, and public administration in the policy-making and 
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implementation process. The research set out by Lasswell, Simon, and Easton 
specified the different stages in the policy process that explained how problems are 
defined, decisions are made, and policy implemented and evaluated (Parsons, 1995). 
The dominant focus within post-war political science (i.e., Anglo-Saxon political 
science) has been ‘objective’ policy research or research based on behaviourist and/or 
rational-actor approaches (deLeon, 1998). This was viewed as the only ‘real’ basis for 
how policy sciences could develop into a model of predictive status and thereby gain 
credibility. With its logical simplicity and its ability to produce impressive empirical 
results, it is easy to see how such a natural science ideal became attractive in social 
science (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Neopositivist/empiricist4 methods came to dominate the 
social sciences, with a strong emphasis on quantitative analysis where facts were 
separated from values and the search for general results was independent of contexts 
(Fischer, 2003). Clearly, many policy writers have followed Simon (1957) in speaking 
of the policy process as one of ‘bounded rationality’: In this way it is portrayed that 
policy makers will never have sufficient knowledge about the policy process. 
However, Fischer (2003, p. 5) argues that even this understanding reveals an ideal of a 
rational model where ‘satisfactory knowledge’ is the standard offered to decisions 
makers.  
Even though rational approaches based on the natural science model continue to be an 
ideal for many of the social science traditions, a growing dissatisfaction with these 
approaches has become evident (Flyvbjerg 2001; Fischer, 2003). The social sciences 
have not delivered effective solutions to pressing societal problems nor have they 
developed into anything that resembles a predictive ‘science’ of society (Fischer, 
2003). Flyvbjerg (2001, p. 32) states bluntly:
After more than 200 years of attempts, one could reasonably expect that there would exist at 
least a sign that social science has moved in the desired direction, that is, toward a predictive 
theory. It has not. […] The difference between the natural and the social sciences seems to be 
too constant and too comprehensive to be a historical coincidence. […] We may thus be 
4 Burr (1995, p. 184) defines positivism as “the belief that we can only know what we can immediately 
apprehend. That which exists is what we perceive to exist”; and empiricism as “the view that the only 
valid knowledge is that which is derived from observation and experiment”. 
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speaking of so fundamental a difference that the same research procedure cannot be applied 
in the two domains.  
Underlying the limited success of social science in making a difference in the political 
environment of the 1960s and 70s was the problem of context (Fischer, 2003). The 
Vietnam War was an example of a constantly changing policy arena, requiring policy 
makers and analysts to consider the specific context in which policy was situated. 
After also the failure of policy analysis to inform decision-makers about energy 
politics in the 1970s, it became increasingly clear that policy analysis lacked an 
understanding of how knowledge leads to politics (Fischer, 2003). Increasingly, 
studies began to acknowledge that politics are much more complicated than assumed 
and infused with sticky problems. Majone (1989, p. 1) writes: “As politicians know 
only too well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language”. 
The early 1990s saw the development of approaches that valued the role of language 
in policy analysis. Fischer and Forester’s (1993) The argumentative turn in policy 
analysis and planning and Schön and Rein’s (1994) Frame reflection are examples of 
books that signalled a new direction in policy studies. In the 1990s numerous other 
scholars wrote about discourses in environmental politics following the pioneering 
work of Litfin’s (1994) Ozone Discourses and Hajer’s (1995) The Politics of 
Environmental discourses. During this decade this tradition developed into 
argumentative discourse analysis. The term signifies that it is more correct to speak of 
an argumentative than a linguistic turn, since the focus is on more than just the text; 
discourse analysis goes beyond the text to see how texts are situated in particular 
contexts and aims to show how language shapes reality (Hajer, 2003, p. 103).
What these and other approaches stated was that social science needed to change if it 
is to regain relevance. Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) argue that the classical-modernist 
politics (‘conceive-decide-implement’) fails to deal with the complexities of modern 
politics. In discussing planning processes, Rydin (2003) writes that policy is seldom 
the result of a rational process purely involving expert knowledge pursued in the 
public interest. Outcomes are instead more or less the product of the engagement of 
powerful actors with each other and claiming to have different assumptions about 
what is the right thing to do (Rydin, 2003, p. 3). Flyvbjerg (2001) argues that there is 
more to social sciences than what is shown in the context independent causal oriented 
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approaches. With a thorough epistemological critique post-positivist or post-
empiricist traditions have sought for an orientation that goes beyond an ‘objectivist’ 
conception of reality.
Social constructionism5 underpins to a greater or lesser degree all the different 
approaches within post-empiricism and post-positivism. Society is socially 
constructed and social and political life is embedded in a web of different practices 
reproduced through discursive practices (Fischer, 2003). Social constructionism is a 
common denominator for a number of newer theories about culture and society. Burr 
(1995, pp. 2-5) states that four different characteristics are shared by the wide variety 
of social constructionist approaches. First, they are critical of what is denoted as 
‘taken for granted knowledge’ since our world cannot be seen as ‘objective’. Second, 
humans are fundamentally historical and cultural beings and our understanding of 
what constitutes knowledge about the world is historically and culturally contingent. 
Third, our ways of understanding the world are shaped and maintained in social 
interaction. Fourth, the social construction of knowledge and ‘truths’ have social 
consequences: certain worldviews naturalise certain types of actions and discredit 
other types of action.
I have relied on these types of principle to develop a specific social-constructionist 
approach in the thesis that aims to highlight and analyse the discursive dimensions of 
social reality.6 Sabatier (1999) however, in his key review of different policy 
approaches; “Theories of the Policy Process” fails to find room for (or legitimate) a 
discourse approach. He sees constructivist frameworks as less promising because, in 
his view, they: “(a) leave ideas unconnected to socioeconomic conditions or 
institutions and (b) conceive of ideas as free-floating, that is unconnected to specific 
individuals and thus largely nonfalsifiable” (Sabatier, 1999, p. 11). In Sabatier’s 
5 Burr (1995) states that ‘constructivism’ and ‘social constructionism’ are used interchangeably in 
literature, but argues that in order to avoid confusion with the Piagetian theory and to particular 
perceptual theories, it is analytically clarifying to use ‘social constructionism’ for the approaches 
described here.  
6 All discourse approaches are also social constructionist approaches, but not all social constructionist 
theories are discourse approaches. ‘Critical psychology’, ‘deconstruction’, and ‘post-structuralism’ are 
examples of other social constructionist approaches that are not necessarily studying discourses (Burr, 
1995). Burr (1995) argues that due to vivid debates within and amongst social constructionist 
approaches, it is difficult to separate the different perspectives. For instance is it debated in the 
literature whether all post-structuralists necessarily are social constructionists. Such debates are beyond 
the scope of this thesis.   
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defence, it should be stated that discourse analysis in politics has developed 
considerably since he wrote his book in 1999. At that time however, there were 
scholars within environmental politics that addressed the specific type of issues 
Sabatier criticized discourse studies for (see Litfin, 1994; Hajer 1995). Below I 
account for discourse analysis in more detail as an approach in policy science, 
including commenting on the criticism that Sabatier has raised against social 
constructionist perspectives.
2.2 Discourse analysis: basic orientation 
2.2.1 Foucault’s legacy  
In this thesis I build on the tradition of Foucault in seeing beyond the mere linguistic 
approaches in discourse to include the broader context and the institutional practices 
where discourses are produced. In The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Foucault, 
takes as a starting point the assumption that there are a set of practices that renders 
possible production and maintenance of a set of assertions: an archive. Foucault is 
interested in the rules behind expressions accepted as meaningful and truth-worthy in 
a specific historical epoch. Foucault (1972, p. 117) defines a discourse in this way: 
We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive 
formation. [. . .] It is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of 
conditions of existence can be defined.  
A Foucaultian perspective on discourse can be characterised by four factors (Feindt 
and Oels, 2005, p. 164). The first factor is a focus on the productive functions of 
discourse. Discourses not only describe things, they also ‘do things’ through the ways 
they make sense of the world and give meanings to things. Second, power relations 
are seen as present in all kinds and forms of social interaction. Power is not first and 
foremost repressive and limiting people’s choice of action, power is also productive 
and constitutive. Third, following the previous point, discourse is both hindering and 
enabling action. Discourses are locations of struggles and negotiations. Fourth, 
discourses construct subjectivity and make people ‘governable’. Individuals are seen 
as important realms of politics, since governing the population takes place largely 
through how concepts and political problems constitute objects and subjects.  
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Most of today’s analytical perspectives on discourse follow Foucault’s7 view as 
something relatively regular that define what is meaningful, and that bring forward the 
idea that ‘truth’ is something created discursively. However, Foucault tends to focus 
on the long historical lines and regimes of knowledge that dominated each historical 
epoch. My focus in this thesis is the micro processes of discourse. I study how 
different discourses can exist side by side, and how they strive for the right to decide 
what is true or false in political debates. My approach is strongly influenced by the 
work of Maarten M. Hajer (Hajer, 1995 and also Hajer, 2003; Hajer and Wagenaar, 
2003; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005) who builds on a Foucaultian discourse approach in 
his studies of environmental politics. Hajer (1995, p. 44) defines discourse as,
[…] a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that is produced, reproduced, 
and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
physical and social realities. 
In particular Hajer has sought to develop Foucault’s perspectives and make them 
more relevant for policy studies. He argues that there is a need for a more middle 
range theory than what we inherit from Foucault, somewhere there is also room for 
individuals’ strategic action (Hajer, 1995). Through concepts such as ‘storylines’ and 
‘discourse coalitions’ Hajer has given a better account of how actors can use 
discourses as a means to work for specific aims. His work has contributed to 
understanding the roles of institutions in discourse and the way changes happen in 
politics.
Phillips and Hardy differentiate critical discourse analysis and constructionist 
discourse analysis (2002, in Hardy 2004). Hardy (2004) argues that not all researchers 
are as explicitly interested in the power dimensions as Foucault was. Whereas critical 
discourse analysis focus on bringing out the power dimensions, Phillips and Hardy 
2002, p. 416 in Hardy, 2004) state that constructionist approaches aim to shed light on 
the,
7 We can separate Foucault’s work into an archaeological and a genealogical period. In his later 
genealogical work Foucault develops a theory about power and knowledge. Instead of looking at agents 
and structures as primary categories, Foucault now focuses on power. Power is spread over different 
social practices, not something that specific agents exert over passive subjects (Phillips and Jørgensen, 
2002).  
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[…] intricate way in which discourses lead to the creation and reification of certain 
phenomena, rather than exploring who is advantaged or disadvantaged by a particular socially 
constructed ‘reality’. 
In my articles I talk about discursive power on several occasions; an important aim in 
my studies is to assess how different discourses structure political debates and cause 
specific outcomes. However, unlike critical discourse analysts (cf. Fairclough, 1992), 
I do not aim to show how discourses are ideologically invested or determined by 
relationships of power in particular institutions or contexts. More important in this 
thesis is understanding how a phenomena (climate change) is constructed as a 
particular social reality.
2.2.2 Policy as discourse 
The study of discourse gives new perspectives on how we are to understand policy 
processes and how different policy suggestions are legitimised. The key to 
understanding how actors argue or how claims of rationality are made in a case, is to 
see them as socially constructed through discourse (Rydin, 2003). Discourses consist 
of different arguments and perceptions of what is an appropriate or logical way to do 
things. These arguments and perceptions are structured in different patterns that our 
statements or utterances follow when we are placed within a particular domain, and it 
is precisely this regularity that constitutes a discourse; we are part of different 
discourses. Discourse is the use of language to express thoughts, intensions, values, 
and alternative courses of action.
In his study on the acid rain problem, Hajer (1995) emphasises how policy-making is 
an interpretative activity where different actors struggle over the meaning of a policy 
problem, and how the definition affects the ways in which solutions are sought and 
found. The process that results in a particular definition of a policy problem is seen by 
Hajer (1995, p. 22) as a ‘discursive closure’. When a problem is ‘closed’ one can 
analyse what is included in the problem and what is left out. In line with Foucault 
(1972) Hajer (1995, p. 49) argues that,
Discourses imply prohibitions since they make it impossible to raise certain questions or 
argue certain cases; they imply exclusionary systems because they only authorize certain 
people to participate in a discourse; they come with discursive forms of internal discipline 
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through which a discursive order is maintained; and finally there are also certain rules 
regarding the conditions under which a discourse can be drawn upon.  
The power of discourse is the structural constraints determined by the linguistic frame 
of reference in a debate. Politics is a discursive struggle. Furthermore, discourses are 
not independent, they are upheld by institutions and material structures; political 
struggles do not take place in a ‘social vacuum’. These structures both enable and 
constrain actors (Hajer, 1995). For Hajer, interests cannot be assumed as given; they 
are inter-subjectively constituted through discourse. It is paramount for the 
understanding of a topic or a problem approach to study what is being said or 
expressed and in which context this expression takes place. 
Through studying these discourses, we comprehend how different claims to rationality 
or standpoints are being presented and how these are related to institutional norms and 
other material and social issues that aim to legitimise policy. Discourses ‘mediate’ in 
this way between the different aspects of social life, including the interaction between 
different interests (Rydin, 2003). Discourses make possible an understanding of how 
the interaction between interests is structured, but also the dynamics in itself. This is 
an important benefit of discourse analysis: When we study different representations of 
a particular case as a discourse, we gain insights into what is presented as ‘truth’. 
These truths often hide other presentations and ideas. Such an analysis is fruitful since 
it says something about the possibilities of action and the hindrances that actors meet. 
Foucault’s objective is to uncover the structure in these different regimes of 
knowledge; the rules for what can and cannot be said, and the rules for what is truth or 
falsehood (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 13). 
2.2.3 Discourse and agency 
One of Sabatier’s (1999, p. 4) criticisms of social constructionist approaches is that 
they, “conceive of ideas as free-floating, that is unconnected to specific individuals 
and thus largely nonfalsifiable”.
Foucault indeed had an ambivalent view on the subject. Thus Hajer’s (1995) ambition 
is to show how a clearer view of individual agency can be operationalised within 
discourse analysis. Hajer understands actors as constrained by discursive structures, 
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but sees a role for actors within these discursive structures and pays particular 
attention to the concept of ‘storyline’. In Hajer’s (1995, p. 56) words a storyline is a 
“generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive 
categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena”. Finding an 
appropriate ‘storyline’ is an important form of agency. A storyline is a strategy that 
actors can use to pursue a particular agenda. Actors form ‘discourse coalitions’ around 
these storylines; not primarily based on shared interests or goals, but on shared 
concepts and terms (Hajer, 1995). These groups uphold or develop new ways of 
approaching the problem; the actors do not necessarily know each other, or may not 
even have met, but they place themselves around certain storylines or broader 
discourses which they employ when they engage in political discussion. Since 
discourses are always to some degree subject for social struggles, a role for agency 
follows (Phillips et al., 2004).  
The role of actors is still often underestimated in discourse studies. Further developing 
the actor perspective is thus an important task if discourse analysis is to be taken 
seriously in policy analysis. Hardy (2004, p. 420) argues that we,
[…] need to find new ways of contextualizing agency so that it takes into account the fluidity 
and idiosyncrasy of a discursive field, at the same time acknowledging that some actors are 
more active and consequential in creating and using texts to influence organizing processes.  
Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 181) write that discourse analysis is a study of 
regularities in language, but it does so “in the awareness that it is the actors that utter 
statements and that those actors might do so with certain tactical or strategic goals in 
mind”. We should not reduce politics to strategic behaviour, since this would make 
the actors more sovereign than they actually are. Still, it remains evident that certain 
actor groups, such as epistemic communities, have greater discursive resources and a 
better chance in reaching their goals than others in a discursive context (Hajer and 
Versteeg, 2005).
In this thesis I emphasise how actors are vital to the power of discourses, and that 
there are different ways they can influence discourse. In the way they take the power 
of discourse into account (the structural constraints determined by the linguistic frame 
21
of reference in a debate) they can exert power in discourse (e.g., design their text and 
speech in line with the assumed expectations of their audience in order to be more 
forceful) (Holzscheiter, 2005). In short, actors influence discourse through their 
production and dissemination of texts. This thesis focuses on an understanding of 
texts as “symbolic inscriptions that range from spoken, written, graphical, and 
material form” (Hardy 2004, p. 419). It follows that the context is also drawn into 
discourse analysis. I begin with the texts and the local or proximate context. To 
understand or shed light on the particular phenomena, I also extend the analysis to a 
more distal context. It is important to pinpoint that this broader context is not the 
locus of the analytic activity: this (broader context) provides insight that follows from 
the micro-analysis of the primary texts. 
2.2.4 Discourse and institutions 
The other criticism from Sabatier (1999, p.11) against social constructionist 
approaches is that they “leave ideas unconnected to socioeconomic conditions or 
institutions”.
This statement seems to have little resonance in the newer discourse literature. 
Following Foucault, a central building block is to bring out the institutional dimension 
of discourse, considering where things are said and how specific ways of seeing can 
be structured or embedded in society at the same time as they structure society (Hajer 
1995, p. 263). This perspective highlights that discourses are not just speech and text 
floating around; they have a material and institutional anchoring. Discourses are 
materialised in certain regularities: the material world (institutions, belief systems, 
‘economic laws’ etc.) resists when one tries to change it. Neumann (2001, p. 92) 
points out that understanding the social resonance and the reproduction of these 
discourses is one of social sciences’ most important tasks. The social constructionist 
perspective of discourse analysis is then not a strategy for finding out what people 
really mean, or to find out what reality is actually behind the discourse; it is based on 
the assumption that you cannot truly grasp reality without the discourses, and it is 
therefore the discourse itself that constitutes the object of the analysis. Discourse 
analysis builds on the assumptions that these social practices and structures must be 
re-presented. They become representations of reality when they are expressed through 
discourses. Rydin (2005, p. 77) even sees the rise in discourse studies largely due to 
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the problems in science of how to understand in detail how “interests, conflicts and 
outcome were represented and how this affected social interactions and policy 
processes”.
The approach used in this thesis does not deny the role of interests or institutions in 
shaping ideas. Schmidt, (2002, p. 250) in employing a discourse approach in an 
institutional analysis, states that the ideas articulated by a discourse should not be 
separated from other types of influence; neither the interests that find expression 
through discourses, the institutional interactions which shape their expression, or the 
cultural norms that frame them. Ideas often shape the interests themselves. Rather 
than reducing ideas to a reflection of self- interests, this thesis acknowledges that 
ideas must be seen on their own terms and be assessed in relation to their impacts on 
political decisions. The point is to underline that language is the basis for the 
construction of ideas and interests (Fischer, 2003, p. 41). 
Discourse analysis brings forward a different understanding of institutions than what 
has been common in institutional theories. Most of these theories have been 
“dominated by realist investigations in which the examination of organizational 
practices has been disconnected from the discursive practices that constitute them” 
(Phillips et al., 2004, p. 636). Phillips et al., (2004, p. 636) argue that,
[…] institutions are constituted through discourse and that it is not action per se that provides 
the basis for institutionalization, but rather the texts that describe and communicate those 
actions. 
From a discourse perspective, language is the purposeful activity. However, any actor 
will find him- or herself subject to the prevailing norms of working practice, and may 
well face overlapping and even competing norms that represent institutions. 
Institutions provide an account of the context within which language occurs (Rydin, 
2003, p. 52). Hajer (1995, p. 264) makes an important distinction between an 
institutional and a discourse approach: 
[…] discourse analysis is not to be counterposed with institutional analysis, but is rather a 
different way of looking at institutions that is meant to shed new light on the functioning of 
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those institutions, how power is structured in institutional arrangements, and how political 
change in such arrangements comes about. 
There is however, not too great a distance between discourse analytical approaches 
and new institutional theories where institutions are defined as “historical accretions 
of past practices and understandings that set conditions on action”, through the way in 
which they “gradually acquire the moral and ontological status of taken-for-granted 
facts which, in turn, shape future interactions and negotiations” (Phillips et al., 2004, 
p. 8). Within the institutional theory, institutions are seen as socially constructed. 
Extending this to a discourse perspective entails that institutions are constructed 
through discourse. Discourses are norms and rules that enable certain ways of acting 
and make other ways costly and impossible. When sanctions are sufficiently robust, 
an institution exists (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 8). However, even though all institutions 
are discursive products, not all products of discourse are institutions. Hajer (1995) 
makes the separation between discourse structuration (the ways in which certain ideas 
have to be referred to in order to convey legitimacy on actors) and discourse 
institutionalisation (the way in which particular understandings of policy problems 
become ingrained in policy practices and institutions). A discourse perspective on 
institutions sees institutions constructed primarily “through the production of texts, 
rather than directly through actions” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 10). Phillips et al., (2004, 
p. 11) argue that,
[…] institutions are constituted by the structured collections of texts that exist in a particular 
field and that produce the social categories and norms that shape the understandings and 
behaviour of actors.  
2.2.5 Discourse and environmental politics 
Within the broader field of environmental discourse we find numerous subtopics, such 
as air quality, climate change, toxic substances, and nature protection (Feindt and 
Oels, 2005, p. 164). Several attempts have been made to classify different 
environmental discourses (Hajer 1995; Dryzek 1997; Benton and Short 1999; Darier 
1999; Rydin 2003; Oels 2005). Many of these categorisations are quite broad. For 
instance Dryzek (1997) sees ‘environmental problem solving’, ‘survivalism’, 
‘sustainability’, and ‘green radicalism’ as the four main environmental discourses. 
Through looking at the history as well as the content of the discourses, he depicts how 
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they have developed and what effect they have had on society. In studying the 
discourse on acid rain in the UK and the Netherlands, Hajer (1995) uses the more 
middle range concept of ‘storyline’ and shows how identifiable policy discourses 
provide the signpost for action through their storylines. In particular Hajer accounts 
for how ‘ecological modernization’ has emerged as the new dominant policy 
discourse in environmental politics. This discourse states that the environment and the 
economy are mutually reinforcing if properly managed. It suggests that 
“environmental problems can be solved in accordance with the workings of the main 
institutional arrangements of society” (Hajer, 1995, p. 3).
Another key concept in environmental politics is ‘sustainable development’. Hajer 
(1995, p. 3) argues that the Brundtland Commission’s report from 1987 Our Common 
Future is one of the paradigm statements of ecological modernisation. According to 
Langhelle (2000) ecological modernisation has no established relationship with global 
environmental problems or social justice, and thus ecological modernisation and 
sustainable development should not be conflated. Whereas Langhelle (2000) tries to 
prescriptively define these two different concepts, Hajer (1995) first and foremost 
uses them to describe changes in perceptions of environmental problems. The key 
aspect for Hajer is thus not primarily what these concepts are ‘labelled’ or whether we 
can ontologically define the concepts, but how we can understand the practices in 
current environmental politics in terms of discourse. Even though sustainable 
development is defined by the Brundtland report, it is more important in a discourse 
perspective to account for how this idea has been received, developed, and embedded 
in institutional practices, than to argue prescriptively how it should have been 
understood.
This is the key to understanding the environment from a discourse perspective. Rather 
than seeing environmental problems as ontologically defined; they are instead subject 
to discursive struggles. Discourse analysis has established that nature is no longer 
lying outside society but is being co-produced with society: “Expressions of 
environmental concern and sentiment are not self-contained but are bounded within 
wider social, cultural and political contexts” (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998, p. 97). 
Environmental problems have become a conflict of interpretation, where different 
actors gather around specific concepts and ideas that produce common 
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understandings. Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 177) point out the fact that even if actors 
try to make sense of environmental problems this does not always result in the 
different actors understanding each other. A seemingly mutual understanding might 
even conceal complexity and different sub discourses. Rather than calling for clarity 
of concepts, or a more positivist understanding of environmental problems, discourse 
studies enhance our understanding of environmental politics through seeing how 
“inherent ambiguities in concepts were fostered within the policy process to allow 
different discursive strategies to be adopted by different actors” (Rydin, 2005, p. 77). 
Discourse is well suited to describe the complexities of environmental politics, since it 
offers an explanation of why environmental policy making is not seen as a ‘necessity’, 
as the natural science ideal informs us. Discourse analysis “allows one to study the 
power effects produced by and built into environmental discourses” (Feindt and Oels, 
2005, p. 169). Certain problems are left out or included as certain actors are viewed as 
legitimate partners in the discussion and some are not.  
The key issue is thus how the environment is represented. The way that problems are 
defined and the meaning attached to specific environmental problems decides the 
available solutions which again affect outcomes, laws, and institutions. This thesis 
focuses on the representation of climate change in politics, and what enables or 
hinders local actors in climate protection work. It has been suggested that climate 
change is part of a wider problem in the ‘risk society’ (cf. Beck, 1992), and the risk 
dimensions will be investigated in my cases of climate policy-making. However, risk 
dimensions are far from the only dimension infusing climate policy processes. 
Macnaghten and Urry (1998, p. 97-98) point out,
As risks transcends the boundaries of sensory perception, and as the contours of risk extend to 
the very distant and the extraordinary long term, we become dependent on national and 
increasingly global expert systems for information, knowledge, images, and icons to enable 
such processes to be ‘interpreted’.   
2.3 Conducting Discourse Analysis
2.3.1 Methods and data  
What kind of ‘method’ is discourse analysis? Fischer (2003, p. 191) sums up the 
overall aim of discourse analysis as a matter of,  
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[…] establishing interconnections among the empirical data, normative assumptions that 
structure our understanding of the social world, the interpretative judgements involved in the 
data collection process, the particular circumstances of a situational context (in which the 
findings are generated or the prescriptions applied), and the specific conclusions.  
In a more concrete sense, Yanow (2000, p. 22) suggests four basic steps in 
interpretative policy analysis that can be used to guide the study of discourse. The first
is to ‘identify’ the artefacts (language, objects, acts) that are carriers of meaning in a 
specific policy analysis. Since discourses cannot be studied directly, they can only be 
explored by studying the text that constitutes them. Discourse analysis involves the 
systematic study of texts. The first step therefore includes how texts are produced, 
disseminated, and consumed (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 6). Discourse analysis does not 
simply focus on individual or isolated texts, but on collections of texts and the ways 
they are made meaningful through links to other texts. The second step according to 
Yanow, is to identify the ‘communities of meaning’ that are relevant to the policy 
issue. The focus then moves on to see who is producing the texts and what kind of 
policy communities are involved. The third step is to identify the relevant discourses. 
The aim is to explore the relationships between discourse and social reality through 
studying how texts draw on different discourses, “…how and to whom they are 
disseminated, the methods of their production and the manner in which they are 
received and conceived” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 6). The final step is to identify points 
of conflict and how they reflect different interpretations by different communities. 
This is what Hajer (1995) denotes as a discursive struggle; it points to a kind of 
destabilization that could possibly lead to a policy change. 
My articles to a smaller or greater degree follow these four steps. Through beginning 
with texts, I aim to describe the actors and the policy communities involved in 
discursive struggles. The purpose of such a study is to make better sense of the 
complexities and connections in a specific policy issue. My method is an open, 
explorative, and qualitative approach. The research process I used can be 
characterised as abduction. Abduction signifies a round dance back and forth between 
theory and empirical material (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994, p. 42). It is a 
combination of induction (which generalizes from findings) and deduction (which 
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starts from theory), where new moments are added as the process moves on. Induction 
is from the perspective of abduction concentrated on empirical facts; these facts 
however, are not seen as independent of theory. Empirical arguments are seen 
differently as new knowledge and insights develop in the study. Theory also develops 
as empirical material is gathered. Such an understanding of science goes beyond both 
objectivism and relativism. It is a methodology that has roots in Aristotle and the 
intellectual deed of phronetics: practical wisdom and ethics. Flyvbjerg (2001) states 
that phronetics is about the analysis of values with a basis in practice. Phronetic 
research is then pragmatic, variable, and depends on context.
Not only has the research focus and questions changed due to the process of 
abduction, these matters have also changed due to the specific institutional conditions 
in which this thesis was carried out. I have held positions both at Western Norway 
Research Institute and ProSus/University of Oslo and have been involved in different 
broader research projects at these institutions while working on the thesis. Before I 
began I was already involved in a book project at ProSus (Realizing Rio in Norway) 
where I wrote a chapter on Norwegian Climate Politics with Eivind Hovden. This 
chapter was later developed into a discourse perspective and came to be included in 
the thesis. Furthermore, I wrote a report (Lindseth, 2003) for ProSus about climate 
impact and adaptation that was later developed into the ‘Climate adaptation’ article. 
Researchers Carlo Aall and Kyrre Groven at Western Norway Research Institute 
invited me to participate in a paper that summarized the experience with climate 
planning in Norway. This has also been included in the thesis, although it is not a 
paper employing a discourse perspective.   
My thesis consists of six case studies of climate politics. Case studies are 
characteristically portrayed by different kinds of data sources. I tried to follow the 
policy processes at hand closely and collected a great deal of empirical material,  
First in this collection are policy documents from local and national authorities. I have 
collected minutes, project plans, and other documents accounting for how specific 
policy processes have developed. In ‘Norwegian climate policy’ I studied minutes 
from the Parliament. I also used media clippings; these were a particularly important 
source in the ‘Kristiansand’ and ‘Stavanger’ cases. To better understand how political 
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conflicts are played out I searched internet editions of newspapers in Stavanger and 
Kristiansand. I studied documents and research reports from organisations and 
businesses. Both in ‘Stavanger’ and ‘CCPC’ I relied on documents produced by the 
organisations studied. I have also conducted interviews, especially in the 
‘Kristiansand’ and ‘Stavanger’ cases. The point of the interviews was not to 
investigate the specific motives people have, or what they ‘really’ mean about 
particular cases. The interviews were conducted in order to get information about 
important processes and possible future actions. As part of the data material for the 
‘Multilevel’ article I carried out a survey. All municipalities and counties reported on 
were sent an email survey. Those that did not answer through e-mail were included 
through a telephone interview. Finally, I relied on articles, book chapters, books, 
reports, and papers written about similar problems or that studied similar contexts. 
2.3.2 The question of causality  
Social constructionist perspectives are often written off due to the failure to account 
for causality. Fischer (2003, p. 157) states, 
How, ask the critics, can the social sciences explain social phenomena if they ignore the 
causal relationships underlying them? Without casual explanations, for example, how can we 
come to know why people hold the ideas and beliefs they employ to interpret events? What 
social conditions – for instance, the conditions of the wealthy or the poor – lead people to see 
the world one way or another? Seeking firm causal knowledge, empiricists have generally 
argued that meanings cannot be causes.  
Fischer states that some interpretivist researchers neglect the questions of causality. 
Fischer (2003, p. 158-159), however, also argues that this is unnecessary and that we 
can adopt a different form of causality than positivists and empiricists. The author 
argues that empirical analysts seldom manage to establish a cause-effect relationship; 
they can prove statistical correlations, but are unable to prove that A caused B. 
According to Fischer (2003, p. 158) is the basic reason clear: “the social world is 
simply too complicated to permit isolating variables in ways that permit 
determinations of what caused what”. A social interpretivist analysis should move 
beyond the ‘causal relationships’ to focus on ‘casual mechanisms’, 
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[ …] only a closer qualitative analysis can offer us statements about how and why these 
variables are connected. Only through interpretive methods can we discover the various 
possible explanations of what particular actors thought they were doing when they engaged in 
actions pertinent to the causal relationships (Fischer, 2003, p. 158).  
Thus the casual mechanism is explained through qualitative research. Fischer (2003, 
p. 159) argues we should comprehend social science as ‘quasi –causal’. Rather than 
governed directly by external conditions, we act in terms of how we interpret these 
conditions and the beliefs, intentions and purposes we ascribe to them. While ideas 
never stand altogether apart from interests and institutions, these ideas will be seen as 
independent in this thesis, in the sense that they have their own rules that structure 
public deliberations. Ideas and principles are ascribed as possible explanations, but 
these ideas are only comprehended through representation in language.
2.3.3 Validity and the role of the researcher 
I would argue that there is no value-free position for the researcher. Phillips and 
Jørgensen (2002, p. 22) point out that if we accept all knowledge as a single 
representation of reality amongst many, we enter into a number of ultimately 
unsolvable philosophical problems. All research is grounded in a subjective 
dimension, and this decides what the researcher will see and bring forward as results. 
There will always be other positions from where the world will look different.  
This account of science does not mean that there can be no objectivity; it only looses 
its rigorous meaning. Rather we must accept that the concept relies on social 
definitions and this involves “recognizing that objectivity typically means that we 
converse with people who agree with our standards of comparison” (Fischer, 2003, p. 
153). Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 178) argue that it is through the meaning we 
ascribe to things that we can come to understand them, but that most meanings are 
relatively stable. As such, 
[…] if a single individual declares that during the afternoon, she has undergone a sex change, 
it is not likely that this will be accepted by those around her or that our understanding of 
gender will suddenly change. The existing fixities of meaning are too stable for that  (Phillips 
and Jørgensen, 2002, p. 178).  
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Instead of objectivity as a standard, Fischer (2003, p. 154) argues that credibility is 
more important for the researcher. Not all research results are equally good.
Phillips and Jørgensen (2002, p. 173) suggest the following rules of thumb for the 
researcher in assuring the research is valid:  
x Analysis should be solid. The interpretation should be based on a number of 
different textual sources.
x Analysis should be comprehensive. The questions posed to the text should be 
answered fully and textual references that seem to conflict should be clarified 
or accounted for. 
x Analysis should be accounted for in a transparent way. The reader should as 
far as possible be able to ‘test’ the claims made. Interpretations made in the 
text should be documented as far as possible through the empirical material. 
I have sought in this thesis to follow these rules of thumb but the question of 
subjectivity deserves further discussion. A scientific ideal is to try to tell a story that 
to the least degree is the author’s own synthesis of what happened, but a story that is 
laid open such that the reader by herself can experience and draw her own conclusions 
(Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002). It is debatable whether I have managed to be 
theoretically consistent and free myself from my personally biased knowledge. As a 
researcher and part of research communities that work with sustainable development 
(at ProSus and Western Norway Research Institute) I am already engaged and 
interested in environmental politics, arguably something that can lead me to becoming 
narrow minded. Additionally, it is easy to become an advocate for environmental 
interests opposing industrial projects that the environmental movement is sceptical 
towards. It is my hope that through a reflective and consequent use of theory and 
methods I have managed to free myself from some of the biases I brought with me 
into the research process. The argument is that it is through seeing the world through a 
specific method or theory that we can distance ourselves from some of the 
assumptions and common sensual ideas that we use, and subject our material to 
questions other than our everyday perspective (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002).
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I would also argue that instead of striving for an ‘independent position’, an alternative 
is to select dominating discourses and open them up for problematisation as Hammer 
(2001, p. 21) points out, not because we think they can be replaced by utopias, but 
because Foucault has shown us that agreement is potentially dangerous and that 
conflict and disagreement should be assigned more value. In my thesis I have done 
this. I have studied the development of the thinking globally discourse in detail and 
sought to understand how this discourse has come to enjoy a hegemonic position. 
Phillips and Jørgensen (2002) argue that one makes clear where one stands in relation 
to the discourses and contexts at study, and reflects over the consequences one’s own 
contribution has to the discursive production of society. I have sought to analyse the 
discourses without taking a stand towards the moral or ethical basis of the dominant 
discourses. I would also like to stress that I see that explanations or discourse 
framings other than mine also are possible. I posit, however, that my methods are 
fruitful in that it emphasises things other perspectives overlook. 
Yanow (2000, p. 90) also informs us that bias and subjectivity not need to be a 
problem for the researcher; she informs us that there are other options available. In 
particular, interpretivist research has a certain democratic potential: The policy analyst 
can be seen as a translator, bringing different stories from different communities into 
the study and letting different voices be heard. Interpretative analysis also depends on 
the ability of the researcher as a storyteller, not a technocratic expert, to open up the 
conversation for lay people. In my research I have been in close contact with many 
actors at the local level of governance, mostly in Stavanger and Kristiansand. I have 
interacted and learned from a number of people and through interviews they have had 
the chance to tell their stories. Through a close and detailed study of these local 
contexts it is my hope that my study has a certain democratic potential: that I can 
provide local actors with a more detailed knowledge about how politics has played out 
in these constituencies.  
Finally, when objectifying is impossible, the question is rather what we choose to be 
engaged in. Here we can conclude with the words from Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus 
(1997) that man functions at his best when he aims to change what is perceived as 
matters of course or common sense, and not through abstract distanced reflection.
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3 Summary of the Articles in the Thesis  
3.1 Discourses in Norwegian Climate policy: National Action 
or Thinking globally? 
This article builds on, and is a further development of, the book chapter “Norwegian 
Climate Policy 1989-2002” by Hovden and Lindseth (2002). This article takes 
Norway as a pioneering country in climate politics at the end of the 1980s as a starting 
point. We argue that Norwegian climate policy changed considerably during the 
1990s. It has evolved from a broad consensus in 1989 where the notion that a national 
target for the stabilisation of CO2 emissions was the principal instrument for climate 
change abatement, to a situation at the turn of the century where Norway emerged as 
one of the most committed supporters of flexible mechanisms, the so-called ‘Kyoto 
mechanisms’.  
We read this empirical development through a discourse approach; we identify two 
main discourses in the Norwegian politics of climate change: ‘national action’ and 
‘thinking globally’. We propose that these are the two main discourses in Norwegian 
climate politics and highlight how different actors placed themselves around them and 
formed two coalitions to influence the discursive context. Both discourses emphasise 
climate politics as an important concern, but disagree on what responsibility Norway 
should take. The national action ‘NA’ discourse focuses on curbing national 
emissions, whereas the thinking globally ‘TG’ discourse explicitly targets 
international emissions. The motive for the NA discourse is to lead by example, 
invoking moral imperatives to lead the way and do one’s share of the work; for the 
TG discourse the motive is to achieve international reductions in emissions as cost-
effectively as possible. Consequently, the policy focus is international for the TG 
discourse, and national for the NA discourse (albeit as an intrinsic part of honouring 
international obligations). The core development in the 1990s is that the TG discourse 
took over as the dominant discourse in the second half of the decade.  
We provide insight into how the TG discourse managed to translate the Norwegian 
petroleum industry from a problem into a benefit for Norwegian climate politics in the 
1990s. Whether through direct export of oil and gas, the direct export of gas-based 
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electricity, or as domestic use of gas-based electricity, the arguments of the TG 
discourse essentially revolved around the same line of reasoning: since Norwegian 
petroleum products are relatively clean internationally, Norwegian oil and gas 
production is good international climate policy. We emphasise how the TG discourse 
has managed to depoliticise the petroleum industry in climate politics to a large 
degree. The TG discourse allows the main institutional arrangements of society, such 
as the petroleum industry, to remain while addressing the environmental problem at 
hand. This makes the TG discourse rather attractive, and the NA discourse suffered 
loss after loss in the late 1990s as it is seemingly baseless after the Kyoto protocol.  
In this article we do not employ the concept ‘scale’. However, the main theoretical 
contribution this article makes is that Norwegian climate politics must be understood 
through two scalar categories: the global and the national. We highlight how the 
climate problem is represented through concepts, terms, and the communication of 
scientific knowledge that relate to these two specific scalar categories. We argue that 
climate policy depends not only on actors and interests, but also on the power of the 
various discourses that emerge from the representations of the climate issue. Our 
purpose has been to supplement the more actor- and interest-based accounts available 
and provide another lens through which the developments in this policy field may be 
viewed and which can broaden our understanding of the processes at work. 
3.2 The Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) and 
the Framing of Local Climate Policy 
This aim of this article is to explicate knowledge about the possibilities and problems 
of translating the global dimensions of climate change into local action. The concepts 
‘frame’ and ‘framing’ are used as theoretical perspectives through which this case is 
studied. The word ‘framing’ means that some aspects of a perceived reality are 
selected and made more salient. I emphasise how climate change is a diffuse ‘problem 
of the common’, and that if the local level is to contribute constructively in climate 
change work it is important to clarify the ‘in between’ substance linking the local and 
the global. The Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) is selected as a case. 
This article sees the CCPC (organisation) as an actor trying to mobilise and persuade 
cities to work on climate protection. This campaign, originating from ICLEI (The 
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International Council of Local Initiatives), has come to play a pivotal role in 
organising local community work on climate change and acting as a torch for cities 
worldwide willing to work with climate protection.  
Understanding how the campaign framed climate change is an important source of 
knowledge about the ‘nature’ of local climate politics. The article summarises several 
strategic documents from CCPC and ICLEI organisations, in which their positions 
and perspectives on climate change protection are laid out. The empirical material is 
mainly from CCPC’s early phase (1993–97), when the campaign’s framework was 
established. I discuss the campaign’s profile both in light of this framework, and the 
results from the campaign.  
I highlight two aspects of the CCPC climate change frame. First, the problem is 
established and made relevant through scientific knowledge explaining that we will 
increasingly notice the effects of climate change. City dwellers are at risk from 
climate change and therefore should cut emissions. Second, motivation for action is 
based on the assumption that local and global issues are linked. It is this last 
dimension that is the main focus in the CCPC’s reports and documents about climate 
protection. In a closer examination of CCPC I concentrate on determining to what 
degree the different elements of local and global sustainable development agendas can 
be mutually reinforcing, and whether climate change protection can be reconciled 
with local priorities and initiatives that reduce GHG.
Through data from regional CCP campaigns and studies of the organisation by other 
researchers, I argue that the frame that CCPC aim to ‘market’ climate change through 
has not been effective in reducing GHG emissions in CCPC cities. Clearly, the 
conditions for climate protection are not shaped only within the local level of 
governance. However, I argue that this frame of seeing overlapping local and global 
issues does not account for how a civic subpolitics of climate change can emerge: 
where people are provided explicit means through which they can collectively 
respond, and where the responsibilities of other actors and institutions are explicitly 
acknowledged. I argue that CCPC does not explicitly show how climate change is an 
overarching responsibility for society where climate protection means saying ‘no’ to 
unsustainable development, and about restricting practices and policies in other 
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sectors of society. In short, CCPC has discussed the climate issue without reference to 
climate change or the harm it causes nature.  
The CCPC case illustrates the problems and prospects of organising climate initiatives 
to represent a global awareness. The criticism of CCPC opens up a discussion on 
other ways that climate change protection action could be framed. It may be that 
CCPC is failing to use all its potential or that other strategies could bring about more 
emission reduction (within the cities’ available policy space). Finding new and 
meaningful ways of linking the global and the local should be a core concern of local 
climate change protection action. This article also questions whether the extremely 
complex climate change issue might not lend itself to being portrayed in a way that is 
empirically credible to those who need to be mobilised. In this regard, constructing 
climate change as a local issue can pose a problem because it creates the impression 
that climate change matters can be solved locally. 
3.3 Local Level Adaptation to Climate Change: Discursive 
Strategies in the Norwegian Context 
The aim of this article is to show how climate adaptation can be further developed in 
Norway through a discourse approach. The issue at stake, climate adaptation, aims at 
moderating the adverse effects of climate change through a wide range of actions 
targeted at vulnerable systems. Even though people have adapted to variances in 
climate throughout history, there is now a new dimension to adaptation in light of the 
human induced process of global warming. Thus far, climate impacts and adaptation 
initiatives have not realised the added value of climate adaptation; adaptation often 
appears as an afterthought, with an emphasis on technological solutions. Based on a 
review of literature on climate impacts and adaptation, I argue that what is lacking in 
the climate adaptation literature is consideration of the process of adaptation; how 
adaptations will be implemented, by whom, and why. So far, assessments have not 
resulted in strategic and long-term planning for climate adaptation. Moreover, the idea 
that the sub-national level should play an important role in adaptation is only 
acknowledged to a limited degree in the literature.
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This article is a thought experiment. It assumes that Norway will have to be much 
better prepared for climate changes in the future. I argue that before planning for 
adaptation, the planner(s) must understand how the issue of adaptation or 
vulnerability is framed before being able to select tools for the planning process. The 
article presents an institutional-discourse approach based on Rydin (2003) as an 
alternative to further climate adaptation planning. There seems to be agreement in the 
climate adaptation literature that institutional factors are crucial in forcing and 
determining adaptation. Institutions affect the social distribution of vulnerability, as 
well as determine the management of climate-sensitive aspects of society. Through an 
application of Rydin’s approach, the article shows how specific institutions operating 
at the local level can play a role in climate adaptation in Norway.  
Three specific discursive strategies, a scientific–economic, communicative–economic,
and scientific–communicative discourse, are presented. Rydin (2003) argues that 
scientific, economic, and communicative rationality are the three main rationalities 
used to legitimate policy and decisions in environmental planning. A discourse 
perspective on environmental planning must take into account and build on how these 
rationalities work to develop and frame an issue. The rationale for combining these 
rationalities into specific discourses is to take into account the ‘holistic’ nature of 
sustainable development, and shows that if we draw on established rationalities in a 
new and creative way, planners and local actors can be given new discursive tools in 
planning for a sustainable development. It should also be noted that the rationale for 
combining these rationalities is not to decide whether the different rationalities can be 
combined logically, in terms of their content or assumptions, but to consider how the 
discursive structure affects their potential for being combined and used in discursive 
strategies for planning. 
The article continues with assessing the discursive structure of the rationalities and 
includes an institutional dimension in a portrayal of how specific institutions 
operating at the local level in Norway can convey or ‘carry’ these discourses and how 
actors placed within these institutions can use discourses as resources when planning 
for climate adaptation. An adaptation agenda will look quite different depending on 
which discursive strategy that is chosen. The article does not favour one over the 
other, but acknowledges the need to investigate and discuss different approaches 
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throughout Norway. Furthermore, the contextual nature of knowledge and local 
climatic and social conditions will result in unique ways of legitimating climate 
adaptation policy in each community. In this sense, the article can be seen as a ‘tool 
kit’ for local planners. The analysis suggests how adaptation can be achieved if local 
actors in local institutions realize the potential of discursive planning.
Rydin is one of the few authors to use discourse analysis as more than an analysis 
technique. She aims to provide a normative theoretical basis that shows how 
discourses can be used as planning tools, bringing a discursive dimension to the 
institutional approach. There is clearly a need for further studies to demonstrate how 
insight from discourse analysis can be used as a tool for planning. The article has 
sought to find an analytic perspective that is constructivist without being ideographic 
or positivist. 
3.4 Scalar Strategies in Climate Change Politics: Debating the 
Environmental Consequences of a Natural Gas Project 
The issue at stake in this article is how the domestic use of natural gas in the 
Norwegian city of Stavanger became a struggle over scale; over which geographical 
scale the environmental and climatic consequences of a natural gas project should be 
seen. The article is a further development of the scales perspective addressed in 
Hovden and Lindseth (2004). There are few references to scale and the politics of 
scale in environmental politics and planning. This article argues that this field of 
research could gain from understanding how the concepts of ‘scale’, ‘scalar strategies’ 
and ‘struggles over scale’ play out empirically in issues of sustainable development 
and the environment.  
The article by Hovden and Lindseth (2004) discussed the relationship between 
petroleum and climate politics on the national level; this article discusses the 
relationship at the local level. Stavanger is selected because of the role it plays as best 
practice in urban sustainability. The conflict between the use of natural gas and 
climate protection at the local level of governance has never been as apparent as in 
Stavanger. Stavanger is a pioneering case in showing how local actors come to debate 
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and negotiate the environmental and climatic consequences of domestic use of natural 
gas.
The conflict has its root in two specific events. In the summer of 2000 the local 
energy company Lyse Energi decided that they would implement their plan to bring 
natural gas through the Stavanger region via a pipeline. In June 2002 the Municipal 
Council in Stavanger approved a Climate Plan for the municipality. After the plans to 
build the pipeline materialised it brought about a vocal and intense debate over the 
environmental consequences of the use of natural gas. The use of natural gas in the 
Stavanger Region would be a severe challenge to the role Stavanger plays as ‘best 
practice’ in urban sustainability. It would thus make it more difficult to reach the 
climate objectives, in particular the goal of reducing GHG emissions from stationary 
energy use with 30 % by 2010 (compared to 2000 level).
This article analyses the conflict between the use of natural gas and climate protection 
through the lens of scale theory. I emphasise how, as an issue in environmental 
governance, scale is not merely an independent variable causing specific outcomes 
but is negotiable, allowing actors to adopt different strategies to pursue their varying 
agendas. Even though the political struggle studied was primarily ‘localised’ in the 
city of Stavanger, the process in question cannot be reduced to ‘local’ or ‘global’. We 
often misunderstand environmental politics if we aim to use bipolar categories. 
The article demonstrates how a local energy company felt compelled to use 
environmental arguments to win positive acceptance within an established local 
climate protection discourse. Various scalar strategies can be identified in the debate. 
I show how a local struggle can be represented as a global struggle. By framing 
climate change as a global issue, local actors found arguments that enabled them to 
portray this natural gas project as environmentally friendly. The local case was thus 
reframed to shift attention from local responsibilities. In order to achieve its 
preferences Lyse Energi drew in other centres of social power – both locally and 
nationally based actors – and formed a discourse coalition. Ultimately it was the State 
Pollution Control Agency (SPCA) that decided in favour of the company’s Rogass 
project. The realisation of the project can be seen in relation to how it fit with an 
established national climate discourse. The way in which Lyse framed the project and 
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the approval of the SPCA bears clear resonance to the thinking globally discourse that 
was developed during the climate debate in the 1990s in Norway. 
I argue that the article has more general implications for the understanding of 
environmental governance. The case demonstrates how local actors need to re-scale 
sub national governance in search of a ‘sustainability fix’ (cf. While et al., 2004) that 
can accommodate a new and demanding ecological challenge such as climate change. 
The Stavanger case shows how Lyse Energi used a scalar strategy that ultimately 
managed to undermine alternate local climate-change objectives by referring to 
climate change as a global issue which demands global solutions. The discursive 
approach used here revealed how a local energy company could use the old 
environmental slogan ‘think global, act local’ to its benefit. The results of the 
Stavanger case study indicate a growing need to critically explore the normative 
implications of scalar re-framing as a discursive technique in local environmental 
conflicts.
3.5 Multilevel Governance and Local Climate Planning in 
Norway
In this article we draw on experiences from local climate planning in Norway to 
discuss the ways in which climate change enters into a multilevel policy setting. We 
address the following three research questions:  
(1) How can climate change be described as multilevel oriented?  
(2) What are the experiences with local climate planning in Norway?  
(3) How can we assess policy space for local climate policy?  
By local we mean sub-national governments, and in Norway this means 
municipalities and counties. Although our emphasis is on Norway, we relate to the 
experiences internationally, and in this way discuss local climate policy more 
generally.
For the first question we understand multilevel governance to be an alternative and 
opponent to the traditional hierarchical top-down system of international-national-
local government relations. Multilevel governance signifies both that trans-national 
levels of government and local authorities play a more important role in global 
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politics. It also signifies a horizontal shift where responsibilities are moved from 
governmental towards non-governmental actors. We highlight that in this multilevel 
governance chain local actors can play the role as a ‘structure’ for the implementation 
of national or international climate objectives, as well as that of policy ‘actor’ taking 
independent policy initiatives.
The second research question considers what the particular case of Norway can tell us 
about the nature, potential, and pitfalls of local government action on climate change. 
Our study covers all municipalities in Norway involved in comprehensive local 
climate planning at the time of the study. The study consists of two surveys: one 
during spring 2002 (Groven and Aall, 2002), and a follow-up study during winter 
2003/04 (Lindseth and Aall, 2004). Regarding the implementation of the climate plans 
we find that the follow-up concentrated for the most part on measures within the 
energy sector, wherein the installation of district heating was prevalent. This was the 
case for measures implemented in both municipal buildings and the local community 
as a whole. Only some of the larger cities reported implementation of measures within 
the transport sector, in which structural measures and investments in public transport 
dominate. We emphasise the municipalities’ clear shift of focus from climate and
energy to mostly energy during the period the plans were drafted in 2000, to the 
follow-up survey during winter 2003-04.
The third research question addresses policy space for local climate policy. Based on 
the Norwegian case and supplemented with knowledge gained from international 
review, we present a typology of six different categories of local climate policy:  
(1) business as usual;
(2) policy redressing;
(3) picking the low-hanging fruit;
(4) symbolic climate policy;  
(5) local authorities as policy structure; and  
(6) local authorities as policy actor.  
In the discussion we argue that even though the local level has increasingly been 
acknowledged as an important contributor in global environmental politics and in a 
multi level governance chain, national governments continue to play an important pre-
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requisite for local climate protection. We emphasise how the relationship between 
national and local authorities is a crucial factor if climate policy as a specific local 
responsibility would be strengthened. In particular, the Norwegian experience with 
local climate planning gives food for thought as to how the communication lines and 
responsibilities between the local and national level should be ordered. It seems 
evident that unless national commitments are strengthened, it is unlikely that local 
climate policy will become more than a policy area for the few front-runner 
municipalities: in a larger context this will only represent symbolic contributions to 
the global quest of reducing GHG-emissions.  
Multilevel governance is a reality that local level actors will meet in their aim to work 
for climate protection; we argue that there is a choice as to what extent and how one 
should include the local levels of governance in any kind of governing process. 
3.6 The Urban Governance of Transport and the Environment 
in the City of Kristiansand 
This article studies how environmental objectives are integrated in transport policies 
through the empirical case of Kristiansand where a cooperative project was initiated 
to better find a co-ordination of environmental and transport objectives. We studied a 
project called the Land use and Transport forum (ATP) in which political and 
administrative representatives from Kristiansand, five surrounding municipalities, and 
two counties were brought together with the State Road Administration. We also 
analysed ATP’s relationship with private business organisations in the ‘City forum’ in 
Kristiansand.
The article investigates how different discourses about transport and the environment 
are presented and argued in this new co-operative institutional setting. In assessing the 
possibilities of a change in policy discourse, we combine discourse analysis with an 
institutional approach. In line with Healey et al., (2003) we employ a relational view 
of institutional capacity where the ability of a discourse change through these 
deliberative forums is seen as a product of relational resources, knowledge resources, 
and mobilization capacity. 
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The core challenge for the ATP forum was to settle tensions and barriers between 
those that saw the forum as a road-building project, and those that primarily saw it as 
an environmental project to provide better access and conditions for the bus, including 
restricting car use in the city centre. Although the project promised to prioritise 
environmental solutions, it is also evident that the more global dimensions of transport 
were not addressed. It is first and foremost a ‘localised’ understanding of transport 
problems that was stressed; more global problems such as the contribution transport 
makes to climate change were not addressed.  
In terms of governance relations the project gives clear indications of change. We 
argue that the ATP forum set up new channels of communication, challenged the City 
council’s established discourses and practices, and improved relationships with 
business interests in the city partly due to the establishment of the ‘City forum’. We 
argue that this is an example of how one kind of new governance structure (ATP) 
creates a need for better integration and inclusive governance between other actor 
constellations. It seems evident that a new, more open minded and inclusive style of 
governance has been established in Kristiansand. The way that business interests have 
increasingly come to realise that environmental issues and environmental projects also 
be beneficial for them, can be seen as one of the more visible products of these 
governance relations thus far.
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4 Discussion  
The different articles are informed by discourse approaches. This final chapter of the 
introductory section gives a more explicit interpretation of the analytical and the more 
general aspects of both climate policy and discourse analysis. I do not provide a 
comprehensive account, since the different articles provide individual results and 
conclusions, but I aim to bring out the more general aspects. The discussion relates 
directly to the four different research questions in section 1.2. In the discussion I refer 
to the different articles by the following abbreviations:  
Article 1: ‘Discourse in Norwegian Climate policy: National Action or Thinking 
globally?’ will be called ‘Norwegian climate policy’ 
Article 2: ‘The Cities for Climate Protection Campaign (CCPC) and the Framing of 
Local Climate Policy’ will be called ‘CCPC’
Article 3: ‘Local Level Adaptation to Climate Change: Discursive Strategies in the 
Norwegian Context’ will be called ‘Climate adaptation’
Article 4: ‘Scalar Strategies in Climate Change Politics: Debating the Environmental 
Consequences of a Natural Gas Project’ will be called ‘Stavanger’
Article 5: ‘Multilevel Governance and Local Climate Planning in Norway’ will be 
called ‘Multilevel’
Article 6: ‘The Urban Governance of Transport and the Environment in the City of 
Kristiansand’ will be called ‘Kristiansand’
4.1 Which discourses – at which levels and scales – can be 
identified in climate politics? 
There are numerous ways of organizing discourses in environmental politics.  
Environmental issues do not place themselves in well-defined boxes; they are 
contested and interconnected in many ways (Dryzek, 1997). As Dryzek (1997) argues, 
the more complex the problem is, the larger the possible perspectives. In this thesis, I 
emphasise the scalar dimensions attached to discourse. Since delimiting or 
constructing a discourse is always the task of the researcher, there are other plausible 
discourses that could have been used as labels for the particular contexts I have 
studied. Nevertheless, I propose that scalar dimensions are well suited to understand 
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the politics of climate change and climate protection at the local level of governance 
in particular. Scalar dimensions relate to where the climate problem belongs, in terms 
of which level of governance is best suited to deal with the problem and the global or 
a local ‘nature’ of the problem. 
One finding from my studies is how the climate issue at local and national levels of 
governance are ‘scaled-up’ to the global level. The first article ‘Norwegian climate 
policy’ sets the stage. For the national action ‘NA’ discourse, the focus is on curbing 
national emissions whereas for the thinking globally ‘TG’ discourse it is explicitly 
international emissions that are targeted. In ‘Stavanger’, the climate issue was framed 
as a global issue, and in that sense the local case was reframed to shift attention from 
local responsibilities. I argue the same dynamics take place in debates at the local 
(‘Stavanger’) and the national level (‘Norwegian climate policy’) of governance. Both 
articles show how climate change was primarily understood as a global problem, and 
how local and national policies and projects should be seen and evaluated in light of 
how this impacts the total global emission situation. A key argument was that a policy 
and development that result in an increase in local emissions can be environmentally 
sound since the same policy can result in a reduction of the total global emissions.
The core idea about discourses in this field is that the way we think and talk about 
basic concepts concerning the environment has consequences for the politics and 
policies that occur in the environmental field. Both these cases indicate a growing 
need to critically explore the normative implications of scalar re-framing as a 
discursive technique in environmental conflicts. In terms of policy, I show how 
bringing in the global scale in a local context makes the decision spaces wider. The 
thinking globally discourse allows the petroleum industry to remain while addressing 
the problem at hand. I have shown how ‘thinking globally’ can be a way of 
strategically framing climate change in conflict with the direct struggles of people, 
most visibly environmental groups, that aim to take responsibility for their country’s 
or region’s own contribution to global warming.  
This thesis argues that there is no perfect ‘fit’ between the ecosystem and institutional 
systems in climate change, since it is contested both how the climate issue should be 
understood and how it should be solved. The key issue is how specific issues are 
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scaled or rescaled and whether there have been networks or arenas created around 
these issues in which governing can take place (cf. Bulkeley, 2005). Lutes (1998) 
argues that the ‘global’ construction of the climate issue warrants careful scrutiny 
since it privileges particular ways of controlling greenhouse gases. It is true that the 
climate issue also is global. The world’s climate has come to be understood as an 
interdependent global system. The point here, however, is that the term ‘global’ 
applied to the causes and effects of global warming is more problematic (Lutes, 
1998). Lutes argues that these responses place the responsibility on supra-national 
institutions and a further extension of market principles such as property rights, to 
control emissions. This does not mean that global climate agreements such as the 
Kyoto protocol are not useful in battling climate change. The question is rather what 
happens when the term global is applied to national and local action. 
The core argument of the thinking globally discourse as studied in this thesis is that 
since Norwegian petroleum products and activities are internationally relatively clean, 
Norwegian oil and gas production is good international climate policy.8 For this to 
happen, however, one must make sure that cleaner fossil energy that is produced in 
Norway actually replaces the older dirty energy, i.e., one would have to make certain 
of two things: old energy sources like coal are phased out as the ‘new’ power is 
phased in, (that not the new energy comes in addition to the old energy and does not 
actually lead to increased energy supply and use), and the ‘dirtiest’ power is phased 
out. The core argument that the thinking globally discourse rests on is that these 
mechanisms actually work. From the beginning of the 1990s Norway focused on how 
emissions from petroleum could be debited to Norway under an international climate 
regime of flexible mechanisms (Hovden and Lindseth, 2002). Even in the absence of 
such an international agreement, these ‘substitution benefits’ continued to be the core 
argument of the thinking globally discourse. There are currently no institutional 
arrangements that ensure that natural gas will replace coal or, for that matter, hinder 
that natural gas does not replace cleaner energy like wind power or bio fuel. In a 
liberalised European energy market, the price mechanism makes stipulations of where 
8 In the beginning of the 1990s, this argument first and foremost concerned oil production. It was 
argued that it was unreasonable that unavoidable emissions from oil production for export should only 
be debited to Norway, since Norwegian petroleum products were less pollution intensive than fossil 
alternatives such as coal. This argument has been further developed to concern natural gas; the export 
of natural gas, the direct export of gas-based electricity, and domestic use of gas-based electricity. 
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and how such replacements will take place a highly uncertain business. We can 
conclude that the TG discourse has been based on preconditions that have not actually 
been met in Norwegian national climate policy.  
The evaluation of the thinking globally discourse comes out differently when we look 
at the local case of ‘Stavanger’. In this case, there were actually mechanisms in place 
that would ensure that a replacement of more polluting fossil fuel would happen. Lyse
Energi had signed a number of contracts for the delivery of natural gas with different 
industries and businesses that would phase out more polluting fossil fuel. They 
claimed that based on its contracts with customers, the use of natural gas would 
replace a total of about 200 GWH from other energy sources. The environmental 
movement found it hard to argue against the logic of this replacement, even though 
the debate that developed in Stavanger showed a fundamental disagreement about 
future sustainable energy paths. The thinking globally discourse thus, in this case, 
provided solutions that could result in GHG reductions. The most serious attack on 
the thinking globally discourse is arguably, however, that in the long run fossil fuels 
will also replace investments in alternative energy sources. It seems evident in light of 
the major challenges that IPCC9 has warned us about for more than a decade, that a 
sustainable future is one that makes a transition to an economy that is less fossil 
dependent as soon as possible. It is alarming that new infrastructure investments in 
fossil fuels like natural gas and increased supply of gas based power in a 30 year 
perspective will press power prices down and reduce investments in renewable energy 
that today are almost competitive (Vogstad, 2005).  
The thinking globally discourse is forceful in that it reunites strong economic interests 
with environmental concerns. However, it is appropriate to ask if the thinking globally 
discourse has become a linguistic tool for some businesses and politicians that has 
enabled them to maintain an image of environmental concern, while ignoring the 
serious problems at hand. The discourse is fronted by the business and industry sector 
to a large degree and they are meshing the ‘global’ character of the climate problem 
9 IPCC (2001) concludes that globally averaged surface temperatures have increased by 0.6 ± 0.2°C in 
the 20th century; and for the range of scenarios developed in the IPCC Special Report on Emission 
Scenarios (SRES), the globally averaged surface air temperature is projected by models to warm 1.4 to 
5.8°C by 2100 relative to 1990, and globally averaged sea level is projected by models to rise 0.09 to 
0.88 m by 2100.  
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with an economic rationality. Lutes (1998, p. 170) states that global warming as a 
political issue is losing its potential for progressive change. It is an agenda being: 
[…] appropriated by state and corporate institutions more interested in maintaining profits 
and keeping the world safe for corporate capitalism, than in creating a world in which society 
and nature can reconcile their differences in a mutually supportive manner. 
From a democratic governance perspective it seems evident that the idea that 
communities have a democratic responsibility to take on climate commitments at the 
local and national level appears to have lost resonance relative to the idea that climate 
change is a global issue requiring global solutions. In the absence of an effective way 
of dealing with the climate issue at the supra-national level10, the thinking globally 
discourse in Norway has not created networks or arenas around issues in which 
effective governing can take place (cf. Bulkeley, 2005). Furthermore, if a leading 
climate municipality in Norway (cf. ‘Stavanger’) cannot maintain the idea of 
‘differentiated responsibility’ – with specific ameliorative burdens taken on by local-
community interests – how and why should other municipalities in Norway be 
expected to take on such commitments?  
The question is whether the alternative discourse of taking national or local 
responsibility is capable of providing the means through which climate change can be 
effectively governed. The ‘CCPC’ article sheds light on this matter. In this story the 
global dimensions of climate change are the sole rationale for creating and organising 
the work in a network. To find a solution for such a large-scale problem, action from 
vast numbers of people is required; it is the cumulative work of the many cities that 
together contribute to the reduction of global warming. The global dimensions are 
further emphasised in the motivation to act based on the overlap between global and 
local issues: local action contributes to reducing global warming as well as solving 
local problems. In this way CCPC is localising a global issue. However, when the 
cities entered the stage of implementation, the global dimensions are lost in this 
localised discourse. As other researchers also emphasise (Betsill 2001; Slocum 2004a; 
b) it is the local benefits of climate protection that are emphasised by the CCPC as the 
10 This could however change in a latter phase of the Kyoto protocol with US involvement and more 
effective sanction mechanisms when countries do not fulfill their obligations.   
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key motivation for cities. Local benefits might be helpful in bringing attention to 
global warming, but the modest reductions of GHG in CCPC cities thus far questions 
whether this localised discourse works or not; there are indications that the cities in 
this campaign under a ‘climate banner’ work with projects and initiatives that have 
little or nothing to do with reducing GHG. As research on CCPC has pointed out 
(Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Betsill, 2001; Slocum, 2004a; b) the climate is often 
discussed without reference to climate change or the harm it causes nature. 
There are evidences in the CCPC case that the deontological aspects of climate 
change that emphasise the intrinsic problematic nature of GHG emissions are lost. 
The global dimensions that CCPC emphasised in the beginning of the campaign (the 
scientific evidence, risks, and moral concerns outside the time perspective and space 
location of people encouraged to take action) took a backseat when the CCPC entered 
in to the stage of implementation. A somewhat different understanding of scale is seen 
in this case compared to the Norwegian case. Whereas the global dimensions are used 
to divert attention from local climate action, the global seriousness of the problems 
are forgotten in the CCPC case.
What I show in this thesis is the conflicts between different scalar discourses and how 
they are actively used. The discussion emphasises the complex ways in which scalar 
categories framed the decisions context. Global or local cannot be understood as ‘bad’ 
or ‘good’. The global and local can be used as categories that can hinder or empower 
actors in climate politics. The global can be used to point to the seriousness of the 
climate issue, and it can be used to move attention away from local and national 
responsibilities. The local or national can be used as a category to prioritise local 
responsibility for climate action, but is also a way to prioritise local needs that have 
little or no consequence for the climate. This last aspect is emphasised in the 
‘Multilevel’ article, where state money for local climate planning resulted in the 
municipalities mostly prioritising local needs. Instead of emission cutting projects, 
action and measures were taken in less controversial sectors with little or no effect on 
GHG emission reduction.  
My discussion ends with a somewhat pessimistic conclusion in relation to finding 
effective means through which climate emissions can be curbed. I argue in the 
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‘CCPC’ article that due to its extreme complexity the climate change issue might not 
lend itself to being portrayed in a way that is empirically credible to those who need 
to be mobilised. The CCPC case does not provide clear signs that networks and arenas 
around these issues have been created in which effective governing can take place (cf. 
Bulkeley, 2005). In light of this, it seems evident that future local level engagement in 
climate protection work would have to continue the discussion on how to find new 
and meaningful ways of linking the global and the local. 
4.2 What is the role of discourse in influencing policy? 
I reject an extreme constructivist approach where language is the source of society. I 
emphasise a physical reality independent of our understanding or perceptions11. I also 
argue that ideas can have a causal influence, but that they can seldom be totally 
separated from material interests or institutional processes. In line with Fischer I argue 
that a social interpretivist analysis should not reject causality as a means of 
explanation, but that it should move beyond the ‘causal relationships’ to focus on 
‘casual mechanisms’. Only a closer qualitative analysis can offer us statements about 
how and why these variables are connected (Fischer, 2003, p. 158). However, it is 
difficult to separate cause and effect in such studies. Weale (1992, p. 58) argues that 
language or ideas could be conceived as effects rather than causes, for example as 
rationalizations of economic or political interests. In this way references are made to 
the interests underlying the ideas rather than the ideas themselves. What does my 
articles say about this problematic?  
I acknowledge that actors involved in the discursive struggles clearly can be 
understood as having material interests. In ‘Norwegian Climate Policy’ and 
‘Stavanger’ I show how the petroleum industry stood to lose if a discourse on national 
and local responsibility were to win through. However, in both cases a discourse on 
local and national responsibility also played a role. This was based on a deontological 
ethic, emphasising the intrinsically problematic nature of GHG emissions. This 
discourse shaped the framework of the debate in such a way that the petroleum 
industry was forced to present their activity in terms of concepts, ideas, and categories 
that acknowledged the seriousness of global warming. These actors could have argued 
11 In this particular case, I take as a precondition that climate change is actually happening; that the 
scientific evidences are strong enough to argue this. 
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that petroleum production is more important than the threats of global warming, or 
they could have questioned the seriousness and trustworthy of the scientific evidences 
of global warming in the first place. Neither position has played a significant role in 
the Norwegian debate. In this way, ideas mattered in structuring the Norwegian 
debate on global warming, contrary to what a more interest-based approach would 
suggest.
In the later phase of the debate it is more difficult to separate material interests from 
the ideas put forward. I have shown in ‘Norwegian Climate Policy’ and ‘Stavanger’
how the petroleum industry played a more important role in the debate and how 
eventually solutions were found that led the petroleum industry to continue with its 
production and address climate change at the same time. It is possible to portray these 
policy processes in terms of an interest-based approach, but a discourse perspective 
can also add something to an understanding of the policy process here. Rightly so, the 
petroleum industry has remained in these political battles concerning climate politics. 
But in order to make the petroleum industry continue uninterrupted, actors had to 
develop a discourse that could gain legitimacy in the political context. This thinking 
globally discourse clearly had a component of material interest, but it also addressed 
environmental values needed to provide the conceptual basis for the continued 
existence of the petroleum industry and to show how this production fits into the 
framework of existing policy. I have shown, particularly in ‘Norwegian Climate 
Policy’, how actors made active use of the thinking globally discourse to increase 
assent, discover new implications, and anticipate or answer criticism. In this way the 
discourse was continually reproduced and developed further in the field of climate 
policy. Legitimization and justification is an integral part of politics. Given that 
language of politics, inscribes the meanings of a policy problem, politics is not only 
expressed through words, it is also constructed through language (Fischer, 2003).
In ‘Stavanger’ I showed that by insisting on using the reference to climate change as a 
global issue which demands global solutions Lyse used a scalar strategy that 
ultimately undermined alternative local climate-change objectives. A core discursive 
structure and hindrance for the environmental movement is that it no longer owns the 
old slogan ‘think global, act local’. My article disclosed how the energy company 
managed to use the idea of ‘thinking globally’ to its benefit. In ‘Stavanger’ I argue 
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that with the translation of the thinking globally discourse into concrete politics 
[building the gas pipeline], the nature and interpretation of local climate protection as 
a policy problem has been challenged and reframed. By its decision to permit Rogass,
the State Pollution Control Agency effectively institutionalised the relationship
between domestic use of natural gas and climate change. In line with Phillips et al, 
(2004) I argue that discourses are norms and rules that enable certain ways of acting 
and make other ways costly and impossible and that when sanctions are sufficiently 
robust, an institution exists. In the Rogass case the thinking globally discourse 
developed from structuring the debate to institutionalising the relationship between 
domestic use of natural gas and climate protection: an institution was formed. This is 
an important hindrance for actors arguing that we should take national or local 
responsibility for our climate emissions. Even though interests play a part in the 
thinking globally discourse, it is the rationality claims and conceptions posited by this 
(now institutionalised) discourse that actors challenging these interests must take into 
account. This is the power of discourses – to determine the linguistic frame of 
reference within which the debate takes place.
I would argue that we are always surrounded by discourses. Actors are constantly 
putting forward rationality claims and trying to persuade others of their ideas. 
Whereas a more positivist account of reality would stress that we can only gain 
knowledge about what we can immediately apprehend, I argue that our primary 
source of knowledge and our best guess in trying to grasp ‘reality’ are these 
statements and texts people produce. Discourse analysis is arguably well suited to 
account for the politics of a situation, because it is grounded in “a detailed contextual 
examination of the circumstances at play in specific cases” (Fischer, 2003, p. 108).  
My reading of discourse analysis sees it, amongst other things, as a tool for 
identifying how actors actively use language to pursue their interests. I also argue that 
interests, actor networks, or resources are insufficient in understanding the politics of 
climate change. Climate change threatens not only the interest of national 
governments and multinational companies, but every one of us in our dependence on 
products and services yielded by fossil fuels. The extensive character of the climate 
issue results in a multitude of actors, organisations, and various interests groups at the 
international, national, and local levels that all have opinions, ideas, and requirements 
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concerning how policies on this field ought to look. The climate problem’s character 
not only depends on the actors participating in the debate, but on new technological 
discoveries and the character of the institution for available scientific research. The 
climate field is a highly complex field where it is impossible to predicate what kind of 
solutions world society will reach in years and decades to come. My thesis adds to 
this field by paying attention to the crucial role of discourse. The purpose has been to 
supplement the more actor- and interest-based accounts available and provide another 
lens through which we can broaden our understanding of the processes at work and 
perhaps make them more amenable to change. 
4.3 How are governance relations changing in climate 
politics?
Section 1.1 states an understanding of governance in this thesis broadly as the 
“totality of steering mechanisms employed, regardless of the seat of responsibility” 
(cf. Lafferty, 2004, p. 7). Eckerberg and Joas (2004, p. 406) argue that governance is a 
highly contested concept, where scholars only seem to agree on one common aspect: 
it entails a change from traditional ways of management or government to a more 
modern way of management or government. Political science has focused on how 
these new modern ways of management are changing the role of the nation state. 
Eckerberg and Joas (2004) account for how the multilevel governance system has 
been through both a vertical and horizontal shift. Vertically, we have seen a 
movement of political power upwards to trans-national levels of government while 
sub-national levels of government are gaining more power. Horizontally, we have 
seen a shift of responsibilities from governmental actors towards non-governmental 
actors. This shift can be noticed at all societal levels (Eckerberg and Joas, 2004. p. 
407). This thesis addresses matters concerning both the vertical and horizontal shift. 
4.3.1 The vertical dimension 
The ‘Multilevel’ article accounts first and foremost for the vertical dimensions and 
places local climate protection in a multilevel governance chain. We highlight that in 
this structure of governance local actors can play the role as a ‘structure’ for the 
implementation of national or international climate objectives as well as that of a 
policy ‘actor’ taking independent policy initiatives, including sending political signals 
to the national and international level. In the ‘Multilevel’ article, we emphasise the 
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relationships between the national and the local levels of governance in Norway.12
The direct cause for municipalities starting with climate planning in Norway was the 
Ministry of Environment (MoE) 2000 grant of NOK 7 million13 to stimulate local 
climate planning in Norwegian municipalities and counties. The experiences from 
these planning processes show that apart from a few front-runner municipalities, 
climate change is rarely on the forefront of the local political agenda. In the 
‘Multilevel’ article we account for a general decline in commitment and interest in 
climate issues among the municipalities. This trend engenders more profound 
questions about the relationship between the national and local level in environmental 
politics.
Through a number of publications over recent years, Western Norway Research 
Institute and ProSus have accounted for the national-local relationship in 
environmental politics (Aall et al., 2001; Aall et al., 2002; Lafferty et al., 2002; 
Lafferty et al., forthcoming). One of the general findings is that national authorities 
have used the municipalities as a ‘laboratory for experiments’ in this field. The state 
funded project for local climate protection in Norway follows a tradition within 
environmental policy and planning: initiating pilot projects. Through the 1990s until 
the present numerous pilot projects in a number of municipalities have been initiated 
to make the municipalities take responsibility for global environmental issues. After 
the pilot projects end however, municipality activity and initiatives drop and go back 
to concentrate more on locally oriented environmental problems like waste treatment, 
noise, and air pollution (Aall et al., 2002). The Norwegian experience with local 
climate planning gives food for thought as to how communication lines and 
responsibilities between local and national levels should be ordered. First, even 
though the local level is increasingly recognised as a partner to national authorities in 
environmental politics, actors at the local level experience hindrances due to national 
inaction. This is due to the failure of coordinating conflicting interests and the 
integration of climate issues in sectors such as transport, communication, and energy 
at the national level, and also because local actors do not hold the policy measures 
12 It should be emphasised that the Norwegian institutional structure is different from federal states. 
Norway is a unitary state where conflicts between national, regional and local levels of governance are 
part of the ‘political game’. Norwegian municipalities also have a relatively high tax rate compared to 
other countries. There is also more of a culture for strong public steering (not least through the land-use 
plan) than in many other countries.  
13 Approximately 850,000 € 
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required to create changes in policy (see Aall, 2000; Aall et al., 2002). It is also 
unclear what the national authorities want the municipal level to do with global issues. 
Norwegian authorities, through White Papers and guidelines, clearly state that the 
municipalities have a role to play with respect to global environmental problems. 
After the projects and the money that has facilitated local action on these matters ends 
however (for instance in Local Agenda 21 and the project with local climate 
planning), the municipalities are left uncertain of what they should do next.
The ‘CCPC’ article accounts for a somewhat different story. The article describes 
how a trans-national municipality network acted as a policy actor in climate politics 
by initiating a climate campaign independent of nation states, trying to organize a co-
operative effort among cities and playing a role in the international climate arena. 
Before and after the Kyoto meeting in 1997, CCPC gave their input and 
recommendation to the parties in the Climate Convention. CCPC follows a framework 
that parallels the Conference of the Parties (COP), and representatives from the CCPC 
attended the meetings (Lindseth, 2003). Many regard the Johannesburg meeting in 
2002 as the point when the local level of governance was finally and fully recognised 
as a partner in a coordinated and multilevel approach on sustainable development, 
much thanks to the work of the International Council of Local Environmental 
Initiatives (ICLEI) and CCPC.14
Even though I question the success of the CCPC in terms of contributing to reducing 
global warming, this network accounts for new ways of governance in climate 
politics. Not only does it show how local actors can initiate actions themselves in the 
absence of nation state politics, it is also creating a new sphere of authority within 
which climate governance takes place (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 894). Bulkeley (2005, p. 
894) argues that this network can be seen as part of a “polycentric system of 
multilevel or multi-scalar governance”. The CCPC does not operate across existing 
scales, but destabilises the old notion of how governance is played out in a hierarchy, 
since it is not defined in terms of a particular territory. Whereas the CCPC was 
initially coordinated by staff at ICLEI’s international headquarters in Toronto, the 
CCPC programme is more and more decentralized as ICLEI establishes national and 
14 CCPC has its own staff and its own campaign organisation. However, CCPC grew out of ICLEI and 
is a campaign under ICLEI’s organisational umbrella. 
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regional campaigns. Today, local and regional campaigns have developed close 
partnerships with a number of national governments (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003, p. 
51). In line with the experience from the ‘Multilevel’ article, this also indicates that 
cities are dependent on help from higher level of governance in order to succeed. 
Through its policy dialogue with the Conferences of the Parties (COP) under the 
Climate protocol, the CCPC has emphasised that cities are doing fine, but need help. 
Legally binding national commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, if agreed-
upon targets and timetables are ambitious, would significantly enhance and amplify 
local initiatives. On the other hand, weak national commitments risk undermining 
local government initiatives (Lindseth, 2003). 
‘Stavanger’ and ‘Kristiansand’ account for different ways that national politics is 
inflicted on local politics. In ‘Stavanger’ I show how the realisation of the Rogass
project became critically dependent on state power, when in July 2003 the State 
Pollution Control Agency (SPCA) decided that Lyse’s plans for the pipeline had to be 
evaluated according to the National Pollution Control Act. In late November 2003 the 
SPCA approved all aspects of Lyse’s application and the decision effectively states 
that climate commitments must be seen in relation to other national goals and values. 
As such, local actors aiming to keep climate commitments did not receive any help 
from a crucial national actor.   
In ‘Kristiansand’, we portray how the national authorities became an important factor 
in changing policy discourses through its reward grant to stimulate public transport 
and delimit car use. A precondition for this allocation is that the cities have managed 
to, or planned to introduce initiatives that, reduce car traffic. There has been a 
discussion on whether one really needs to initiate restrictive measures to release this 
money. In meetings in the city development committee and the executive committee 
on the local council in winter 2005/2006 however, it was confirmed that these 
measures are important, not only to get money from the Ministry of Transport and 
Communication (MoTC), but also to provide better conditions and access for the bus. 
In the application to the MoTC completed in November 2005 it is stated that the 
municipality has already initiated a number of restrictive measures and that it sets out 
to do the following: Remove parking places, put restrictions on parking, work with 
traffic refurbishing, and preserve certain streets for public transport. It seems evident 
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that this institutional anchoring including national government ‘carrots’ played a role 
in structuring the work in Kristiansand.
This thesis is not infused with the idea that ‘small is beautiful’ and that ecological 
crises will be best managed through local action. However, experiences from the 
‘CCPC’ and the ‘Multilevel’ articles indicate that unless national commitments are 
strengthened, it is unlikely that local climate policy will become more than a policy 
area for the few front-runner municipalities. The strong normative argument here for a 
better facilitation and support from national authorities is that it is hard to see how 
nation states will be able to meet their international commitments for addressing 
climate change without including a strong cooperation with local authorities. 
Kristiansand is an example of how this could be done where the reward grant from the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication initiated actions to delimit car use in the 
city.
4.3.2 The horizontal dimension  
With the involvement of other policy actors, the political game is also changing. In 
the ‘CCPC’ article I state that CCPC understood that giving priority to options with 
clear co-benefits is helpful in persuading groups that would otherwise not be 
persuaded to adopt innovations. This might seem wise from the perspective of 
businesses, consumers, and local authorities. By integrating climate change into the 
broader sustainability debate, the window of opportunity is bigger and more actors 
can be a part of the process. However, a problem with such a broad approach seen 
from an environmental perspective is that climate issues can become less prioritised; 
the sector or organisations responsible for climate change protection action will not be 
given the principle authority and will therefore lose out to other sector interests. In 
democracies there is always a discussion about what kind of policy issues should 
prevail, and in many cases it is legitimate to put aside environmental objectives for 
more pressing concerns. The widening of the policy agenda, in terms of more non-
state actors and governmental sectors participating, makes visible the possible win-
win solutions where mutual benefits can be realised. However, it is also clear that in 
many cases climate objectives stand in contrast to and compete with other policy 
issues. Lafferty (2004, p. 203) suggests that non-environmental sectors would be 
equally monitored with environmental sectors – in the case of curbing CO2 emissions 
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– in its compliance with an overriding norm. The suggestion here is that a priority 
principle should apply to individual sectors and cumulatively across sectors.  
The ‘Kristiansand’ article tells a story of how local business increasingly was drawn 
into the Land-use and Transport project (ATP) in the city. The ATP forum set up new 
channels of communication and managed to create a partnership with local business. 
Business and industry were not formally integrated, but the project highlighted a need 
for better dialogue with business organisations in order to realise projects and plans. 
This led to the establishment of a ‘City forum’, where the leader of the business 
association and the leader of the Kvadraturen met together with key persons in the 
municipality administration. This new City forum is an example of how one kind of 
new governance structure (ATP) creates a need for better integration and inclusive 
governance between other actor constellations.
The Kristiansand case shows how policy integration between the environmental sector 
and representatives and business actors can happen. Information and new knowledge 
about public transport and shopping combined with a new institutional structure 
played important roles. A survey on bus-use contributed to a new understanding 
among business representatives in the city. It seems that a process of reframing is 
taking place. Key persons in business life increasingly realise that there are solutions 
good for both shopping and the environment. The changing relations among the 
businesses can be seen as a discursive reframing in terms of how to view the bus in 
the city. Where the bus was formerly seen as an enemy and a competitor to the car, it 
is now seen as an asset in the city centre. 
4.4 How can discourse analysis be further developed as an 
approach for analysing the relationship between scale and 
multi-level governance in policy analysis? 
I argue in the ‘Climate adaptation’ article that discourse analysis also needs to answer 
the ‘so what?’ question: What does the insight from this study actually mean for 
improving our understanding of environmental politics or providing insights on 
similar cases in different contexts? What is necessary to develop a discursive theory 
of local environment politics? The specific issue that I aim to bring into the political 
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science literature is the issue of scale. I argue at the end of the ‘Stavanger’ article that 
much more needs to be known about how the emerging multi-scaled politics of 
climate change policymaking is shaping the conditions for urban environmental 
management.  
Political science research has made little impact on climate policy analysis and 
policymaking. Where do we go from here? The founder of discourse analysis, 
Foucault, was not interested in determining what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ but to determine 
the ‘main danger’. For Foucault “not everything is bad, but everything is dangerous” 
(Luke, 1999, p. 27). From this perspective a response to the question of “where do we 
go from here?”, would be to ask what the main dangers are with framing climate 
change in terms of the global scale. Fairclough (1992, p. 91) states that only 
discourses that take an active role in reproduction or transforming society are 
ideologically invested. When a discourse is ideologically effective it has managed to 
naturalize a certain understanding and win acceptance as a common sense. The point 
for Fairclough is to denaturalize such an opinion. This entails showing which interests 
and perspectives lie behind such a dominating or hegemonic understanding. Certain 
ways of framing climate change emphasise and empower some institutions and 
individuals whose concerns and competencies they are associated with, and 
simultaneously marginalize others (cf. Keeley and Scoones, 1999, p. 25). In earlier 
times it was easier to ‘pick out the bad guy’, but as Hajer (1995) writes, today 
everybody is ’green’. Discourse analysis informs us to never take any argument as 
given and emphasises finding the overlooked marginal voices. In this case, it is 
problematic that everybody is green, while climate emissions still continue to rise.  
The most critical aspect or ‘danger’ of the thinking globally discourse is that it is 
backed by powerful actors from business and the political arena. The scalar category 
of ‘global’ has provided corporate groups with a language that can accommodate 
ecological issues. My studies indicate that scalar framing should be a core concern in 
mapping out power dimensions in climate politics. For instance, Lutes (1998, p. 171) 
suggests that we “reconceptualise the ‘global’ without romanticizing and reifying the 
‘local’”.
In this thesis I rely heavily on Rydin’s (2003) way of conceptualising discourses. 
Rydin suggests that if discourse analysis is to be used as a means in environmental 
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politics and planning, we should pay attention to three specific sources of rationality: 
scientific, economic, and communicative. These three sources appear to be the main 
rationalities used to legitimate policy and decisions in this field. Rydin develops three 
distinctive discourses: a scientific–economic, communicative-economic, and 
scientific–communicative. Combining the rationalities aims to contribute to the 
ongoing process by which a stronger justification for environmental and sustainable 
policy can be built (Rydin, 2003, p. 168). Rydin’s perspective has broad implications 
for the discourse field as an attempt to systematize local discourses on the 
environment in such a way that they are useful for environmental planning.  
In the final discussion of this thesis I relate Rydin’s ideas of rationalities to my 
findings and offer ideas of how to move on from here. Applying Rydin’s perspective 
in such a discussion is legitimised in the ways these rationalities resemble the idea of 
sustainable development. The core idea of sustainable development is its holistic 
character: the ways in which it seeks to combine the environmental, the economic, 
and the social. Rydin (2003, p. 167) explains how these three dimensions are closely 
related to the rationalities:  
Scientific rationality supports the claims of environmental sustainability; economic rationality 
relates directly to the economic dimension; and communicative rationality justifies the 
involvement of a broad range of actors and considerations of a wide range of perspectives, a 
key link to social sustainability.  
Applying this perspective to the three articles discussed above (‘Norwegian Climate 
Policy’, ‘Stavanger’, and ‘CCPC’), we begin by investigating what role these 
rationalities play in the dominating discourses in the different cases. It seems evident 
that there is a dominance of economic rationality in the thinking globally (TG) 
discourse as portrayed in ‘Norwegian Climate Policy’ and ‘Stavanger’. Here the 
climate issue is constructed in terms of (international) cost-effectiveness, and nature is 
seen as a resource and an object of consumption: Norwegian petroleum production is 
an environmentally and climatic sound harvesting of nature’s resources. The TG 
discourse does not pay particular interest to a scientific rationality; i.e., seeing nature 
as a physical reality which is an object of scientific inquiry. The limitations – 
envisaged and revealed by scientific knowledge – of an uninterrupted continuation of 
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economic processes is not discussed in the TG discourse. To the degree that scientific 
rationality is included in this discourse, it is found among the actors of the petroleum 
industry that aim to further develop the methods and means of petroleum production 
to make it cleaner and more acceptable from an environmental perspective (and thus 
also more internationally competitive). Communicative rationality emphasises how 
nature is socially constructed in the interface between the physical and the social, and 
highlights the importance of a wide range of stakeholder involvement in the decision 
making process. The critique of economic rationality from the perspective of 
communicative rationality is inadequate stakeholder involvement and the rejection of 
lay knowledge in the process. Arguably, the TG discourse is a technical discourse 
relying on a consequential ethic (see ‘Norwegian Climate Policy’), and dependent on 
a continuous ‘knowledge brokerage’ to make it comprehensible. Whereas a discourse 
of national or local responsibility relies on an understanding that there is too much 
GHG in the atmosphere (a point that was ‘brokered’ a long time ago), the TG involves 
complex macro-economic reasoning. Thus, a communicative rationality has not 
played a dominant role in the TG discourse.  
In the ‘CCPC’ article I show that the frame into which CCPC has put climate change 
has a stronger influence on scientific rationality. Scientific evidence of human 
induced global warming and the threats this produces for humanity are themes 
repeated in CCPC documents. Additionally, a scientific methodology is core in the 
approach and the tools that CCPC recommends for its member cities. Once inducted, 
the local government should complete five performance milestones. The milestones 
are a methodology helping local governments understand how municipal decisions 
affect energy use, and how reductions in use can mitigate global climate change while 
improving the quality of life. CCPC has also designed GHG emissions software for 
municipalities, which streamlines emissions analysis. The frame also includes a 
significant focus on economic rationality however, through how CCPC is portraying 
the benefits cities enjoy in working with climate protection. When the CCPC enters 
the stage of implementation it is this economic rationality that is increasingly stressed. 
Scientific methodology is still the primary tool, but as the article shows, the CCPC is 
now diminishing the importance of scientific rationality (of an unbalanced world that 
requires immediate action). This way of framing climate change as a technical and 
economic issue mirrors a general trend in climate politics as portrayed by Weingart et 
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al., (2000). These authors argue that initially, a basic understanding of the underlying 
science and cause and effect of climate change is established, and is then translated 
into responsibilities of different actors and corresponding policy options. In later 
phases, the climate field becomes more technical and ‘removed’ from the original 
problem formulation. This development can be seen as a lack of communicative 
rationality in climate politics. The climate issue no longer belongs to the people, and 
the concerns of the people are not influencing the ways in which the issue is treated.
The main discursive argument is that the scalar discourses analysed in this thesis do 
not mesh and create a balance between the different rationalities and thus fail to create 
sustainable development (cf. Rydin, 2003). In the quest for sustainable development, 
the discourse approach informs us that different rationalities are more than ideology 
and interests. Rationalities entail that knowledge and ideas have an independent force 
since they are built on arguments. These arguments can be more or less true, but as 
long as we believe them, they have their own force. In the thinking globally discourse, 
economic rationality is a strong and growing presupposition within the policy process 
as a whole (see also Dryzek, 1997; Hajer, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 1998). Any actor willing 
to create a better balance between economic, scientific, and communicative 
rationality, must realise that economic rationality is an important presupposition in 
local and national politics. Environmental actors are forced to rethink how they can 
make use of this rationality to the benefit of the environment. Local actors therefore 
need to redefine or reframe globally oriented policy discourses by for instance, a 
scientific-economic discourse. Such a discourse would seek to incorporate the 
knowledge generated by environmental science into the prevailing economic models 
(see ‘Climate adaptation’). Rydin (2003, p. 170) argues that the two rationalities can 
easily complement each other since they both use the rhetoric of the expert and can 
speak with the expert voice. Such a discourse could be used to identify the potential 
for finding solutions both technologically feasible and economically viable in real-
world situations. 
Another key point from a discourse perspective is that the time for agitated 
environmental battle without compromises is over. To the degree that one only makes 
use of a scientific rationality that emphasises knowledge of environmental 
degradation and effects of climate impacts, the environmental issue will also lose out 
62
in the future. Illustrative here is the article “The Death of Environmentalism, Global 
Warming politics in a post-environmental world” by Michael Shellenberger and Ted 
Nordhaus. These authors argue that the green activists have reduced themselves to a 
small sectoral interest group by reducing all environmental questions to a limited 
issue that only can be solved through technical regulations (Shellenberger and 
Nordhaus, 2004). The article has clear resonance for the Norwegian condition (see 
Kaarbø, 2005). The environmental movement is in the process of being placed on the 
sideline due to the tough Kyoto demands and the failure to provide a realistic answer 
to how an increasing need for energy and the Kyoto- requirements are to be met 
without a market-oriented strategy. By insisting on promoting resistance to natural gas 
based power plants, the environmental movement risks losing to an alliance of 
business, labour unions, and strong political actors (Kaarbø, 2005).
Today’s environmental fight, globally, nationally, and locally, demands a better 
understanding of the need to combine different rationalities and create alliances with 
different actors that are carriers of different rationalities. Rydin (2003) informs us that 
the potential for a renewed sustainability discourse lies here: These discourses have 
the potential of facilitating action through the creation of new actor constellations. 
Through accentuating different rationalities, designing its message in such a manner 
that actors from businesses, organisations or communities are given an understanding 
and a language through which they can comprehend the issue at stake, more actors 
can be mobilized under the sustainable development banner. The challenge for 
environmental planners and environmentally concerned citizens is to make an analysis 
of its constituency and find out how knowledge about rationalities and discourses can 
be used to create a new engagement for sustainable development.  
Bringing different rationalities into the debate affords the promise that the public 
debate can be more open. It is only through democratic institutions that conflicts 
relating to climate change and other interests can be solved. Habermas (1996) informs 
us that when the idea is consensus, private and special interests will be diminished in 
the public arena as it will not be legitimate to argue for political solutions based on 
pure self-interests in this space. Paramount for sustainable development is to allow 
different interests to meet each other in an open debate on sustainability. In this regard 
it is problematic that there is virtually no current debate about our petroleum industry 
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seen from a climate perspective. As Erling Kjekstad, commentator in the newspaper 
Nationen stated 23 July 2005,
[It…] should be possible to speak loudly about politically decided limits for petroleum 
extraction. Once a production limit was actually discussed in Norway [...] in consideration of 
pressure on the economy, but also due to environmental concerns. The question about the 
speed of oil extraction, possibly the most important question in Norway, has become de-
politicized.   
In light of the facts that the Norwegian parliament stated in 1989 that we should 
stabilize our CO2 emissions, we have ratified the Kyoto protocol, and our emissions 
continue to grow, a debate about the opening of new oil fields in the North of 
Norway15 should also be assessed from a climate perspective. In this case an open 
debate where different rationalities are upheld may result in a discussion about what 
has gone wrong in Norwegian climate politics, and a search for solution could 
commence, where all sectors and actors – including the petroleum industry - would 
have to address the problem that climate emissions are continuously growing.
15 Cf. The ongoing debate on the “Forvaltningsplan for Nord- Områdene”
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis concerns the politics of climate change as understood through a discourse 
perspective. Central to this perspective’s understanding of the environment is that the 
lack of urgency about the problem cannot be attributed to the nature of the climate 
problem and human beings alone. Environmental problems are not ontologically 
fixed, but are subject to discursive struggles. I have highlighted that the way climate 
change is defined and the meaning attached to this problem decides available 
solutions. In line with Hajer and Versteeg (2005, p. 181) I see the strength of 
discursive analysis as the “ability to trace the discursive power struggles underlying 
environmental politics”. Rather than striving for analytical clarity or discussing 
nuances or differences between discourse and other related concepts like  ‘frames’, 
‘storylines’ or ‘ideas’, I employ the discourse concept in a pragmatic way, aiming to 
advance insights about the processes under study. I have sought to understand how 
particular definitions and interpretation of climate change catch on and what the 
consequences of these particular framings are.
My findings are first and foremost valid for the Norwegian context. However, I have 
also accounted for different aspects of the climate issue that have broader and more 
general implications. Most importantly, the discourse perspective and the empirical 
cases have contributed to new insights through the way they interact: I have shed light 
on specific climate controversies and have contributed to a more nuanced 
understanding of the discourse perspective. I would argue that this thesis makes at 
least two important contributions to the field of climate politics. 
First, I will argue that viewing climate change controversies in terms of ‘scales’ is an 
important asset to policy literature in this field. I adopt an understanding of scale as a 
fluid and procedural concept that is socially constructed. In climate politics there is no 
perfect fit between the ecological dimensions of climate change and the institutional 
dimensions of the problem. My studies show how climate change as a political 
problem belongs to the local, regional, national, or global scales. I argue that we 
misunderstand politics if we make clear distinctions between local or global politics. 
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The core challenge for politics in light of this perspective, becomes one of assessing 
whether or not dominant understandings of climate change as a political problem fit 
with the institutional apparatus set up to handle the problem. In this setting, my thesis 
concludes that local and national actors have up-scaled the climate issue. In Norway 
the climate issue has been institutionally placed as a responsibility for both national 
and local levels of governance; i.e. both Norwegian national and local authorities have 
committed to work on climate protection. My thesis however, shows that these actors  
in their work and discussions on climate change bring forward a discourse in which 
the climate issue is a global problem requiring global solutions.
Second, and related to the first point, this way of viewing climate change as a global 
issue in a national or local context has consequences for the policy solutions that can 
be sought. Local and national actors aiming to work for climate change are being met 
with the argument that projects and plans must be evaluated according to emission 
consequences at the global scale. This thesis argues that it is not that the climate issue 
should be solved at the local level of governance or within the boundaries of the 
nation states. – This work opens up a broader discussion about climate change as a 
concerted multilevel operation. In this light, the thinking globally discourse is a break 
with the idea of differentiated responsibilities, where communities at the local and 
national level have a democratic responsibility to deal with their own emissions. We 
argue in the ‘Multilevel’ article that it seems today that unless national commitments 
are strengthened, it is unlikely that local climate policy will become more than a 
policy area for the few front-runner municipalities. The idea of thinking globally 
might work to distract attention from how actors at the different levels of governance 
can make a contribution to climate governance.  
Building on these points, this thesis also provides a normative theoretical answer to 
the question of how we can move forward. Through relying on a perspective by 
Yvonne Rydin (2003) I contribute to a better understanding of how discourses can be 
used as a tool in climate change policy making. Rydin contributes to the ongoing 
process by which a stronger justification for environmental and sustainable policy can 
be built; she does this by bringing attention to three dominating rationalities in 
environmental policymaking: scientific, economic, and communicative. Based on 
Rydin’s perspective I argue that the scalar discourses analysed here do not mesh and 
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create a balance between these different rationalities. Today’s environmental 
challenges, globally, nationally, and locally, demand a better understanding of the 
need to combine different rationalities and create alliances with different actors.
Discourse analysis is underestimated as a tool in environmental policy and planning. 
The strength of the perspective in policy analysis has so far been its ability to reveal 
the power relations that lie in language use and to account for how politics turns out 
the way it does. However, an important next step for discourse analysts should be to 
find productive ways to use discourses. This thesis has brought forward a perspective 
by Rydin that is constructivist without being ideographic or positivist. Such a 
perspective suggests ways that discourses can be used as tool for a better realisation of 
policy goals. Further research should be set into discussing whether specific 
rationalities, discourses, and knowledge systems from one case can be transferred to 
other contexts, situations, and cases without compromising the strength and the 
fruitfulness of the discourse approach. The promise that lies in trying to systematise 
how different rationalities and discourses frame policy processes, is a discursive 
theory of environmental politics.  
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Abstract
In this article it is argued that environmental policy research could gain from 
developing an understanding of how the concepts of ‘scale’, ‘scalar strategies’ 
and ‘struggles over scale’ play out empirically in processes of environmental 
policy-making and planning. I emphasise how scale, as an issue in 
environmental governance, is not merely an independent variable causing 
specific outcomes; rather it is negotiable, allowing actors to adopt different 
strategies in order to pursue their varying agendas. In this article it is shown 
how a local struggle can be represented as a global struggle. The case concerns 
the domestic use of natural gas in the Norwegian city of Stavanger, and how this 
metamorphosed into a struggle as to what was the appropriate geographical 
scale at which the environmental and climatic consequences of a natural gas 
project should be assessed. By framing climate change as a global issue, local 
actors were able to portray the natural gas project as environmentally friendly. 
The article argues that the realisation of this natural gas project should be seen 
1
in light of how strategies over scale – that were developed in the debate – fitted 
with climate discourses institutionalised in national policy and politics. 
1. Introduction 
A key characteristic of climate policy making is its multi-scalar nature 
(Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). The climate change problem can be seen as both 
global and local. – Global because the triggering factor of man-made climate 
changes, the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere is 
globally dispersed, and because the processes that cause greenhouse gas 
emissions are distributed over the entire planet. At the same time, the problems 
can be seen as local in the sense that the effects of climate changes will vary 
dramatically due to local conditions, and because emissions in reality always 
will occur locally.  
The governance of climate change has primarily belonged to the national and 
international level, the Kyoto agreements being the main institutional apparatus 
for handling the problem. However, during the nineties local climate policy and 
planning has been established as a distinct policy field of its own and it has 
become evident that local level action can be an important supplement to 
climate change actions on other levels of government (Bulkeley and Betsill, 
2003). Local climate policy can thus be seen as an example of rescaling of 
environmental governance (cf. Gibbs and Jonas, 2001, p. 271). When one of the 
leading international climate network of local governments, the Cities for 
Climate Protection campaign (CCP), argues that cities are both part of the 
climate problem and of the solution, this can be seen as a way to actively 
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‘reframe’ or ‘rescale’ climate change from being a global to a local issue 
(Lindseth, 2004).
This multi-scalar nature of climate policy and planning makes it a contested 
policy field open to various social constructs. The role that scales play in 
climate policy making depends, however, on what we mean by scale. In this 
article scale will be seen as socially constructed. Swyngedouw (1997) suggests 
that rather than take a geographical scale as ontologically pregiven, one should 
investigate how and why particular scales are privileged in socio-political 
struggles. A number of authors have emphasised how scale and scalar 
configurations have been used strategically by groups to pursue a particular 
agenda (Brown and Purcell, 2005; Randles and Dicken, 2004; Cowell, 2003). 
The issue at stake in this article is how locally based actors used such scalar 
categories in the political struggle over a natural gas project in the Norwegian 
city of Stavanger. Stavanger is selected as a case on the basis of the role it plays 
as ‘best practice’ in urban sustainability. In Norway, the conflict between the 
use of natural gas and climate protection has never been as apparent as in 
Stavanger. Stavanger is thus a pioneering case in showing how local actors 
come to debate and negotiate the environmental and climatic consequences of 
domestic use of natural gas. 
The structure of this article is as follows. Section two explains how the scale 
concept is relevant in the study of climate change politics. Section three lays out 
the policy context – both how climate change politics has been debated at the 
national level in Norway and how the city of Stavanger has engaged in climate 
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protection work. Section four presents the Stavanger case study. This section 
analyses the conflict between the use of natural gas and climate protection 
through the lens of scale theory. Section five concludes and points to a need for 
further research on scalar re-framing as a strategy in local environmental 
conflicts. 
2. Scalar struggles and climate policy 
In recent years the idea that geographical scale is socially constructed and thus 
historically changeable through socio-political contestation has been repeated 
over and over in scientific articles (Brenner, 2001). Moreover, a second insight 
from the scale literature is that since scales are socially produced through 
political struggles, scales and scalar arrangements are both fluid and processual 
(Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 609). According to Swyngedouw and Heynen 
(2003, p. 913) there is a constant societal struggle going on to define who has 
control over a particular scale. It is important, then, that the priority both 
theoretically and politically focuses on the socio- ecological process through 
“which particular social and environmental scales become constituted and 
subsequently reconstituted” (Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003, p. 912). Although 
considerable work has been undertaken to understand scale as a theoretical and 
methodological concept, less work has concentrated on scale as an explicit 
object of analysis (Brown and Purcell, 2005; Hu, 2005). Moreover, there are 
few references to scale and the politics of scale in studies of environmental 
policy and planning (Bulkeley, 2005). To the degree that scale is mentioned in 
this literature, it fails to recognize scale as socially constructed. Scale is rather 
taken for granted as synonymous with the “nested territorial containers within 
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which social and political life takes place” (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 876). When there 
is nothing ontologically given about scale, it follows that that results of a 
political struggle can not be explained based on the inherent qualities of 
particular scales themselves (Brown and Purcell, 2005). In this article I will 
emphasise how scales within environmental governance are not primarily an 
independent variable causing specific outcomes; rather they are a strategy that 
actors can use to pursue a particular agenda (cf. Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 
608). A scalar strategy can be denoted as a political strategy that frames reality 
in terms of scale (cf. McCann, 2003, p. 160). Outcomes of a given scalar 
arrangements, it will be argued, are then to be found in the “political agendas of 
the actors and organizations that produced and are empowered by the 
arrangement” (cf. Brown and Purcell, 2005, p. 608). 
Recent work has begun to address how the concepts of ‘scale’, ‘scalar 
strategies’ and ‘struggles over scale’ play out empirically in issues of 
sustainable development and the environment. Bulkeley (2005), for e.g., depicts 
how the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) campaign is a case well suited to 
comprehend how the “new geographies of environmental governance are taking 
shape” (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 897). She argues (Bulkeley, 2005, p. 897) that 
through this network the nature of the state is being rearticulated and rescaled, 
while at the same “a new networked arena within which climate change is being 
governed is emergent”. Boyle (2002) shows more explicitly how the concepts of 
‘scalar strategies’ and ‘struggles over scales’ can be useful in studying 
ecological projects. The scaling of environmental governance can be both a 
medium for and an outcome of concrete environmental projects (Boyle, 2002, p. 
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173). Similarly Cowell (2003) seeks to demonstrate how relations of ecological 
and political scale framed the ‘decision space’ in a study of the development of 
an amenity barrage in Cardiff Bay. In particular, Cowell discusses the issue of 
substitutability, i.e. the extent to which forms of capital (environmental, 
economic) might be substitutable, and how scalar constructs were deployed by 
various actors actively in compensating the loss of wildlife habitat. A key 
question was: should the measures provided for compensation primarily create 
value of international, national or local importance (Cowell, 2003, p. 352)? In a 
climate change context, this struggle entails both defining how far local climate 
responsibility should extend, and what sustainability actually means in a local 
context. In the case study presented in the present article this problematic is 
exemplified by how the introduction and use of natural gas in the city of 
Stavanger challenged the city’s climate protection commitment. Piecing 
together different mitigation options and balancing economic interests and 
nature preservation is an exercise in scalar politics, problematising the 
‘optimum scale’ for pursuing sustainable development (Cowell, 2003, p. 356).  
The literature summarised in the previous section provides intriguing examples 
of scalar constructions in environmental politics. Cox (1998) adds to this 
literature an analytical ‘tool’ that help us more explicitly comprehend what 
actors do when they construct scale and how scalar strategies are used in 
political struggles.1 He makes the analytical distinction between ‘spaces of 
dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’. Cox (1998) emphasises the 
intersection between local politics and a constructed concept of scale: Local 
1 Cowell (2003) do, however, to a certain degree make use of Cox (1998) methodology. 
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interests, identities, conditions, and agents constitute a ‘space of dependence’; 
the somewhat fixed local arenas upon which more or less ‘immobilized’ actors 
depend for sustenance (see also Smith, 1998). A space of dependence may for 
instance be a local labour market surrounding a localised core industry. These 
spaces of dependence are inserted in broader sets of relationships or structures, 
which for example can be local government, national press or even global 
institutions or actors. Cox (1998) calls these the ‘spaces of engagement’; the 
spaces that local actors construct in order to secure the conditions for the 
continued existence of their spaces of dependence.
Cox’ methodology is not without difficulties, however. Cox (1998) emphasises 
that a number of socio-spatial relations are not possible to substitute for another. 
Spaces of dependence are these social relations and the interactions that can 
only be undertaken locally. This immobilisation in particular spaces of 
dependence – like local economies or local government jurisdiction – is 
something that is shared among the locally based actors (Cox, 1998, p. 5). It is 
not easy, however, to decide how these local social conditions are to be defined 
or circumscribed. Smith (1998, p 36) argues that Cox’ definition of spaces of 
dependence, brings to mind question such as: “What local power relations are 
embedded in this ‘preservation’ of local objects, relations and purposes? Who is 
dependent upon what or whom in these localized networks?” These questions 
engender another key issue: where does a space of dependence end and where 
does a space of engagement begin? Cox (1998, p. 17) states that the relation 
between spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement is a contingent matter, 
and to complicate things further, in certain cases spaces of engagement may 
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actually be smaller than spaces of dependence2. As such, Cox’ methodology is 
not always easy to employ in nesting out particular political struggles. However, 
even though the distinction between the two concepts is not clear cut, Cox has 
made an important contribution to the scale debate through pointing to the great 
variety of ways that scale can be constructed (Jones, 1998, p. 25). The key issue 
is that locally based actors do not necessarily only practice local politics. –
Spaces of dependence are the locally fixed arenas where actors are based and 
upon which they depend if they want to realise their project. However, through 
involving the concept of spaces of engagement, Cox shows how actors construct 
networks of associations more global than the local. Whereas Cox (1998) in his 
case studies concentrates on how local actors or groups build actor-networks
with centres of power more global than the local, Jones (1998) primarily brings 
attention to the discursive resources that actors use. By building networks, local 
groups practice politics by reshaping discourses; these local groups discursively 
re-present their political struggle across scale (Jones, 1998, p. 26). Moreover, 
actors in such networks do not necessarily know each other, or may not even 
have met. They do, however, share a specific way of framing and presenting a 
particular issue. Hajer (1995) calls such networks or associations discourse
coalitions; they are not primarily based on shared interests, let alone shared 
goals, but much more on shared concepts and terms. In this article, I align 
myself with Hajer (1995) in investigating the discursive resources that actors 
use, not the actor-networks in themselves.3 It will be shown how the ‘local’, 
2 An example of this in Cox’ article is the case of a local development network where the space of 
dependence is a service area. Cox (1998, p. 18) states that “for the local actors much of their local 
economic development activity has to be fought out in the jurisdiction of the local governments into 
which that space of dependence is subdivided so that the spaces of engagement are at a smaller scale.” 
3 This is not to say that actor-networks in themselves are not important (see Keeley and Scoones, 1999. 
for an overview of different approaches to environmental policy processes). A discursive approach 
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‘national’ and ‘global’ must be understood not just as arenas where political 
struggles play out, but as discursively constructed concepts that consciously and 
unconsciously are used as a means of power in political processes. Through 
building discourse coalitions and designing their texts and speeches in such a 
way that the benefits of viewing a problem at a particular scale is made visible, 
these actors can become more forceful (cf. Holzscheiter, 2005). They can e.g. 
promote certain kinds of intervention and foreclose others, and legitimate 
certain solutions (Boyle, 2002, Cowell, 2003, McCann, 2003). By scaling 
environmental problems in a specific way they are thus employing a scalar 
strategy, where the goal is to determine which scalar frame of reference within 
which the debate should take place.
3. The policy context: debating climate change in 
Norway 
Norway is a major producer of oil and natural gas, which is reflected in the fact 
that Norwegian greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from petroleum operations 
(stemming from the burning of gas in turbines and flares, as well as the burning 
of diesel) accounted for 25 per cent of all GHG emissions in 2003 (MoE, 
2005).4 The environmental debate in Norway from the 1990s and onwards has 
circled around how Norway’s petroleum production can be assessed from a 
climate change perspective. There is little discussion in Norway about whether 
will, however, in highlighting the discursive manoeuvring around political considerations emphasis 
other factors which are often overlooked in a more traditional actor-network or interest based analysis. 
See conclusion for more discussion on this.  
4 The other sources of GHG emissions in Norway are: Road traffic (19%), industrial processes (18 %), 
combustion (15%), agriculture (8%), coastal traffic and fisheries (7%), waste (4%), other mobile (4%).  
The total emissions of GHG increased with 9 % in the period 1990-2003 (MoE, 2005). 
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petroleum should be extracted or not, it is given that we should do this; rather, 
the discussion is about how it should be extracted, i.e. the rate and place of 
extraction.
Norway has to date not used its oil and gas production domestically, but 
exported it. Historically, Norway has based its industrial development on the 
provision of cheap energy from hydro-electric power (HEP). Norway’s 
electricity production is virtually 100 per cent based on HEP (Hovden and 
Lindseth, 2002). However, with the increased level of energy in Norway, the 
national production has not been sufficient to cover domestic use, and Norway 
has imported electricity in recent years. In this context, the White paper No. 9 to 
the Storting5 (2002–2003) On Domestic Use of Natural Gas considers it 
important to facilitate increased use of natural gas in domestic value creation 
(MoPE, 2003). Considerable interest now exists in making use of natural gas in 
Norway. Increased use of natural gas domestically will add more fuel to the 
discussion concerning whether Norway should take ‘national action’ or ‘think 
globally’ (cf. Hovden and Lindseth, 2004). The national action (NA) discourse 
in Norwegian climate policy emphasises that national climate policy should be 
based on reductions in domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to 
fulfil an international obligation and demonstrate willingness to be an 
environmental pioneer. The thinking globally (TG) discourse shares with the 
NA discourse a concern for climate change, but it emphasises the need to think 
globally and to help secure the internationally most cost-effective reductions in 
GHG emissions. Such an understanding limits the need for domestic reductions: 
5 The Norwegian Parliament  
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Rather than prioritising unilateral emission reductions, Norway could through 
its (relatively clean) petroleum activity contribute to reducing the total global
emissions (Hovden and Lindseth, 2004, p. 66).  
These two discourses have dominated the national debate concerning climate 
change. In Norway petroleum operations have gone from representing a 
significant problem for national climate policy in the beginning of the nineties, 
to becoming a form of climate policy today. Whether through the direct export 
of oil and gas, the direct export of gas-based electricity, or as domestic use of 
gas-based electricity, the arguments essentially revolved around the same line of 
reasoning: since Norwegian petroleum products are internationally relatively 
clean and could substitute more polluting fossil fuel, Norwegian oil and gas 
production is good climate policy internationally (Hovden and Lindseth, 2004). 
As it is becoming more and more attractive for municipalities in Norway to use 
natural gas as an energy source, the national discourses on climate change and 
the problems and challenges of coordinating climate engagement and gas 
production are now filtered down to the local level of governance.
The local level has almost been neglected as a site of its own for climate 
protection in Norway. Long into the nineties the national authorities did not 
foresee any role for local authorities in climate protection work, nor were there 
any examples of local authorities taking climate protection initiatives on their 
own. In the aftermath of the Kyoto agreements in 1997, the parliament, 
however, started discussing what responsibility that could be placed on the local 
and regional authorities. This discussion led to a Government allocation of 7 
million NOK in 2000 (approx. 900.000 Euros) for testing local climate planning 
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in a limited number of municipalities. As a part of this allocation the city of 
Stavanger was given money to draw up its own climate plan.  
Stavanger is regarded as one of Norway’s leading municipalities in sustainable 
development and climate protection. The municipality has participated in 
several state-financed environmental and sustainability projects. In 2001 
Stavanger was awarded a prize for being the most sustainable community in 
Norway. In June 2002 the Municipal Council in Stavanger approved a Climate 
Plan for the municipality (Stavanger, 2002). The Plan is part of the Municipal 
Plan and it is connected to the city’s Environmental Plan. The Municipal 
Council saw great challenges to reducing CO2 emissions in Stavanger: 
Emissions between 1991 and 2000 had increased by 8. 4 % (exclusive of 
emissions from air transport), and it was expected that emissions would be 23. 3 
% higher in 2010 compared to the 1991 level.6 The Climate Plan proposed to 
reduce emissions from mobile, process and stationary sources. One of these 
reduction objectives came to be highly relevant in the debate that was to follow 
in Stavanger: local GHG emissions from stationary energy use should be 
reduced by 30 % by 2010 (compared to the 2000 level).  
At the time the Municipal Council had committed to work for climate 
protection, the energy company Lyse Energi was well en route to planning the 
introduction of natural gas in the Stavanger Region. 
6 The total GHG emissions for Stavanger in 2000 were 337.923 tonnes CO2 equivalents (Stavanger, 
2002). Mobile sources accounted for 60 % of these emissions, process sources for 27 % and stationary 
sources for 13 %.  
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4. The Stavanger case 
4.1 The Rogass project 
In the summer of 2000, Lyse Energi7 decided that they would implement their 
plan to bring natural gas via a pipeline in the Bokna Fjord to North Jæren, and 
in September 2000 Lyse Gass was established as a subsidiary of Lyse Energi 
AS. The company’s aim is to build and operate transportation and distribution 
facilities for natural gas in southern Rogaland County (Lyse, 2004). In 
September 2001 Lyse decided to invest 500 million NOK (approx. 60 million 
Euros) in a natural gas pipeline that would provide Stavanger and the 
surrounding area of Jæren with natural gas. Lyse’s owners said in September 
2001 that their commitment to develop the use of natural gas for energy would 
create new business structures and strengthen existing businesses (Lyse, 2001).
Figure 1: Map of Norway, Rogaland County and the gas pipeline grid
7 The owners of Lyse are 16 municipalities in the southern part of Rogaland County. The two biggest 
owners are Stavanger, with 43 % of the shares, and Sandnes, with 19 %. 
13
14
This would, if realised, be a pioneering project; the first inland natural gas 
pipeline in Norway. The peculiar thing about the Rogass project, as it came to 
be called, is that it brought about a vocal and intense debate over the 
environmental consequences of the use of natural gas. Such a debate would 
arguably not have occurred in many other Norwegian cities, where climate 
commitments are rather low (Lindseth and Aall, 2004). The use of natural gas in 
the Stavanger Region would be a severe challenge to the role Stavanger plays as 
‘best practice’ in urban sustainability. It would thus make it more difficult to 
reach the climate objectives, in particular the goal of reducing GHG emissions 
from stationary energy use with 30 % by 2010 (compared to 2000 level).  
During autumn 2001, the planning process started. In August 2002, it was 
decided to expand the gas pipeline grid to South Jæren, and Lyse started making 
contracts with companies about the delivery of natural gas. In January 2003 
Lyse continued with the building of the onshore pipeline and the distribution of 
natural gas was extended to municipalities in a part of Rogaland County called 
Ryfylke. Although the debate on Rogass, both the economical feasibility of the 
project and the environmental consequences of the project, had been going since 
the beginning of this decade, it was not until the autumn of 2003 that it was to 
be decided whether the project would be realised or not. Three events came to 
be crucial in the Rogass debate. First, the decision that Stavanger Municipal 
Council made in September 2003 when they approved Lyse Energi’s natural gas 
project. Second, the application in August 2003 from Lyse Gass for a permit to 
supply and distribute natural gas in accordance with the National Pollution 
Control Act and the formal complaint against the Rogass project with the State 
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Pollution Control Agency (SPCA) lodged by Friends of the Earth Norway and 
Nature and Youth. Third, the SPCA approval, in November 2003, of Lyse’s 
application. My following analysis will be organised around these three events; 
events that effectively show how Rogass came to be a debate over the ‘scaling 
of environmental governance’. 
4.2 Rogass as a local struggle: Rogass confronting the 
Climate Plan 
The majority of the Municipal Council on September 22, 2003, gave its 
approval for Lyse Energi to deliver natural gas to the city (Stavanger, 2003b): 
“The Municipal Council is positive to the plans from Lyse Energi and content with the 
environmental account that shows that the use of natural gas will not conflict with the 
municipality’s Climate and Energy Plan.”  
However, not everyone agreed with this conclusion. Stavanger’s environmental 
officer stated that the Council’s statement deviated from the goals agreed on in 
the Climate Plan (Miljøstrategi, 2003). Several politicians in the Municipal 
Council stated the same. The organisation Nature and Youth (NY) uttered that 
Lyse Energi dictated Stavanger’s Climate Plan. NY spokesperson Marit Hepsø 
said (Aftenbladet, 2003c): 
“When we finally get the municipality to assess the natural gas project in relation to its own 
climate objectives, the Council in reality ends up abolishing its climate objectives.” 
The debate continued in the local newspaper Stavanger Aftenblad in the weeks 
and months to come. The question in point was how the emissions from the 
Rogass project ought to be seen. Since natural gas is a fossil energy source, this 
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new project would result in CO2 emissions. However should these emissions be 
seen as benefiting the environment or as an environmental liability?  
The key issue in deciding this matter was that of which scale these emissions 
should be seen in relation to. Prior to the decision in the Municipal Council, the 
environmental consultancy Ambio (2003) presented an emission account for the 
Rogass project. It was on this report the Municipal Council based its decision 
that the Rogass project was compatible with Stavanger’s Climate Plan. A 
number of arguments were presented in support of the environmental benefits of 
the project (Stavanger, 2003a; 2003 b). First, the Council argued in its decision 
that natural gas would replace energy sources in the Stavanger region that 
pollute more. Lyse claimed that based on its contracts with customers, the use of 
natural gas would replace a total of about 200 GWH that were being generated 
from other energy sources. The substitution would be: 56 GWH from electricity; 
12 GWH from wood fuel; 71 GWH from propane and 59 GWH from (light) oil. 
The Rogass project thus demonstrated the benefits of replacing oil with natural 
gas. The argument is that since it was taken for granted that the region would 
need more energy, it would be better if energy came from natural gas than oil. 
The logic here is that it would be a ‘benefit’ compared to the business-as-usual 
scenario; as long as one assumes that energy consumption would increase, and 
that this increase would be based on other fossil fuels, natural gas would then 
make the emissions rise less than oil would.8 Second, although it was stated 
(Stavanger, 2003a) that total local emissions would increase, Lyse’s project, it 
was argued, would result in an overall reduction of global CO2 emissions. Using 
8 It would still, as the environmental movement argued, result in increased emissions – and thus make it 
more difficult to reach the climate objectives. 
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natural gas would contribute to reducing Norwegian imports of oil and coal, and 
would therefore reduce the global emissions related to such imports. Third, the 
local climate commitments were downplayed by the Council. Ambio (2003) 
stated in its report that municipalities in the Stavanger region would achieve 
their share of the Norwegian national emission reduction target. In this way, the 
Ambio report alluded to a fairness principle: Seen in a national context, the 
Stavanger region is not a major committer of CO2, and it is already taking its 
share of the Norwegian Kyoto commitments (Ambio, 2003, p. 9). Fourth, the 
local emissions were portrayed as marginal in a regional context. Ambio stated 
in the report that the Rogass project would increase local emissions by 2000 
metric tons/year, a number that is marginal in relation to the total annual CO2
emissions regionally, in Rogaland County, of 2.694.000 metric tons (Ambio, 
2003, p. 7). Likewise, the chairman of Lyse’s board stated that the 
environmental movement’s criticisms were exaggerated. He argued that based 
on already signed contracts, Lyse’s gas project will emit as much CO2 in one 
year as the Stavanger Airport, Sola, emits in two days (Aftenbladet, 2003a). The 
chairman is here downplaying the consequences and disregarding the local 
climate responsibilities – in reality disregarding the local scale as a valid site for 
climate protection. 
Cox’ (1998) idea of spaces of dependence and spaces of engagement provides a 
good lens through which to view how this conflict unfolded. Within the territory 
of the Stavanger-region local actors like Lyse and the local politicians are 
embedded in and dependent on a number of place-specific conditions (cf. Cox, 
1998, p. 2) that constitute a ‘space of dependence’. What is at stake in this case 
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is a local interest: Lyse’s plans to realise the Rogass project. Harvey (1982) 
emphasises how capital is mobile (it can always be reinvested other places), 
however it can only realise its potential for appreciation by transforming itself 
into immobile forms: Lyse could not relocate the Rogass project easily. The 
most important socio-political condition that Lyse and local politicians had to 
face was an obligation on the part of the municipality of Stavanger to take its 
climate commitments seriously. The ability to realise the Rogass project became 
dependent on whether they could influence the municipal council, and the 
broader community for that matter9, that Lyse’s project was acceptable from an 
environmental perspective. Lacking local leverage to gain acceptance for the 
project, a network of associates that could promote Rogass was needed. This 
relationship can be understood as a ‘space of engagement’. A network 
consisting of politicians, primarily from the Labour and Conservative party, 
Lyse and Ambio Consulting was formed as a discourse coalition (cf. Hajer, 
1995); i.e. it was based on a shared way of framing and presenting the 
environmental consequences of the project. This set of relationships was 
established in a fixed space of dependence (the Stavanger region), however, the 
space of engagement was discursively extended to a higher geographical scale: 
The majority of the politicians in the Municipal Council argued that if one were 
to view the climate change problem as belonging to a more global scale (cf. 
Cox, 1998), Lyse’s project would be environmentally friendly. The emissions 
from Lyse’s project would be marginal in a regional and national context, 
9 Although the debate mainly took part in the municipal council, and in the local press, a broader 
community based campaign was also started. Nature and Youth (Natur og Ungdom), Friends of the 
Earth Norway (Naturvernforbundet) and the Environmental Home Guard (Grønn Hverdag) started a 
campaign called “Fire Lyse!” [Gi Lyse sparken!], which had the goal of hindering Lyse’s project. They 
encouraged all consumers to shift to a more environmentally friendly electricity supplier (Aftenbladet, 
2003d). 
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whereas in a global context they would even contribute to a total reduction of 
global emissions. The local struggle was effectively represented as a global 
struggle, and in choosing this representation it stroke a chord with local 
politicians that argued on its behalf (cf. Jones, 1998). In this way one could say 
that the politics of securing a space of dependence for Lyse unfolded 
discursively on a global scale. The Rogass project was presented in a way that 
increased the possibility for local politicians to overcome “the contradiction 
between mobility and fixity” (cf. Cox, 1998, p. 6). 
By scaling climate change globally, Lyse and the local politicians saw no reason 
to pay attention to the 30 % emissions reduction objective that the Municipality 
had committed to.10 Instead, the Council took into account how the contracts 
already signed, in the Stavanger Region, showed that natural gas would replace 
other, more polluting energy sources. Those in favour of Rogass could not 
effectively dispute NY’s argument that Rogass would make it impossible to 
reach the local climate objectives. Rather than accepting this premise for the 
debate, they instead downplayed the negative consequences of the Rogass 
project. The debate was ‘reframed’ or rescaled in such a way that it became 
difficult, or even irrelevant, to raise the issue of local climate commitment (cf. 
Hajer, 1995, p. 49). The actor network in favour of Rogass – consisting of Lyse, 
local politicians and Ambio consultancy – had chosen their discursive space of 
engagement (cf. Jones, 1998) as first and foremost the global scale. 
10 Although most of the GHG emissions in Stavanger come from process (mainly waste deposits) and 
mobile sources, it was the goal of reducing stationary energy use by 30 % by 2010 that primarily would 
be challenged by Lyse’s natural gas project. 
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4.3 Rogass as a national struggle: Rogass meets the 
National Pollution Control Act
4.3.1 Application from Lyse and the response by NY/FEN 
Cox (1998, p. 7) emphasises how local interests are critically conditioned by the 
ability to exercise territorial power, and that the most obvious candidate for 
control over a geographic area is the various agencies of the state. The 
realisation of the Rogass project became critically dependent on state power, 
when in July 2003 the State Pollution Control Agency (SPCA) decided that 
Lyse’s plans for the pipeline had to be evaluated according to the National 
Pollution Control Act. It was the organisation Nature and Youth (NY) that 
lodged a formal complaint against the Rogass project. They wanted to stop the 
Rogass project by appealing to national government on the basis of The 
National Pollution Control Act. Lyse, however, continued with the building of 
the onshore pipeline, while awaiting the State Pollution Control Agency’s 
(SPCA) verdict.11 With the case handed over to the SPCA, the local issue was 
now also fought nationally. In order for both Lyse and the environmental 
organisations to secure their local interests in the case, they where now relying 
on how Rogass was evaluated at the national scale: Lyse had to show more 
explicitly how their project could be seen as environmentally friendly, and 
NY/FEN on their part hoped that the act would stop the project.
11 NY charged that “Lyse’s tactic is apparently to finish as much as possible in order to make it difficult 
for the SPCA to stop the project” (Aftenbladet, 2003b). The SPCA did not, however, want to stop 
Lyse’s building work while it was dealing with the case. In the middle of August, Lyse started laying 
the underwater pipeline, and on August 27, the 48 km from Kårstø to Risavika across the Bokna Fjord 
were finished. 
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On August 8, 2003, Lyse Gass applied for a permit to supply and distribute 
natural gas in accordance with the National Pollution Control Act (Lyse, 2003). 
The application is a thorough presentation of the environmental consequences of 
the Rogass project. September 8, 2003 NY and FEN filed their joint submission. 
The two organisations stated that the Rogass project, if realised, would be the 
first great gas pipeline project in Norway. Therefore, how the SPCA managed 
the case was very important, they argued, because it would set a precedent (NY, 
2003). NY/FEN made several comments about Lyse’s application. Similar to 
the local dispute presented above, Lyse’s application and the submission by 
NY/FEN can be read as a struggle over scale. However, this dispute is first and 
foremost a contestation of how Lyse’s project will effect national climate 
commitments.  
Lyse and NY/FEN view national climate commitments diametrically different. 
A key assumption for NY/FEN is that Lyse’s gas project must be stopped 
because it would violate Norway’s Kyoto commitments.12 Lyse, however, tried 
to reframe national climate obligations. They did not use the Kyoto 
commitments as their key reference, but argued instead that national emissions 
would be higher if the project were not built. A key assumption for Lyse was 
that if Norway does not produce more electricity, Norway would have to 
‘import emissions’ from abroad. With reference to The Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), Lyse (2003, p. 18) argued that the 
total of such emissions imports in 2015 would be 15 TWH. Since electricity 
produced abroad for the Norwegian market to a large degree comes from coal, 
12 The national climate target that was given Norway in Kyoto 1997 was that CO2 emissions should not 
be increased by more than 1 % by 2010, compared to 1990 level.  
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the use of imported electricity would increase Norway’s total global emissions. 
The company cited (2003, p. 18) NVE and the Ministry of Oil and Petroleum 
(MoPE) in arguing that coal power would continue to be, in the short term, the 
marginal production in the integrated North European market. Furthermore, 
some studies show that natural gas-based power will become the most important 
marginal electricity source in this market (ECON, 2002 in Lyse, 2003, p. 18). 
Based on these conditions, Lyse showed how the contracts they already had 
entered into would result in a global reduction of CO2 by about 26.000 metric 
tons/year due to substitution of electricity from more polluting fossil fuels.  
Lyse brought forward strategies that ‘jump scale’ (cf. Smith, 1996; Cox, 1998):  
local interests in spaces of dependence are related to the global scale. Moreover, 
Lyse successfully formed a discourse coalition with other centres of power. By 
citing a state agency (MoPE) directly the company is trying to influence state 
agencies. They also cite important national resource and development 
institutions (like NVE and ECON13) that can exercise some indirect influence 
over these agencies (cf. Cox, 1998, p. 7). While these institutions did not 
actively participate as strategic partners in Lyse’s campaign, they were 
nonetheless drawn into it and used to legitimise Lyse’s arguments, which 
attributed the campaign more leverage.  
NY/FEN on their part argued that the Rogass project would lead to a significant 
increase in GHG emissions (NY, 2003). First of all, they disputed that coal 
power would come to be the marginal production in the future power market. 
13 ECON is a leading Norwegian economic knowledge-based firm. Climate change has been an 
important area of work for ECON since 1990. ECON have performed a series of studies of policy 
instruments to address climate change, such as taxes, tradable emissions quotas and negotiated deals. 
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Moreover, NY/FEN argued that there are alternatives to natural gas, such as 
renewable electricity, biomass and increased energy efficiency. NY/FEN also 
disagreed with what was denoted as an environmental ‘benefit’. For Lyse the 
project was environmentally beneficial in comparison to the business-as-usual 
scenario, given the assumption that energy consumption would increase, and 
that this increase would be based on other fossil fuels. Natural gas would then 
contribute to a lower rise in emissions than what could be expected with oil. For 
NY/FEN a fossil free solution was the only environmentally beneficial 
resolution, involving the substitution of petroleum with renewable energy.
However, NY/FEN did not just aim to reframe national commitments; they 
continued their mission to rescale climate commitments. As they did in the local 
dispute over the Climate Plan, they insisted in their complaint with the SPCA 
that the consequences of the project should be assessed at the local and regional
scale. An important reference for NY/FEN was the Energy Plan for North Jæren 
region14 (cf. Farsund and Storås, 2000). The two organisations brought attention 
to an energy scenario presented in this plan, The Environmental Energy 
Alternative. According to this scenario a commitment to energy efficiency and 
renewable energy could secure the region’s necessary amount of energy without 
using fossil fuel, while at the same time replacing most of the heating generated 
from burning oil. Therefore, the region could manage well without Lyse’s 
natural gas project, NY/FEN argued. They also referred to a report about the use 
of natural gas in North Jæren by the consultancy Asplan Viak (cf. Asplan, 2003) 
on a commission from the SPCA. The report stated that emissions would 
14 The geographical area surrounding the city of Stavanger. See Figure 1 
24
increase by 30 % to 85 % by 2020, if Lyse would get permission to distribute 
natural gas in the region (NY, 2003. p. 9).  Lyse, on the other hand, downplayed 
the level of local emissions that would be generated by the project, and it was 
taken for granted that Norway would simply need more energy. Thus NY/FEN 
had a diametrically different view from Lyse. NY/FEN saw great potential in 
alternative energy sources, whereas Lyse downplayed such potentials. The two 
sides used different facts and expertise to support their respective claims.   
4.3.2 The SPCA’s decision 
The National Pollution Control Act was written with end users who polluted in 
mind. However, in the Rogass case Lyse was not an end user, it did not burn the 
natural gas itself. Instead it simply would distribute it via a grid to end users. 
However, in this case, the Law Division in the Ministry of Justice and the Police 
concluded that the act also should apply to the Rogass project. They argued that 
although Lyse did not itself pollute, the company was responsible for emissions 
by virtue of delivering the natural gas to end users that pollute (SPCA, 2003). In 
late November 2003 the SPCA approved all aspects of Lyse’s application. What 
were the SPCA’s grounds for approving Lyse’s Rogass project? Their approval 
was based on §11 cf. §16 of the National Pollution Control Act. This clause 
states that:   
“…the state pollution authority can, after an application is filed, give permission to activity that 
can entail pollution […]. When the pollution authority decides whether to give permission, it 
should be given importance to both the negative consequences of the pollution as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages the initiative will entail in a broader societal context.”  
The SPCA concludes as follows on Lyse’s application: 
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•There are many uncertain factors in this case, and it is thus difficult to decide 
the total environmental consequence of the Rogass project.
•The SPCA, however, states that natural gas in the region – as pinpointed in the 
application – first and foremost will be a direct competitor to other fossil fuels, 
mainly (light) oil and propane that are used today by businesses in the region.
•The SPCA therefore declares that:   
“the natural gas infrastructure is in accordance with the preconditions in the 
Government’s report On Domestic Use of Gas, and will therefore give 
permission to the initiative.” 
.
What is striking about this decision15 is that there was no specific reference to 
the national scale, not to the national climate commitments or whether the 
Rogass project would make it more difficult to reach the national Kyoto goal. 
The SPCA concludes that Lyse’s already signed contracts will result in lower 
global emissions, than would have occurred in the absent of the contracts. Anne-
Grethe Kolstad, an SPCA section leader, pointed out that, the Rogass project 
will lead to increased emissions nationally. However, she considered the 
emission consequences as marginal, and therefore not severe enough to justify 
stopping the project (Kolstad, 2004). The decision marks effectively that climate 
commitments must be seen in relation to other national goals and values. The 
SPCA effectively bought the way of framing national climate commitments that 
Lyse used.
15 After SPCA approved all aspects of Lyse’s application, NY appealed the decision, arguing that the 
case had not been treated in a satisfactory manner from an environmental perspective (Aftenbladet, 
2004). To date, the SPCA’s decision stands unchanged. 
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The SPCA decision was the first of its kind; it was an evaluation of how 
domestic use of natural gas would be seen in a national climate context. By its 
decision to permit Rogass, the SPCA effectively institutionalised the 
relationship between domestic use of natural gas and climate change. Hajer 
(1995) makes a distinction between discourse structuration (the ways in which 
certain ideas have to be referred to in order to convey legitimacy on actors) and 
discourse institutionalisation (the way in which particular understandings of 
policy problems become routinised in policy practices and institutions). 
Referring to Hajer, it is evident how the thinking globally discourse challenged 
the established climate protection discourse, and it came to structure the Rogass 
debate; the benefits of substituting more polluting fossil fuel with natural gas 
was argued over and over again in the local debate. The decision from the 
SPCA marks an institutionalisation of the thinking globally discourse with 
regard to domestic use of natural gas. By permitting the continuation of the 
Rogass project, the national authorities in effect established that national climate 
commitments were not severe enough to stop such activity.  
5. Conclusion and discussion 
There is a lack of studies that aim to understand how the concepts of ‘scale’, 
‘scalar strategies’ and ‘struggles over scale’ play out empirically in case studies 
of sustainable development and the environment. The aim of this article has 
been to show how scalar constructs are actively used in the politics of climate 
change. The article depicts how scalar categories like the ‘local’, ‘national’ and 
‘global’ are conceptually constructed to be used as means of power in political 
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processes. Even though the political struggle studied here was primarily 
‘localised’ in the city of Stavanger, the article argues that the process in question 
cannot be reduced to neither ‘local’ nor ‘global’, and that we often 
misunderstand environmental politics if we aim to use bipolar categories (see 
also Shaw, 2004, p. 385).
The article demonstrates how a local energy company felt compelled to use 
environmental arguments to win positive acceptance within an established local 
climate protection discourse. Given that the controversy was from the outset 
framed as a local climate protection discourse, the company had to make its 
points within this discursive context. This article demonstrates how Lyse framed 
the debate in terms of what is good (or bad) for the environment by constructing 
a ‘space of engagement’ (cf. Cox, 1998) that brings in the global scale, pointing 
to the decrease of global emissions that would result from the Rogass project. 
Parallel to this, the company also chose to overlook Stavanger’s Climate Plan. 
The local case was thus reframed to shift attention from local responsibilities. 
The article shows in this context how Lyse drew in other centres of social power 
– both locally and nationally based actors – and formed a discourse coalition
(cf. Hajer, 1995), to achieve its preferences. Ultimately it was the State 
Pollution Control Agency (SPCA) that decided in favour of Lyse’s Rogass 
project. The realisation of the project can thus be seen in relation to how it fitted 
with an already established climate discourse at the national level. The way in 
which Lyse framed the project, and the approval of the SPCA, bears clear 
resonance to the thinking globally discourse that was developed during the 
climate debate in the 90s in Norway. The claim that the effects must be seen 
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assessed with reference to the global scale, enlarges the ‘decision space’ within 
which trade offs can take place (Cowell, 2003, p. 347). If the discourse on local 
responsibility were to win through, the impacts of development and impacts of 
climate protection would have been brought much closer together and thus it 
would have restricted the options available. By contrast, the thinking globally 
discourse makes the petroleum industry remain while addressing the 
environmental problem at hand (Hovden and Lindseth, 2004, p. 77).
By analysing the case in terms of the issue of scale, I have shown how Lyse’s 
corporate purpose to advance an economic agenda can also accommodate 
ecological issues. Lyse having invested a total of 700 million NOK (approx. 90 
million Euros) in the project, clearly had an industry-economic rationale of 
seeing the project realised. A more actor- or interest based study of this dispute 
would have emphasised these material interests first. However, an interest based 
approach would have failed to see how Lyse was able to employ an 
environmental discourse to gain legitimisation and acceptance for their plans. 
By referring to climate change as a global issue which demands global 
solutions, Lyse used a scalar strategy that ultimately managed to undermine 
alternative local climate-change objectives. The discursive approach used here 
has proved to be particularly helpful in terms of revealing how a local energy 
company could use the old environmental slogan ‘think global, act local’ to its 
benefit.
This finding also has more general implications for the understanding of 
environmental governance. Pressures from increasing flows of people and 
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resources have placed the environment more centrally in urban politics. A new 
global/local environmental politics is emerging, with cities increasingly taking 
on global environmental issue such as climate change, transport and energy 
(Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). A key question becomes how these issues of 
environmental management are incorporated and come into conflict with other 
forms of urban governance. While et al. (2004, p 550) argue that cities are 
increasingly searching for a ‘sustainability fix’: “A selective incorporation of 
environmental goals, determined by the balance of pressures for and against 
environmental policy within and across the city”. The idea is particularly 
relevant in a situation where a growing volume of international environmental 
agreements, like the Kyoto protocol, are ‘brought home’ for implementation by 
national authorities, with clear obligations to be posed on to subnational 
authorities (cf. Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). The present case demonstrates how 
local actors are in need of re-scaling sub national governance in search for a 
‘sustainability fix’ (cf. While et al., 2004) that can accommodate a new and 
demanding ecological challenge like climate change. However, in negotiating 
such a fix, it has become evident how a fundamental dislocation between 
competing interpretations of climate protection can emerge. The jury is still out 
on the question of who is the most environmentally friendly in this case – Lyse 
or the environmental movement in Stavanger. There are no generally accepted 
rules and norms according to which local sustainable development politics is to 
be conducted and policy measures to be agreed upon. However, through the 
translation of the ‘thinking globally’ discourse into concrete politics [the 
building of the gas pipeline], the nature and interpretation of local climate 
protection as a policy problem in itself has been challenged and reframed (cf. 
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Schön and Rein, 1993; Bulkeley, 2004). The idea that communities have a 
democratic responsibility to take on climate commitments at the local level 
appears to have lost resonance relative to the idea that climate change is a global 
issue requiring global solutions. Stavanger can be seen as one of the “few 
islands of best practice surrounded by a sea of ‘business-as-usual’” (Cf. 
Bulkeley, 2000, p. 27). If a leading climate municipality in Norway cannot 
maintain the idea of ‘differentiated responsibility’ – with specific ameliorative 
burdens being taken on by local-community interests – how and why should 
other municipalities in Norway be expected to take on such commitments? With 
expected growing ecological problems, like increased global warming, it is hard 
to see how nation states will manage without a strong cooperation from local 
communities (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). In this context much more needs to 
be known as to how the emerging multi-scaled politics of climate change 
policymaking is shaping the conditions for urban environmental management. 
In particular, the results of the Stavanger case study indicates a growing need to 
critically explore the normative implications of scalar re-framing as a discursive 
technique in local environmental conflicts.  
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Abstract
One of the key features of the post-Rio era has been how global environmental governance 
is mediated between local, national and global scales. In this article we draw on 
experiences from local climate planning in Norway in order to discuss the ways in which 
climate change enters into a multilevel policy setting. We highlight that local actors can 
both play the role as a structure for the implementation of national or international climate 
objectives, as well as that of being a policy actors taking independent policy initiatives. 
Based on the Norwegian case, supplemented with knowledge gained from international 
knowledge review, we present a typology of six different categories of local climate 
policy. We emphasise how the relationship between national and local authorities is a 
crucial factor if climate policy as a specific local responsibility should be further 
strengthened. 
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Introduction 
Local climate planning may be understood in different ways: In its most explicit form it 
may be a planning process specifically devoted on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. Still, more common is the implicit form, in which local climate planning can 
have a wide range of formats. It can be in the form of local energy plans, dealing with both 
the production (most common) and consumption side of energy; it can be in the form of 
transport planning, and it can be in the form of land use planning – all examples of local 
planning processes with clear connections to climate policy. The focus in this article is on 
the explicit form of local climate planning. An explicit focus can also capture different 
approaches. A narrow approach would only focus on the GHG emissions from local public 
services like schools etc, whereas a broad perspective would target in principle all local 
sources of GHG emissions. Our discussion will relate to a broad perspective on local 
climate planning. Furthermore we will restrict our discussion to climate change mitigation
and not include the issue of climate change adaptation. 
Global agreements to reduce GHG emissions, and national regulations and incentives to 
stimulate mitigation activities, can encourage or require local action. Still, many scholars 
and politicians think of climate change as an area of politics with relevance mostly for the 
international and national level of government, and with only little room for local 
initiatives. In this article we will show how climate change enters into a multilevel 
governance chain, and what role the local level plays in this chain. We will address the 
following three research questions: (1) How can climate change be described as multilevel 
oriented? (2) What are the experiences with local climate planning in Norway? (3) How 
can we assess policy space for local climate policy? By local we mean subnational 
governments, and in Norway this means municipalities and counties. Although our 
3
emphasis is on Norway, we will also relate to the experiences internationally, and in this 
way discuss local climate policy more generally.  
Multilevel governance and climate protection  
Multilevel governance  
Multilevel governance has become something of a catchword in the academic and political 
debate on environmental policy, and is often presented as an alternative and opponent to 
the traditional hierarchical top-down system of international-national-local government 
relations (Eckerberg and Joas, 2004). Others state that multilevel governance is not a 
normative choice, but rather a “reality” of contemporary governing processes. Still, we will 
argue that there is a choice as to what extent and how one should include the local level of 
governance in any kind of governing process; be it a traditional hierarchical top-down 
system or a more modernistic multilevel governing process. The perhaps most important 
question in this context is what role the local level of government should play: merely a 
structure for national government policy implementation or (also) the role of an 
independent policy actor.
The development of the multilevel system has, according to Eckerberg and Joas (2004), 
been through both a vertical and a horizontal shift. The vertical shift implies a movement 
of political power up to a trans-national level of government and at the same time a 
movement down to local authorities. In this version of multilevel governance the nation-
state will still remain a central actor in processes of governance and government, although 
its’ possibility to govern has become more restricted. The horizontal shift implies a 
movement of responsibilities from governmental towards non-governmental actors. Hajer 
and Wagenaar (2003 p. 1) argue that the shift from government to governance signifies 
“changes in both the nature and topography of politics. A new range of political practices 
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has emerged between institutional layers of the state and between state institutions and 
societal organisations”. Within environmental politics this shift entails a much wider 
involvement of interested parties, both in policy formulation but also implementation 
processes, than before (Rydin 2003, p. 5). This development can be noted on all societal 
levels ranging from the sub-national to the supranational level (Lundqvist, 2004). As such 
Bulkeley and Betsill (2003, p. 18) argue that the concept of multilevel governance is well 
suited to capture Western politics of today. 
The multi level character of climate policy 
Within this multilevel governance chain, climate change can be presented as in figure 1 
below.
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International 
environmental 
treaties
National
government 
Local authorities
International co-
operation of local 
authorities
Chapter 28 in 
Agenda 21
Figure 1 Elements of multi-level governance in climate policy 
At the “top” we find the international climate agreement and climate negotiations taking 
place between states. International agreements are then either implemented, or ignored, by 
national governments, “with consequent local level obligations” (Bulkeley and Betsill 
2003, p. 5). This constitutes a traditional hierarchical view of how politics is conducted. 
However, internationally there are examples not only of regional and local authorities 
functioning as structures for implementing national climate policy; we also find examples 
of them acting as policy actors. Local and regional authorities take independent policy 
initiatives and send political signals to the national level. Such “upward signals” are often 
in the form of clarification questions on what is expected of local and regional climate 
policies. Moreover, they are often a quest for stronger horizontal integration at the national 
level: i.e. a recognition that the environmental sector alone will not be able to secure 
climate objectives, and that each sector must therefore take on board climate objectives if 
these are to be achieved (Lafferty and Hovden, 2003).
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Of particular interest in climate change policymaking are the lines of communication 
between the local and the supranational. These lines often bypass the national authorities. 
Through the formation of different inter-municipality collaborations, like the Climate 
Alliance and the Cities for Climate Protection (CCP), international concerted action for 
climate policy locally has been given an institutional foundation. An interesting feature is 
the assertive role that these organisations have taken towards the international climate 
policy negotiations. The CCP has communicated to the international climate policy 
negotiations a wish for more ambitious and binding GHG reduction goals. The network has 
emphasised that legally binding national commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
if agreed-upon targets and timetables are ambitious, would significantly enhance and 
amplify local initiatives, and that weak national commitments risk undermining local 
government initiatives (Lindseth, 2004).  
Although there are no direct political signals established the opposite way, from the 
supranational to the local level, there is an indirect link through Local Agenda 21. Chapter 
28 of UN’s Agenda 21 (UN, 1993) urges local authorities to undertake a consultative 
process with their inhabitants in order to arrive at a consensus on an action plan or a “Local 
Agenda 21” for the community. Since Local Agenda 21 (LA21) has historically played an 
important role for cities in developing local climate policy, it can be argued that indirect 
political signals on climate policy from the supranational to the local level have been 
established through LA21.
Another characteristic feature is that local environmental policy in a way has developed 
inside a national political vacuum. The pioneer municipalities are not only pioneers in 
comparison to other municipalities; to some extent they are also pioneers in comparison to 
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their respective national authorities (Lafferty and Eckerberg, 1998). This is also the case in 
climate change politics, the situation in USA being perhaps the most striking case in point 
in which frontrunner local communities has an important role in influencing also the 
national climate policy debate (Betsill, 2000; 2001).  
The potentials of multilevel governance 
There are several factors indicating that the local administrative level ought to play an 
important role in a multilevel climate governance regime. Not only are subnational 
governments already important actors in climate governance (Bulkeley and Betsill 2003, 
Lindseth 2004, Coenen and Menkveld 2002), the climate change problem are also indeed 
both global and local. Global because the triggering factor of man-made climate changes, 
i.e. the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere is globally dispersed, 
and because the processes that cause greenhouse gas emissions are distributed over the 
entire planet. At the same time, the problems are also local in the sense that the effects of 
climate changes will vary dramatically due to local conditions, and because emissions in 
reality always will occur locally. Local authorities can here play a central role in 
translating the climate change problem and making it comprehensible and relevant for 
local action. The foremost challenge in climate politics will thus not be to ”think globally 
and act locally”, as frequently stated in the debate on sustainable development, but rather 
to adopt a “local perspective on global environmental problems” and to clarify how the 
global and the local levels are interconnected, in both nature and society (Hägerstrand, 
1991; Kates et al., 2003). This entails transforming the global into a local problem and it 
concerns clarifying the importance of local actions, measures and choice options (Corell, 
2003). To accomplish this there is a need to develop concepts and utilize metaphors (Aall, 
2000). Since local authorities make up the front-line service of public administration, the 
8
municipalities can also play an important role as sounding board and discussion partner
within the framework of a national policy debate. This is particularly significant when 
dealing with contentious and complicated policy areas like climate change, where it is 
essential to ensure legitimacy for proposed (national) goals and measures while at the same 
time be open for local adaptations in order to ensure effective implementation. However, 
as illustrated in particular by the CCP network (Lindseth, 2004), local authorities can not 
only act as implementers of national policies, they can also play an important role in taking 
independent climate policy initiatives both locally and in collaboration with national 
authorities (Groven and Aall, 2002).
Below we consider what the particular case of Norway can tell us about the nature, 
potential and pitfalls of local government action on climate change.  
How do Norwegian municipalities work with climate 
planning?
The emergence of local climate planning in Norway 
Very few Norwegian municipalities have taken part in either of the two international 
networks on local climate policy The Climate Alliance and CCP. Hence local initiatives, 
for instance from NGOs or from local elected representatives, and national government 
initiatives have played a more important role in Norway as compared to many other 
countries when it comes to putting climate policy on the local agenda. Local climate policy 
as an explicitly formulated policy area entered the national political agenda in Norway 
when the Parliament passed the Government White Paper on the Kyoto protocol in June 
1998. The Government White Paper was followed up in a circular from the Ministry of 
Environment (1998) in September 1998, stating that: “[M]unicipalities, in co-operation 
with the county and regional government authorities, should make local climate plans 
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aiming at reducing GHG emissions and increasing carbon sequestration by afforestation”. 
This steering signal was followed up in 2000 by the Ministry of Environment (MoE) which 
granted NOK 7 million1 to stimulate local climate planning in Norwegian municipalities 
and counties. 26 projects were supported, involving a total of 37 municipalities and 8 
counties out of a total number of 435 municipalities and 19 counties. In addition to 
government grants, the municipalities were also offered help through the use of a web-
based information source, which among other facilities allows you through a ”one-click” 
device to produce a local GHG emission account.2 This trial activity constitutes the main 
empirical basis for the study that this article is based upon. 
Background and methods applied 
Our study covers all municipalities in Norway involved in comprehensive local climate 
planning at the time of the study. The study consists of two surveys; one during spring 
2002 (Groven and Aall, 2002), and a follow-up study during winter 2003/04 (Lindseth and 
Aall, 2004). The second survey was a follow-up, in the sense that we focused on the 
implementation stage of the planning process. In both surveys we received a 100 percent 
response rate. For most of the municipalities we have also carried out document analysis, 
studied planning documents, background reports prepared under the planning process, 
minutes from working groups, decisions in municipal bodies, press clippings and internet 
presentations. In addition we have done in-depth studies in three cases: the cities of 
Stavanger and Kristiansand and the county of Sogn og Fjordane (Groven et al., 1999; 
Farsund et al., 2001; Groven, 2001; Lindseth and Aall, 2004, Lindseth 2005 submitted). In 
order to contextualise the national study, we have also carried out two international studies: 
A study of international networks on local climate policy (Groven et al., 1999; Lindseth, 
1 Approximately 850 000 € 
2 http://www.sft.no/arbeidsomr/prosjekt/klima/verktoy/klimakalkulator/index.asp
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2004) and an international knowledge review on research on local climate planning and 
policy (Teigland and Aall, 2002).
The municipalities and counties studied here can be divided into four types of actors or 
actor constellations involving a total of 44 units: Single municipalities (24 municipalities); 
co-operating municipalities (three groups of all-together 13 municipalities); single counties 
(4 counties); co-operating counties (one group of 3 counties). Amongst the municipalities 
that have made a climate plan, larger cities are overrepresented at the cost of rural 
municipalities. The MoE also preferred, in their selection of municipalities to receive 
grants, previously environmentally active municipalities and municipalities with their own 
environmental policy officer (Groven and Aall, 2002, p. 37). However, in total the sample 
of municipalities represent a broad variety of different “municipality-types” in Norway.
The status of the planning process 
Our study reveals that 83 per cent (36 of the 44 units) of all planning processes led to a 
politically adopted planning document (cf. Figure 2). The question of whether to formally 
embed the plan in the Planning and Building Act can be important from the point of view 
that this would increase the likelihood of the plan being followed up with concrete 
measures. 69 per cent of the municipalities and county municipalities (25 units) that have a 
plan have entrenched it either by integrating it into their municipal/county plan or by 
adopting a separate municipal/county sub-plan. Looking at the resolutions to implement the
plan on a rolling basis, the number drops to 17 out of 44 municipalities (27 per cent). The 
decision taken on implementation on a rolling basis can be interpreted as a strong indicator 
of what kind of priority that is attached to climate policy planning. In this respect it is 
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surprising that such a large proportion of the municipalities have decided to implement the 
plans on a rolling basis, given that this must be done without government grants. 
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Figure 2 The primary outcome of the planning process 
Local and national goals 
The overall impression regarding climate goals is that a rather high percentage of the local 
climate plans have been passed without setting a concrete goal for GHG reductions. 
Furthermore, those plans containing such quantified goals in most cases do not provide 
arguments to justify a specific level of ambition. 17 of the 35 climate plans and plan 
proposals contain a quantified goal for GHG emission reductions. The level of ambition in 
the municipalities corresponds well with the national climate goal of Norway. In 9 out of 
17 climate plans with a quantified reduction goal, this has been based on the national 
Kyoto target (i.e. CO2 emissions should not be increased by more than 1 % by 2010, 
compared to 1990 level). Two municipalities have failed to relate their goal to a reference 
year, hence making it impossible to audit the target. The remaining six municipalities have 
higher ambitions; the most ambitious one is Norway’s second largest city, the city of 
Bergen, where the politicians repeatedly have committed themselves to reduce CO2-
emissions by 20 per cent by 2005 with 1991 as the reference year, while the reduction goal 
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for all GHG emissions is set to 30 per cent within the same period. Other examples are 
Sarpsborg and Trondheim, both with a goal of 20 percent reduction. 
Local measures 
In the follow-up survey carried out during winter 2003/04 we asked the municipalities to 
report on what concrete measures mentioned in their climate policy plans that had been 
followed up. Based on the answers received in the survey, we sorted these measures into 
two main groups: measures implemented within the energy sector, and those implemented 
within the transport sector. An overview of the measures implemented reveals that 
concrete follow-up of climate policy plans were for the most part concentrated on 
measures within the energy sector, wherein the installation of district heating was 
prevalent. This was the case for measures implemented in both municipal buildings and in 
the local community as a whole. Only the larger cities – like Bergen, Trondheim and Oslo 
– have reported implementation of measures within the transport sector, in which structural 
measures and investments in public transport are the dominant. A probable reason for why 
we found implementation of transport measures only in the larger cities is the relatively 
higher importance of public transportation as compared to the more sparsely populated 
areas of Norway. 
A change in policy focus 
It is to note that the municipalities clearly have shifted their focus from climate and energy 
to mostly energy during the period of time from the plans were drafted, in 2000, to the time 
when the follow-up survey was carried out, during winter 2003-04. There are several 
possible reasons for this shift.
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In the survey carried out during the winter of 2003-04 we did not ask for the reasoning 
behind the actual choice of measures. We did, on the other hand, ask for general comments 
on how work on climate policy in the municipalities was put into practice. About half of 
the municipalities provided such comments. A common feature was the reporting of a
decline in commitment to and interest in climate issues. While there was considerable 
commitment attached to the planning process itself, it clearly declined once the plans were 
in place and ready to be implemented. This reported decline mirrors the general trend in 
Norway of a marked decrease in concern about the greenhouse effect and climate changes. 
Whilst 40 per cent claimed in 1989 to be very concerned, the same concern was expressed 
by just under 10 per cent in 2001 (Hellevik, 2002, p. 9). At the same time, there has been a 
general increase in the attention given to energy issues due to the periodically large price 
increase (in Norwegian terms) of domestic electricity. In 2003 the average price of 
hydroelectric power in Norway was 45 per cent higher than in 2002. This was due to a 
combination of little rainfall and subsequently a lower production of hydroelectric power, 
combined with greater opportunities to export hydroelectric power. 
A more pragmatic possible reason for the shift from climate to energy might be that the 
municipalities choose to take the line of least resistance. Proposed measures within the 
energy sector will often prove less controversial in the sense that they can entail the 
possibility of financial savings, at least in a long time perspective. There is often also a 
great number of energy saving measures that can be carried out in municipal buildings. 
Such measures often prove easier to get approval for than, for example, emission reduction 
measures in the transport sector. Apart from a small group of industrial municipalities, the 
greatest challenge facing most of the municipalities is to reduce mobile emissions. In our 
last survey, however, only six of the municipalities reported to have climate policy 
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measures directed at the transport sector. The consequences of a shift towards focusing on 
energy in the municipalities might thus lead to a distraction of the climatic challenges in 
the transport sector. 
The scope of action for local climate policymaking  
The experiences with local climate planning in Norway show that municipalities rarely put 
climate change at the forefront of the political agenda. It seems evident, however, that the 
municipalities are not solely to blame for this. – As argued in this paper, the opportunities 
and constraints for local climate action are constructed through the emerging forms of 
multilevel governance (cf. Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). In this governance chain, national 
government continues to play an important pre-requisite for local climate protection. This 
is particularly true in Norway, where municipalities over the last two decades have been 
part of numerous state financed trial projects, and thus can be seen as a “laboratory” for the 
implementation of national political goals (Aall, et al., 1999). According to Lafferty and 
Coenen (2001), local sustainable policy is dependent on national authorities as committed 
collaborators, not least in order to provide local authorities with new policy measures as 
required, as well as to ensure the necessary national coordination of conflicting interests 
and the integration of climate considerations in important sectors such as transport and 
communication and energy. The need for such type of national support is further reinforced 
by our analysis (Groven and Aall, 2002; Lindseth and Aall, 2004). Moreover, an important 
conclusion supported by numerous scientific studies is that if you are to involve local 
authorities in solving conflicting environmental problems, this implies sectoral integration 
at the national level of government (Hovik, 2000). This in turn presupposes that climate 
politics are sufficiently entrenched at the national level.  
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As a way of summing up, we thus below present six different categories on local climate 
policies based on international knowledge review and the experiences we have gained from 
our own empirical studies in Norway: (1) business as usual; (2) policy redressing; (3) 
picking the low-hanging fruit; (4) symbolic climate policy; (5) local authorities as policy 
structure; and (6) local authorities as policy actor. In the discussion and the categorisation 
below we will in particular emphasise the following two factors: a degree of local initiative 
and national involvement. 
On the lowest level of commitment is what can be denoted as ‘business as usual’; i.e. no
local initiatives and no national involvement.  
The first level of any real activity is here referred to as ‘policy redressing’; i.e. redressing 
existing policies in a new climate policy context. A number of examples of this strategy 
can be found in European and American cities, where old programmes to mitigate local air 
pollution are renewed by linking them up to new climate policy initiatives. This is done 
either by using climate policy considerations to reinforce arguments for reducing local 
emissions (from, for example, the transport sector), or by pointing out that proposed 
mitigation measures would also have a positive effect on the reduction of local air 
pollution (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003). In these cases we often find a combination of high 
local and little, to moderate national involvement. 
The next level is referred to as ‘picking the low-hanging fruit’ and refers to those types of 
measures that are lucrative and un-contentious and thus easy to implement. A typical 
example is the conversion from coal and oil to gas-powered heating. This is a conversion 
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which in the majority of cases is quite profitable, both for companies and private 
households (ICLEI, 1997). In reality this often entails reaping the benefits of work done by 
others; i.e. measures and amendment process that would probably have happened anyway. 
Here too, the presence of government authorities is not crucial. 
The level ‘symbolic climate policy’ applies to the type of strategy where local authorities 
try to establish a local climate policy that oversteps the threshold of the uncontroversial 
and simple, an initiative often linked to more non-committal requests from government 
authorities. The point here is that in such situations local authorities are still quite restricted 
with regard to what they can actually accomplish, except from the measures that are 
uncontroversial and simple. This strategy will therefore be characterised by ‘soft’ measures 
such as planning and informing, most likely combined with a formal request to government 
authorities for more committed cooperation in climate policies. The majority of Norwegian 
municipalities that have been involved in climate politics can be found on this level 
(Groven and Aall, 2002). 
The two final, or ‘highest’, levels of commitment presuppose a state that tries to draw local 
authorities actively into climate politics. At first the local authorities can fill the role of 
being a structure for implementing national climate politics. One example is Canada 
(CNCCIP, 1999; Robinson, 2000). The national strategy in Canada intends that all types of 
municipalities can be able to participate. An important national means of involving 
municipalities is the introduction of a national grant and loan scheme and the preparation 
of information material. Similar schemes have been introduced in Sweden and the 
Netherlands (Swedish Environmental Agency, 2002; Coenen and Menkveld, 2002).
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The most ambitious scope of local commitment is the role where local authorities play the 
role as policy actors beyond government defined minimum standards for climate policy. 
Members of the international network of local authorities working with climate policy are 
examples of this category. We also find some examples in our surveys from Norway, 
Kristiansand being one. In this city the local authorities have on several occasions 
proposed regulating and imposing taxes on passenger car consumption. Thus far, the city 
has not managed to win acceptance for the most controversial proposals, but there still 
seems to be political will to initiate such measures (Lindseth and Aall, 2004). 
Conclusion and future prospects 
Multilevel governance is today a reality that local level actors will meet in their aim to 
work for climate protection. This situation is both a hindrance and an important window of 
opportunity for local climate protection. We will argue that there is a choice as to what 
extent and how one should include the local level of governance in any kind of governing 
process. First of all, despite the limited scope and the many hindrances that local actors 
experience, several authors point out that the local administrative level still has relatively 
strong powers of influence on climate policymaking, and that the importance of local 
action is expected to increase (Mäding, 1996, Coenen and Menkveld, 2002). It is hard to 
see how nation states will be able to meet their international commitments for addressing 
climate change without including a strong cooperation with local authorities (Bulkeley and 
Betsill, 2003). Furthermore, Coenen and Menkveld (2002) argue for the importance of 
bringing the local level in, in order to legitimize and improve the efficiency of climate 
initiatives. Through acknowledging the important role local actors can play, a more 
focused and effective climate policy globally is achievable.   
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Secondly, however, in a globalized world the major hindrances are that local authorities 
are dependent on actions on higher level of governance. As one of the major international 
climate change network at the municipality level, the CCP campaign has emphasized, 
cities do need help. Weak national commitments risk undermining local government 
initiatives (ICLEI, 1997). In the Norwegian case, we have seen in particular how the 
national authorities have been pivotal in facilitating local climate protection. The stately 
funded project with local climate protection in Norway follows a tradition within 
environmental policy and planning; namely that of initiating pilot projects. The Norwegian 
authorities, by means of White Papers and guidelines, have clearly stated that the 
municipalities do have a role to play, also with respect to global environmental problems. 
However, after the pilot projects end, municipality activity and initiatives drops and goes 
back to concentrate on more locally oriented environmental problems like waste treatment, 
noise and air pollution (Aall et al., 2002).
The Norwegian experience with local climate planning gives further food for thought as to 
how the communication lines and responsibilities between local and national level should 
be ordered. It seems evident that unless national commitments are strengthened, it is not 
likely that local climate policy will become more than a policy area for the few front 
runner municipalities; which again in a larger context will only represent symbolic 
contributions to the global quest of reducing GHG-emissions. There is even a danger 
connected with the promotion of front runner municipalities. We might end up – as stated 
by Bulkeley (2000, p. 27) - in a situation “in which islands of ‘best practice’ are 
surrounded by a sea of ‘business-as-usual’”, and thus also serve as a ‘lightening rod’ to 
distract attention from a passive national policy (Bulkeley, 2000; Aall, 2000).
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ABSTRACT
This paper studies local institutions established for better co-ordination of environmental 
and transport policies. The empirical case is an institution called the Land-use and 
Transport forum (ATP) in the city area of Kristiansand in Norway, where municipal, 
county, and state organisations have been brought together in decision-making and 
implementation processes. ATP’s relationship with private business organisations is also 
analysed. We argue that the case is an example of how actor constellations and 
partnerships can shape new discourses. The paper shows that urban governance relations 
are changing from a sectorally focused mode of governance to a more open and inclusive 
style in Kristiansand. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Western post-war transport political discourse has been dominated by the idea of the 
‘car city’ to a large degree. Globalised automobility is a phenomenon with characteristics 
typical of a social dilemma (Steg & Gifford, 2005, p. 61): the individual short-term 
interests of owning and driving a car contrast with collective qualities of life, such as 
protecting the environment and the climate. Indeed, Høyer (2001, p. 136) argues that 
globalised automobility is perhaps the most serious threat facing global ecology: car use 
is not just causing immediate local environmental problems, but the dimensions and 
patterns of car use are themselves a global problem.  
Even though the need for policy change is acknowledged, an important factor hindering 
this process is the lack of integration between policy areas and divergent agendas (Hull, 
2005). Much environmental transport planning has failed due to a limited understanding 
of the complex and transient context in which decision-making takes place. In particular, 
the integration of environmental arguments into the transport political context is often 
hindered due to pre-existing frames into which issues of transportation are placed 
(Richardson & Haywood, 1996, p. 43). Pemberton (2000, p. 296) argues that the nature 
of the transport sector leads to a  
[f]ocus on the importance of institutions, key actors within them, policy discourses – the nature 
and content of discussions, policy communities, arenas for policy discussions, and the formal and 
informal networks that exist between the institutions/key actors involved (2000, p. 296).  
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In this paper, we study the micro-processes of a coordinated environmental and transport 
political project aiming at policy change. It is at the local level that most attempts towards 
an environmentally adapted transport system have been seen (Banister, 2005, p.57), and 
if transport is to be made more sustainable or environmentally sound, a number of 
different local policy sectors such as land use policy, transport policy, parking policy, and 
environmental policy must be coordinated (Hompland, 2001, p. 206). Sustainable or 
environmentally adopted transport politics thus often take place in a fragmented 
institutional landscape. Building on the experiences with transport planning and politics 
and the need for organisational and policy sector integration (cf. Hull, 2005, p. 3), this 
paper aims to study institutional settings where transport and the environment are 
explicitly brought together.
The empirical case in this paper is the Land-use and Transport forum1 (ATP) in the city 
area of Kristiansand. In this forum political and administrative representatives from 
Kristiansand, five surrounding municipalities and two counties have been brought into 
the process together with the State Road Administration. We also analysed ATP’s 
relationship with private business organisations in the ‘City forum’ in Kristiansand. 
Kristiansand has shown a commitment to communicative rationality, and has attempted 
to mesh deliberative forums of decision-making into the governance of the environment 
and transport. This paper seeks to understand how different discourses about transport 
and the environment are presented and argued in new cooperative institutional settings. 
We argue that this institutional setting can be seen as an attempt to integrate transport 
with environmental objectives, mirroring a wider trend of a shift from ‘government’ to 
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‘governance’ characterised by the involvement of interested parties in policy formulation 
and the implementation processes (Rydin, 2003, p. 5). The critical question is how this 
kind of governance manages to shape the established discourses and practices of 
‘mainstream’ transport policymaking.   
The empirical materials collected are policy documents about the ATP case in 
Kristiansand municipality (2002 – 2006) and interviews with key participants in the ATP 
process and representatives for private business organisations. The paper is divided into 
six parts. In the following section we develop our theoretical framework. We then present 
the background of the project in the third section, and describe the processes of 
governance in the ATP forum and its relationship with the business sector in the fourth 
section. Our discussion is contained in part five, and in we conclude our remarks in part 
six.
2. GOVERNANCE AND DELIBERATIVE POLICY 
ANALYSIS  
Numerous definitions of “governance” are found in the literature; what the concept stands 
for is still under debate (Rhodes, 1997; Pierre & Peters; 2000; Berger, 2003). Most often 
governance refers to a set of practices where stakeholders and civil society organisations 
are involved in addition to government bodies and experts in policy formulation and 
implementation (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Berger, 2003). Some emphasise this greater 
involvement of non-governmental actors, while others emphasise how governance is 
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about how new types of institutions (with or without non-governmental participation) are 
created or configured in order to better address the changing reality of a more complex 
and interconnected world (cf. Bulkeley, 2005; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Examples range 
from cooperative, networked community sectors in major US cities (Morris in Innes & 
Booher, 2003, p. 57), to transnational networks of cities that work for climate protection 
(Lindseth, 2004) to the UN Global Compact (Kell, 2003). In sum, governance refers to a 
“discussion on how to steer the society and how to reach collective goals” (Berger, 2003, 
p. 220).
A development from traditional state centred government towards more inclusive policy-
making and collaborative governance can be observed on all societal levels from the sub-
national to the supranational level (Lundqvist, 2004). Mirroring this general shift in 
society and politics, governance has become a key concept for comprehending policy-
making and implementation in environmental politics. Sustainable or environmentally 
adopted transport is an illustrative example of the changing conditions of politics. Hajer 
& Wagenaar (2003) argue that policy analysis has to be interpretative to be able to 
capture changes in the nature and topography of politics; it must be practice-oriented and 
deliberative. It is interpretative since meanings are constructed in particular contexts and 
practice-oriented since solutions are not so much formulated as haltingly and tentatively 
arrived at in the situation at hand; thus “knowledge, knowledge application and 
knowledge creation cannot be separated from action” (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, p. 20). 
Finally, it is deliberative since policy issues by definition are always contested, and it is 
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through collective, interactive discourse that deliberative judgement emerges (Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003, p. 23).
In this paper, the role of governance structures in processes of change is analysed by 
combining discursive and institutional aspects of policy-making. A crucial feature of 
institutions is their power of privileging access for some actors and interests at the 
expense of others, thus influencing policy selection (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 937-38). As 
emphasised by Hajer (1995, p. 60) however, although institutional arrangements are seen 
as preconditions for the process of new discourses, institutions need discursive 
‘software’. Meanings and actions are actively constructed and reconstructed in discursive 
social contexts, and not only the process of construction itself, but the institutional 
framework within which they take place must be included in the analysis. Institutions 
provide the context in which language and discourse occurs (cf. Rydin, 2003). 
Considering both discursive and institutional elements in our theoretical framework this 
paper builds upon Healey et al. (2003) and their view of governance processes as 
institutional capacity-building. The ability of a discourse change through deliberative 
forums can be seen as a result of three dimensions of capacity building according to this 
perspective:
1) knowledge resources,
2) relational resources, and
3) mobilization capacity (Healey et al., 2002, p. 62).  
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Knowledge resources are closely related to discursive elements of policy-making, in 
particular the micro dimensions of discourse development (Hajer, 1995; Healey et al., 
2003). Central elements here are the range of knowledge resources, explicit and tacit, 
systematized and experiential, to which participants have access, and the frames of 
reference which shape conceptions of issues, problems, opportunities, and interventions, 
including conceptions of place. The extent to which the range and frames are shared 
among stakeholders and the capacity to absorb new ideas and learn from them is also 
important. 
The second and the third dimensions in the scheme relate to the institutionalised 
relationships between various participants in the processes of governance. Relational 
resources are the networks or webs of relations within which governance actors are 
embedded (Healey et al., 2003). They include the range of stakeholders involved in 
relation to the potential universe of stakeholders in the issue, and the morphology of their 
social networks in terms of density and the extent of integration of the various networks. 
The location of the power to act, the relation of power between actors and the interaction 
with wider authoritative, allocative, and ideological structuring forces must also be taken 
into account. Finally, the mobilization capacity relates explicitly to the institutional 
features of political areas such as the institutional arenas used and developed by 
stakeholders to take advantage of opportunities, the repertoire of mobilization techniques 
used to develop and sustain momentum, and the presence or absence of critical change 
agents at different stages. 
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Building on these three dimensions developed by Healey et al. (2003), this paper analyses 
how processes of governance in the ATP forum and its relationships with business 
organisations in Kristiansand can be seen as processes of institutional capacity building. 
Our focus is on the extent to which these processes have benefited or been hindered by 
the institutional capacities of its context (cf. Healey et al., 2003, p. 74). We study how 
this affected the frames of reference or discourses through which meanings are arrived at 
and mobilised. We begin with the background of the case. 
3. BACKGROUND 
Kristiansand (72,000 inhabitants) has a fifty-year-old reputation of being a ‘front-runner’ 
in city planning (Langeland, 2001). It was one of the first cities in Norway to make a 
General-plan, in 1969 (Langeland, 2003). This comprehensive plan was the first after the 
new planning law of 1965 and became the example in Norway. The plan did not, 
however, take into account environmental consequences of transport but paved the road 
for a discourse that argued the need to plan for a strong growth in car traffic, and the 
solution of transport problems with road investments (Langeland & Tveide, 1999). A 
change in perspective was visible in the City Centre-plan of 1978. This plan was 
pioneering in that it laid out a policy for curbing car traffic in the centre through both 
building-regulations and parking policy. It was very advanced for the time. It also laid out 
several pedestrian streets and removed cars from the market place (Langeland, 2001). In 
the years that followed a number of initiatives were carried out, most impressive the 
commitment to develop bicycle lanes, which resulted in Kristiansand becoming the 
number one bicycle city in Norway at the beginning of the 1980’s. However, the 
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pendulum swung back and focus was once again set on car usability and better parking. 
Langeland & Tveide (1999, p. 111) state that 1984 marks a new period in transport 
planning and implementation in Kristiansand. In the remainder of the 1980’s the 
municipality was no longer in charge of casting new ideas and finding solutions: urban 
sprawl and commuting continued, and road projects were prioritized.  
Later in the decade and into the 1990s new initiatives were taken to develop more 
environmentally friendly transport policies. Kristiansand Municipality made its first 
Environmental Plan in 1988 and a revised and more comprehensive plan was created in 
1994 when Kristiansand became a participant in the state initiated Sustainable City 
programme.2 There was now an increased awareness among national authorities on the 
problems of automobility and a number of pilot projects for environmental transport were 
initiated. Kristiansand took part in the TP10 (Transport Plans for the 10 biggest towns) 
project from 1989-1992. There were great expectations for TP10 in Kristiansand, because 
the growth of traffic increased much faster than the increase in traffic capacity. The 
planning of roads and land-use were insufficient. Rush hour congestion developed in the 
eighties, and pressured politicians (Langeland, 2001). TP10 was shelved however; as the 
director for planning and environment in Kristiansand said: “I had great expectations to 
TP10, but it only became words” (Langeland, 2001, p. 8). Nielsen (2001, p. 93) writes 
that the intended integration between traffic and environment did not happen in the 
project cities; instead it was the transport plans that dominated. In the end, politicians 
chose the road strategies. 
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Another important planning process in Kristiansand during the 1990s was the 
construction of the new main road E 18; it began in 1992 and ran parallel to the 
Sustainable City programme. This process of planning and building went on without any 
connection to the Sustainable City programme – they were a ‘world apart’. Evidence of 
this was that no interview mentioned the Sustainable City programme directly as an 
important plan. Indirectly several adopted the Sustainable City programme through land 
use policy, densification, PT, etc, but all interviewed saw the E18 as the primary project 
(Langeland, 2003, p. 6). The land use planning system realised the major goal of building 
E18. As a part of this planning process local politicians (Langeland, 2001, p. 18) 
managed to get public support for a toll road system in Kristiansand. 
In 1997 Kristiansand began a Local Agenda 21 process and as a result the city 
administration took the initiative to establish a climate action plan. A climate group with 
political, administrative, business, and NGO representatives was established to prepare 
the Climate Plan. Kristiansand Municipality was the first municipality in Norway that 
aimed to reduce climate emissions from both stationary and mobile sources (Groven et 
al., 1999). When the proposal for The Climate Plan was presented in spring 1998 it 
contained a number of controversial and ambitious measures. In particular were 
suggested measures aimed at limiting private motoring, such as road-pricing, parking 
restrictions, increased toll-road prices and the removal of the annual ticket (Kristiansand, 
1998). However, little political support was obtained for the plan in the Municipal 
Council. The Council stated that it “would actively contribute to the development of 
positive initiatives to reduce people’s transport needs. Road-pricing, restrictive initiatives 
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like toll-road and parking restrictions are not current initiatives to reduce car traffic in 
Kristiansand” (Kristiansand, 1999). In the final plan document many of the more radical 
suggestions were removed, and the municipal council approved a plan far less provoking 
to car owners in Kristiansand. The Municipal Council thereby did not support the policy 
of managing demand through restricting the need to travel set out by the climate group.  
The historical lines in Kristiansand give witness to a city engaged in a number of 
different local projects aiming to better realise environmental objectives. Actual policy 
integration of environmental and transport political issues still have had minimal impact 
in these various projects.
4. THE CASE: CO-ORDINATED LAND USE AND 
TRANSPORT PLANNING 
4.1 Horizontal networks of governance 
As a part of the process of developing a National Transport Plan for 2006-2015, 
Kristiansand and five other major cities in Norway were invited to develop strategic 
analyses for their city areas and were encouraged to experiment with alternative 
organisations of transport management. The aim pursued by the Ministry of Transport 
and Communication was to obtain better coordination of land use and transport policies 
in the city areas, and a better use of public resources across different levels of 
administration within the transport sectors. More generally, pilot projects were intended 
as a tool for developing new organisational solutions to problems related to the 
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environment and transport passability in a more effective and overarching manner 
(Kristiansand, 2002b).
Kristiansand accepted the invitation to participate in the project. The project was further 
discussed in a detailed statement to the national authorities on the land use and transport 
political challenges in the region, and the geographic scope was extended (Kristiansand, 
2002a). In October 2002 an application for participation was sent in by the municipalities 
in the Kristiansand region, the counties Aust Agder and Vest Agder, and the Norwegian 
Public Road Association (Vest Agder department). The application argued that the 
broader city region of Kristiansand should constitute the geographic area for the pilot 
project (Kristiansand, 2002b). In June 2003 the application was approved (Kristiansand, 
2003).
An important feature of the project was to establish horizontal structures of governance 
by means of a new political and administrative body. An ATP forum was established for 
the municipal and state actors to jointly find a more suitable way of dealing with 
transport and environmental problems. The forum has political and administrative 
members from the six municipalities, the two county municipalities, and one member 
from the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. The environmental officer in 
Kristiansand is the project manager and the leader of a small project secretariat. 
The ATP organisation took responsibility for local roads from the municipalities, and for 
regional roads from the county councils. The ATP project was given responsibility for 
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policy areas which had earlier been divided between the different levels of governments: 
public transport infrastructure, traffic safety actions, and bicycle facilities. There are also 
issues that fall in a grey area between the ATP project and the city councils of the 
different municipalities (Kristiansand, 2004a). A cooperation agreement was signed for 
these cases, such as parking policy and public transport. In practice this often means that 
the ATP forum makes a decision that is sent to the different committees of the city 
councils for a final review (Riseng, 2005).
During 2005-2006, structures of governance involving business interests have become 
increasingly important in the ATP project. In October 2005 central business actors took 
the initiative to establish a City forum where the leader of Kristiansand Chamber of 
Commerce3 and Kvadraturen4 meet key persons from the municipal administration. The 
business actors wanted to develop a better dialogue with the municipality, especially on 
issues of land use and transport matters with the technical sector. The ATP secretariat is 
also acting as the secretariat for this newly established forum.  
The ATP project is financially supported by a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Transport and Communications. In 2004 the Kristiansand region was given 10 million 
NOK (approx. 1.25 million Euros) (MoTC, 2004a; MoTC, 2004b). In addition to state 
money, financial resources have also been transferred to the ATP forum from the 
municipalities, the counties, highway funds, and funds earmarked for the city bus-metro. 
The total expected income of the project for the four year period is 170 million NOK 
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(approx. 21 million Euros)5. The project administers these funds and decides what they 
will be used for (Kristiansand, 2004b).  
4.2 Incremental but increasingly important policy changes  
The ATP project objectives are stated in an action plan developed for 2005-2007 
(Kristiansand, 2004b). The plan contains a number of suggestions for limiting private 
automobility such as bus-prioritization at the sacrifice of car traffic, parking restrictions, 
traffic payment, and traffic refurbishing. There are also initiatives for improving safety 
and local air pollution and how to improve alternative transport (such as EL-cars).  
In the first phase, the ATP goals were met with opposition in municipal planning 
processes. When the Kristiansand municipal plan for 2005-2016 was approved by the city 
council in September 2005, road projects and central city parking facilities were given 
priority at the expense of cyclists, pedestrians, and public transport (Kristiansand, 2005b). 
These policy principles opposite of the ATP goals, were proposed by the right wing 
Progressive Party and supported by the Conservative Party and the Christian Democratic 
Party as part of a political horse trade (cf. interviews with key actors in the decision 
making process). Reactions against the council’s decision were strong among central 
participants in ATP process (Fevennen, 2005a).
The debate on the status and momentum of the ATP project continued. Late autumn 
2005, the process in the ATP forum of preparing a new application for a grant from the 
Ministry of Transport and Communication began. The Progressive Party argued that the 
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ATP process was developing in the opposite direction of the newly decided municipal 
plan, and invited the forum to support a proposal stating that,
[w]ith reference to the newly approved municipality plan for Kristiansand, some of the 
suggestions that clearly deviate from this must be adjusted or removed.(Kristiansand, 2005c).  
No one in the forum supported the proposal. 15 February 2006 the executive committee 
of the Kristiansand council approved the application and once again turned down the 
suggestion from the Progressive Party to adjust initiatives in light of the newly approved 
Municipality Plan (Kristiansand, 2006b). One could argue that the decision made in the 
municipal council in September did not have the severe consequences for the ATP 
project that could have been expected.
The ATP project also seems to have had some effects of the attitudes of business 
interests. In the beginning of the project period, these interests feared that the quest for a 
more environmentally sound transport system would result in a city where cars were no 
longer welcome (Tvedt, 2005). On several occasions, business representatives reacted 
strongly against the plans to prioritise bus traffic at the expense of automobiles in the 
city.6 The Kristiansand Chamber of Commerce and the business association, 
Kvadraturen in particular argued against the removal of curbside parking, bus 
prioritisation, and the extensions of pedestrian lanes. 
However, signs of a changing climate could be observed in a seminar 10 November 2005 
arranged by the municipality about bus prioritization in the city centre. The seminar had 
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broad representation from the ATP forum, politicians and administrations, and local 
business. Two researchers were invited to explain how business and environmental 
objectives could co-exist. At the beginning of the meeting a survey was presented that 
showed how more people than expected use public transport when shopping in the city 
and that these people were also willing to walk quite a bit to shop (TNS Gallup, 2005). 
Both the Kristiansand Chamber of Commerce and the Kvadraturen responded positively 
to this new information.  
A few weeks after the ATP seminar on bus prioritisation, the mayor and the leader of the 
city development committee in Kristiansand stated that they want an extended pedestrian 
precinct in the city (Fevennen, 2005b). There have been no significant reactions from the 
business community, possibly indicating that there truly is a different understanding of 
how the business interests think about how city space should be used. The Chamber of 
Commerce has signalled that business interests are now willing to accept both the 
removal of parking spaces and better conditions for public transport including one street 
solely preserved for public transport (NRK, 2005). This is particularly interesting since 
similar suggestions had been offered earlier in relation with the start of the bus-metro, 
without getting any acceptance.
The slow but incremental changes in attitudes on transport and land use issues in the city 
are also reflected in the final version of the application to the MoTC (Kristiansand, 
2006a) where it is stated that the municipality has already undertaken restrictive 
measures. Moreover, it is stated in the application that what remains now is a stronger 
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focus on traffic passability in the city centre with prioritizing buses ahead of cars in 
selected streets. It is argued that the application‘s main focus is on structural and 
restrictive measures, and continued pursuit of initiatives financed earlier through the 
reward grant. It is argued in the application that results of the work are finally becoming 
evident. However, it is also stated that there are many things that are still unfinished, and 
it is important that the reward grant is still pursued at a high level, if the municipality 
should be able to change the traffic development in a more sustainable direction 
(Kristiansand, 2006a). 
There is still one matter of concern and disagreement: the question of a new parking 
house in the city centre. Kvadraturen and the Kristiansand Chamber of Commerce have 
wanted a parking garage centrally placed in the city for a long time. Even with the change 
in opinion about environmental and public transport issues, the desire for a big parking 
garage remains. The Conservative Party has also suggested a big parking garage under 
the city marketplace, but in the executive committee meeting of the local council 
(Kristiansand, 2005a) this idea had been put aside for a time. Instead, the council is 
investigating two other alternatives with less capacity. It is still undecided whether the 
suggestion of a major parking garage will finally be shelved.7
Additionally, there is still car traffic growth. In 2004 growth was particularly high (3.6 
%), due to among other things, the opening of highway road E 18.8 In 2005 the growth in 
car traffic was 1.7 %. The goal in the ATP project is for 2008 that growth in car traffic is 
to remain lower than the population growth (ca 1%) in that same year. In the application, 
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the goal is for the restrictive measures and bus prioritizing to contain traffic growth to 
half of what it was in 2005, and in line with population growth (1%) (Kristiansand 
2006a). In terms of public transport, there was a growth of 8.5 % (in number of 
passengers) from 2003 to 20049, and an increase of 2.9 % (in number of cars) (pr. 
October 2005) from 2004 to 2005.  
5. ATP AS A PROCESS OF INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY-
BUILDING 
As argued in Part two, both discursive and institutional elements are important when 
studying the ATP process as a process of institutional capacity-building. We now proceed 
to our analysis, building upon the three dimensions developed by Healey et al. (2003). 
The first dimension in Healey et al.’s scheme, knowledge resources, is closely related to 
discursive elements of policy-making, in particular the micro dimensions of discourse 
development. The second and third dimensions relate to the institutionalised relationships 
between various participants in the processes of governance. 
5.1 Knowledge resources
The ATP forum could draw on knowledge from more than a decade of work to 
coordinate transport and environmental problems in Kristiansand. The ATP secretariat is 
constantly giving the forum updates about recent bus and car traffic trends. The group as 
a whole has also been on study trips to other cities. Increasingly, information about 
sustainable transport has been given to the local business community as they are drawn 
into the project as discussion partners. Information and new knowledge seem to have 
played a vital role in shaping opinions – also among actors adjacent to the forum’s work. 
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One example is the TNS Gallup survey in November that was met with surprise and 
caused leading persons to talk in more environmental rhetoric than earlier. Another new 
example is that a consultancy company is currently evaluating the passability of public 
transport in the city; the business life is oriented and part of this project.
The frame of reference for the project was provided by the national authorities that had 
given Kristiansand money to stimulate public transportation and delimit car use in the 
cities. Everybody in the forum agreed on the need to prioritise the bus. On a deeper level, 
there was not a shared understanding of how the goals of the project should be reached. 
The parties to the right, most visibly the Progressive Party, have primarily seen this as a 
project where the goal is to secure better passability for transport. The representative 
from the Progressive Party in the forum states that there has been too much talk about the 
environment and too little about road building (Rasmussen, 2005). On the other side, the 
ATP secretariat stresses the environmental consequences and the public transport first. A 
tension between traffic restrictions and the need to prioritise the environment has been 
evident.
The confrontation never really surfaced before the municipal council meeting in 
September 2005 as described. although some members of the ATP forum saw this 
decision as the direct opposite of what the ATP co-operation prioritised – a break with 
the ATP agreement– others in the forum downplay this decision and see it as something 
they had to sacrifice or offer in a political horse trade, and that it would not conflict with 
the goals of the ATP project. Indeed, when the application to the Ministry of Transport 
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and Communication was approved in February 2006, the Municipality did not pay 
attention to the decision in the municipal plan in September 2005: an indication that the 
ATP project still has political momentum. Moreover, actors had a good working climate 
from the start and the potential for learning was present. All interviewed emphasise the 
importance of this forum. In particular, they noted learning to work with each other 
across municipal borders. The mayor from the municipality of Søgne, states that, 
The understanding in the forum is that we need to see the region as a whole. Even though our 
problems and needs are different from Kristiansand, we have understood that many of the 
problems origin fro the city. Thus we need to fix the problem in the city first (Løite, 2005).   
Processes of reframing are also taking place within the business sector. The business 
community has increasingly begun to realise that there are solutions that are good for 
both shopping and the environment. The changing relations within the business 
community can be seen as a discursive reframing in terms of how to view the bus in the 
city. Whereas the bus was seen as an enemy set up as a competitor to the car, it is now 
seen as an asset in the city centre. Through new information and surveys on bus-use 
among consumers and shop owners, a new understanding taken place among the business 
representatives in the city. 
5.2 Relational resources 
The ATP forum had broad political and administrative representation; a representative 
from the National Road Associations was also members of the forum. In addition to these 
regular members representatives from public transport have also occasionally met in the 
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forum. Most importantly, all the mayors from the different municipalities around 
Kristiansand sat in the forum. The most important politicians from the different parties in 
Kristiansand were represented, except in the case of the Progressive Party, where a lesser 
profiled person took part. The network morphology were primarily inter-municipal and 
inter-county. There was also an important link to the national authorities through the 
reward grant from the MoTC. The atmosphere in the forum was good from the beginning. 
The forum was grounded on positive experiences with cooperation in this field between 
the municipalities, in particular around the bus-metro. 
In the beginning of the project period the forum had little or no contact with the local 
business community. During autumn 2005 however, relationships with business interests 
improved due to the establishment of the ‘City forum’. Although these actors were not 
formally integrated in the forum, this new City forum is an example of how one kind of 
new governance structure (ATP) can create a need for better integration and inclusive 
governance between other actor constellations. Taking into account that the 
communication between business interests and the municipality were almost nonexistent 
prior to the ATP project, this City forum is an example of how new practices can change 
the character of the political game (cf. Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003, p. 5).
The actors in the ATP forum clearly had the power to act, through a formal right to make 
decisions when it came to specific issues as well as in designing policy. At this stage, 
compared to earlier processes aimed at integrating transport and environmental 
objectives, the environmental problems of transport were better understood and 
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sustainable transport was established as a policy focus. The forum also had the financial 
resources to allocate to different projects. It was stated from the beginning that the group 
was a coherent team, and actors supported the work. The initiative was built on positive 
experiences with cooperation between several of the partners (the Buss metro project for 
example) and the project had a common understanding that cooperation was the best way 
to solve future transport challenges in. 
5.3 Mobilisation capacity 
The forum clearly had opportunity structure and mobilization potential. The way the 
project originated and the relationship with the city councils gave it solid backing. The 
reward grant from the MoTC provided actors in the forum with an important argument 
and a key opportunity structure for pursuing policy changes in transport politics. An 
important debate in Kristiansand was how to interpret the intentions and the meanings 
behind this reward grant: What kind of measures would be needed in Kristiansand in 
order to release the reward grant from the MoTC? Although it was cast doubt on the 
necessity of initiating restrictive measures to release state money, the development has 
headed towards increased support for and the introduction of similar new measures. This 
is emphasised in the 2006 application to the MoTC and the hearing proposal for a new 
climate and energy plan for Kristiansand (Kristiansand, 2006c)
The forum had no significant mobilization from below, but was linked to the other 
municipal arenas in the different municipalities and counties. Stakeholders could pull 
strings in the sense that the major politicians all sat in the forum. The question is whether 
the forum had enough critical change agents present. From the beginning the forum 
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seemed to have too strong a focus on consensus, and it was very seldom that the major 
debates about course adjustments were taken in the forum. Making sure that the 
environmental movement and the business community were present in the forum could 
possibly have created a more critical and intense debate – and made the forum not just 
consensual. Still, it seemed that the dialogue with the business community was finally 
evolving. The seminar in November with local businesses, where researchers talked 
about the need to prioritize the bus, really showed that the business community was 
beginning to change their attitude towards this problematic. As one representative from 
the ATP forum said; “We were almost shocked by the positive response from the local 
business”.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In line with Hildén et al (2004) in this paper we have sought to emphasise that transport 
planning and politics is often best described as a social struggle over problem definitions 
and future choices. To understand the transition to a more environmentally sound 
transport system we chose to pay attention to the behavioural aspects and social processes 
in a specific land use and transport project (cf. Himanen et al., 2005, p. 25) through 
studying new relations of governance as they are played out in Kristiansand. We have 
studied how these relations shape the discourses and practices of established transport
policy-making. Building upon Healey et al., (2003 p. 64), we studied, 
[H]ow far, through the flow of these resources and capacities, wider discourses which structure 
policy agendas and routinised practices are being reinforced or changed.  
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We have used Healey et al’s., scheme as an evaluative framework for studying the 
development in Kristiansand. The design has relied on a relational view of institutional 
capacity, emphasising that meaning and action are constructed in social contexts through 
relational dynamics. We focused on three dimensions of capacity building:1) knowledge 
resources 2) relational resources and 3) mobilization capacity (Healey et al., 2003, p. 64).
Although the ATP project only began in early 2004, the ATP forum can already be 
characterised by an evolving new institutional arena in which a new agenda is being set, 
in a situation where the institutional dynamics of the wider governance context are 
themselves in flux (cf. Healey et al., 2003, p. 74). The long history in Kristiansand tells a 
story of a city where environmental and transport political objectives have rarely been 
coordinated. We provide evidence that the ATP project is slowly starting to change this 
situation and in terms of relational resources we would like to emphasise that: the forum 
set up new channels of communication, was answerable to several municipalities, the 
county administration and the national authorities, and focused on the quality of an area 
rather than the delivery of a service. In this way ATP challenges the council’s established 
discourses and practices. The ATP forum became integrated with business interests in the 
City forum. The case can be seen as an example of how one kind of new governance 
structure (ATP) creates a need for better integration and inclusive governance between 
other actor constellations.
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In relation to the mobilization capacity the institutional anchoring at the national level 
with the reward grant from the MoTC as a ‘carrot’ have been instrumental in giving the 
ATP project political momentum. In order to release government money for future plans 
and projects actors saw the need to prioritise restrictive measures. Still the key 
development that made this project move further was the involvement of the business 
community. With the involvement of the Kristiansand Chambers of Commerce and the 
Kvadraturen association, the project came to include key change agents important for 
pulling strings in the city.
Concerning knowledge resources it seems evident that the ATP forum became an 
important arena for the dissemination of new information which has resulted in learning. 
An environmental discourse has structured the work in the forum and is being reproduced 
as the work continues. It seems that the key political actors in Kristiansand agree that 
curbing traffic is a necessity. There are still however possible to identify different local 
discourse coalitions in Kristiansand, where some actors prioritise environmental concerns 
first and some road and traffic passability. The project has not managed to completely 
settle the tensions between those that see the project as a way to get more money to road 
building and those that want to restrict car use in the city centre. Challenges and critical 
comments, most visible from the Progressive Party and the business community in the 
city, have not led the ATP forum to downplay the environmental problems of car-use.  
The core question that must be asked however, is how rooted this discourse on transport 
and the environment is. It seems evident that the debate in Kristiansand has not managed 
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to take into account the global dimensions of transport. Climate change was not a 
reference in the debate and environmental concerns has primarily been discussed in 
relation to local environmental problems. Transport policies often focus on reductions of 
commuter routes and in the city centre, which may lead a reduction in congestion and 
localised air pollution. However, such a policy often has little impact on reducing overall 
levels of traffic or rates of traffic growth (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005, p. 55). Indeed in 
Kristiansand, there was a growth in car traffic in 2004 and in 2005. These numbers 
reveals that the policy changes we have pointed to in this paper are still somewhat short 
of tackling the major challenges in traffic development in Kristiansand.  
We would like to conclude however, that this case is a good example of how actor 
constellations and partnerships can shape new discourses. The project gives clear 
evidence that urban governance relations are changing in Kristiansand from a more 
paternalist and sectorally focused mode of governance to a stronger place-focus and a 
more open and inclusive style. In line with this Mouffe (1996 in Hajer, 2003, p. 99) 
argues that, “policymaking should not just be evaluated according to whether it gets 
implemented or not, but also as a place where differences and conflicts are articulated”. 
The interaction can be seen as a process where actors come to define what is worth 
striving for and what needs to be done.
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